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This innovative book addresses the question of why increasing numbers of people 
are being diagnosed with autism since the 1990s. Providing an engaging account 
of competing and widely debated explanations, it investigates how these have led 
to differing interpretations of the same data. Crucially, the author argues that the 
increased use of autism diagnosis is due to medicalisation across the life course, 
whilst holding open the possibility that the rise may also be partly accounted for 
by modern- day environmental exposures, again, across the life course.
A further focus of the book is not on whether autism itself is valid as a diag-
nostic category, but whether and how it is useful as a diagnostic category, and 
how the utility of the diagnosis has contributed to the rise. This serves to move 
beyond the question of whether diagnoses are ‘real’ or social constructions, and 
instead asks: who do diagnoses serve to benefit, and at what cost do they come?
The book will appeal to clinicians and health professionals, as well as medical 
researchers, who are interested in a review of the data which demonstrates the 
rising use of autism as a diagnosis, and an analysis of the reasons why this has 
occurred. Providing theory through which to interpret the expanding applica-
tion of the diagnosis and the broadening of autism as a concept, it will also be of 
interest to scholars and students of sociology, philosophy, psychiatry, psychology, 
social work, disability studies and childhood studies.
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Autism is being diagnosed more often in both children and adults. The big 
question is why?
This book aims to answer that question by offering an account of the modern- 
day (post- 1990) rise in the use of autism as a diagnosis. My research in this 
topic comes from my work as an epidemiologist and social scientist with a strong 
interest in the activist counter- narrative of neurodiversity.1 My view is partial and 
situated;2 my knowledge spans both the above disciplines but does neither of 
them justice. Therefore, I have chosen to address this question with a focus on 
what I do know about: my research, which has led me to reflect on how the work 
was carried out, who shaped it and why. The book focuses on my research in the 
last ten years, much of which has been carried out in collaboration with various 
colleagues and students; some of the empirical work reported here is new and 
some comes from published studies.
The post- 1990 period has been a time of change and, in high- income coun-
tries, roughly equates to the period sociologists refer to as late modernity;3 a time 
in which identity politics and self- definition have intensified. This has in turn 
shaped medicine, particularly in the field of autism research. I hope this book will 
reflect this and be read not only by academics and clinicians but also by people 
with autism/ autistic people (I will be using these two terms interchangeablyi) as 
well as people in autism- related jobs, educators, health professionals, students 
and parents of people with autism.
The rise in autism diagnoses since the 1990s is a phenomenon of high- income 
countries, particularly those in North America and Europe. We have no reli-
able data to identify trends in autism diagnosis for lower- and middle- income 
countries. According to our cross- sectional review of published papers in autism 
research in 2016,4 we found (but had no space to report) that 85% of autism 
research took place in North America and Europe, and 45% of European research 
happened in the UK (Figure  I.1). Very little research (<1%) originated from 
 i The terms are used interchangeably in this book, as ‘person with autism’ is used in psychiatric 
epidemiological literature, whereas ‘autistic’ is preferred by activists in the autism community. 










either Africa or South America. There is just not enough data from lower- income 
countries to analyse time trends.
In addition, many low- and middle- income countries, including much of Asia 
and most of Africa, still consider autism to be a condition that was almost always 
associated with an intellectual disability. In the UK and USA, autism is increas-
ingly being diagnosed in children with above- average intelligence (Chapter  3 
covers the implications of this). The trend of autism diagnosis in various low- and 
middle- income countries may be very different to that in Europe and North 
America.
Why is autism on the rise?
The trend of increasing diagnosis of autism since 1990 is established in Chapter 1, 
with data from many settings. The reasons for the upsurge in diagnosis are hotly 
debated. Some researchers attribute the rise solely to artefactual, not actual, 
increases and others suspect the rise is both artefactual and real; in other words 
there are more children with autistic- type behaviours around today than there 
were in 1990.
The artefactual account of the increased use of autism diagnosis is partly due 
to the medicalisation of behaviour at the milder end of the spectrum to bring it 
under the banner of ‘diagnosable autism’: changes in methods of identification, 
diagnostic substitution, increased awareness, shifts in understanding, together 
resulting in the broadening use of the label. All these things have prompted 
increased diagnosis, as many excellent historical and sociological texts have 
shown.5– 9 This book concentrates on another mechanism, the increased diagnosis 
Figure I.1  Distribution of autism studies by continent from cross- sectional review. Includes 







and recording of autism in new cohorts of people, babies, infants, children, 
adults, even dead people: divided by stages across the life course.
Many parents, activists, clinicians and researchers believe that there is a real 
rise in autism, as our study, reported in Chapter 7, attests. By ‘real’ I mean that 
a larger percentage of the population has severe autistic symptomsii than in pre-
vious generations. In Part II, I’ll hold open, and attempt to consider some of the 
evidence for, the possibility that the rise may be fuelled or partly accounted for by 
modern social trends, changes in medical practices or environmental exposures. 
In this account, there is an increased risk of autism because some novel environ-
mental, medical (for example, a new drug used in pregnancy) or social trigger 
(such as older parenthood) disturbs neurodevelopment. Risk factors such as 
these might also be associated with more cases of a range of neurodevelopmental 
problems, leading to outcomes such as intellectual disability, attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), language delay or disrupted neurodevelopment 
across the board, so a broad view is adopted.
The general consensus in mainstream autism science, among epidemiologists 
and most autism researchers, is that the rise in the use of a diagnosis of autism 
diagnosis is artefactual.10 In Chapters 2– 6, I will describe how autism diagnosis 
(or pre- diagnosis) has been extended to types of people it was almost never 
applied to before 1990. The rise itself has contributed to increased awareness – 
a form of looping:11 the rise prompts more awareness which in turn fuels the 
rise. Such looping effects are brilliantly described in Ethan Watters’s book Crazy 
Like Us.12 He demonstrates how Western psychiatric categories, such as anorexia, 
depression and post- traumatic stress disorder, have been relentlessly publicised in 
Asia, leading to huge apparent jumps in prevalence in Asian countries. Also, ser-
vices directed at autism and the availability of diagnostic assessment bolster the 
rates of diagnosis. I will give examples of some other forms of looping effects, as 
well as discussing pertinent modern narratives in autism research that have effect-
ively fuelled autism’s rise.
The debate over how to account for the rise – whether it is entirely artefac-
tual, or whether it is both artefactual and real – is a touchstone of this book, 
seeking to move beyond the somewhat tired question of whether diagnoses are 
‘true’ neurodevelopmental differences or social constructions (they are both) to 
ask, in conclusion, who benefits from autism diagnoses? And at what cost? Is 
autism useful as a diagnostic category and if so, for whom, when and under what 
circumstances?
As a diagnosis, autism has many functions: for clinicians, to organise treatment, 
services and predict outcomes; for insurance companies, to process payments; 
for researchers, as a way to organise the field; for activists, as a banner to rally 
beneath; for lawyers, as a way to decide who is responsible for their actions.13 But 
it is also crucial for parents or for autistic adults, in terms of gaining access to ser-
vices, rewriting biography and providing an explanatory frame, giving meaning. 
 ii Symptoms is a word that is also contested in relation to autism but is used in psychiatric epidemio-










More sinister is the benefit for Autism Inc., the chain of professionalisation and 
commercialisation that runs in parallel with the rising use of diagnosis.
Tribes
Autism has inspired a huge amount of ‘tribal’ community, political and social 
activism over many decades,14 as described in Steve Silberman’s book Neurotribes. 
Three ‘tribal’ viewpoints of autism can be broadly and briefly characterised15– 17 as 
occurring in waves (Figure I.2), each in reaction against and resistance to the pre-
vious conceptualisation. Diagnosis positions autism as a disorder but how people 
regard diagnosis reflects the waves of autism research and activism. The bedrock 
of medical and psychiatric understanding slowly erodes as the waves lift and lash 
against it and in turn, the shape of the bedrock alters the waves.
The understanding of clinical, epidemiological and biomedical scientists in 
the autism research community was originally that autism was triggered by cold 
parenting and should be diagnosed using the expertise of psychiatry. Today, 
scientists believe that autism is a neurodevelopmental disorder that encompasses 
a spectrum of differences and should be diagnosed using the shared expertise 
of psychiatry, clinical psychology or paediatrics. The first wave of resistance, 
breaking against the dominance of psychiatry in opposition to parent blame, 
largely prompted by parent activists, was that parents are the real experts. This 
wave of autism activism developed into one that sees autism as a biochemical 
neurological condition that clinicians should diagnose, and treat (and cure if pos-
sible). This ‘pro- cure’ wave peaked in the early 2000s. The ‘tribe’ are mostly 
parents of severely affected children and speak passionately of the importance of 
efforts to develop biomedical treatment for a highly impairing and distressing 
condition that they see as akin to a disease18 and certainly as a disorder. First- wave 
thinkers put forward the notion of an autism ‘epidemic’19 whose origin, as argued 
by fundamentalists in the tribe, was not only biological but environmental, the 
consequence of new exposures.









Autistic activism emerged in resistance to the risk discourse of the first wave, 
which painted autism as a threat to be feared and as a tragedy. This wave of 
thinking is ascendant, and it encompasses a broadly anti- cure stance, led by aut-
istic activists and allies. This wave argued for autism as an identity, an integral 
and important difference that, although challenging and impairing, should not 
be cured and regarded not as a tragedy but as a disability. Accommodations to 
support autistic people to live well should be provided. There are children and 
adults with real neurodevelopmental differences, sometimes profound differences 
that cause distressing impairments. But distress is also caused by discrimination 
which, combined with a lack of adjustment by other members of society, denies 
them full participation in the world. This wave paved the way for the emer-
gence of the neurodiversity movement and self- identification as autistic. A part 
of our group’s work has been to bring together autistic adults influential in the 
movement; the authors of a collection put out by Steven Kapp in 20201 which, 
together with Tom Lister’s PhD research on self- identification and diagnosis,20 
revealed many engaged adults who firmly consider autism as identity rather than 
disorder, promoting diagnosis but in a less pathologising frame.
In this context, it is clear why the idea of the real increase, an environmental 
risk factor that precipitates autism or has a role in increase of autism or autism 
traits, is understandably problematic for some neurodiversity theorists. The envir-
onmental trigger theories of diet, heavy metals and pollution drove the hard-
core faction in the first wave, who seemed, to autistic self- advocates, to be intent 
on eliminating people like them. According to Kapp, himself an autistic activist, 
arguments against environmental toxins as a risk factor for autism help to ‘direct 
parents away from cottage industries based on rejected and unproven theories 
that offer dangerous “treatments” like heavy metal- injecting chelation therapy, 
chemical castration (Lupron therapy) bleach enemas and vaccine avoidance 
(amid other expensive or at least ill- conceived “interventions”)’.1 Many in the 
neurodiversity wave reject causal models that implicate environmental exposures 
not only because they are sceptical of the evidence but also because arguments 
for rights hinge on neurological differences (meaning neurological structural 
differences with a genetic origin) that are present from, or even before, birth. 
One can make an argument for rights based on differences acquired via exposure 
(wheelchair users need and deserve ramps in the present, regardless of whether 
they were fully mobile at some point in their lives) but nevertheless, many 
advocates reject the idea that autism is a result of an injury.
In different ways, the actions of both the neurodiversity advocates and the pro- 
cure tribe seem to adopt, shore up and dismantle a more medicalised model.21 
Each wave has spawned its own competing language and associated narratives. 
I hope to draw attention to the use of language in medical and resistance discourse 
and its influence in constraining the possibilities for thought and action, even 
though at times I will be using the aforementioned language myself, adopting the 
conventions of some source texts. The over- arching point is that each ‘tribe’ has 
a distinct standpoint on how autism is conceptualised and advocates for autistic 






faction claims authority over knowledge of autism. Each wave of thinking has 
swelled in resistance to what went before, growing through people who care, yet 
feel silenced and marginalised. Perhaps a new wave is even now brewing.
In high- income countries, the post- 1990, late- modern period is associated 
with a rise in self- characterisation,3 as opposed to the earlier, traditional modern, 
period when ordered systems prevailed and people were told what they were. 
Perhaps this explains the misunderstandings over the third- wave autism- as- 
an- identity and the traditional view of autism- as- disorder. Proponents of the 
neurodiversity movement, especially autistic activists, have reclaimed autism for 
their own since 1990 but autism- as- disorder is still traditionally operationalised 
by psychiatrists, clinicians and researchers.22 All parties have epistemic authority 
but know things in different ways. The tribe of those considered expert has grown 
to include parents, autistic adults and many types of professionals, all of whom 
contribute their own ways of defining autism. The result is to multiply the ways 
in which autism is understood and recognised.
The bio- politics of autism illustrate how the same data can be interpreted in 
very different ways by different groups to advance their agendas. The politics of 
autism are bio- politics, not in a Foucauldian sense, but because different groups 
(hybrids of clinicians, self- advocates, parents and researchers) have mobilised 
around the diagnostic category. They influence how information is disseminated, 
by whom and why. The ‘tribal’ stories mesh, or sometimes contrast, with the 
consensus and narratives of science. A multi- level view of autism, together with 
a personal reflection that underscores my point, will be found in the conclusion. 
This will help to answer the guiding question: why is autism on the rise?
What is autism?
I was once lucky enough to attend a lecture given by the legendary Sir Michael 
Rutter, often called the father of modern child psychiatry. A member of the audi-
ence asked him, ‘what is ADHD?’
This was the wrong question, he replied. ADHD is a diagnostic category like 
any other; a way of putting a boundary round a collection of signs and symptoms 
(its ‘symptoms’ being mostly behaviours). ADHD, he explained, is a useful psy-
chiatric construction but it does not exist separately from the definition that we 
give it. It does not carve nature at the joints but is a pragmatic response, designed 
to help children with distressing difficulties. Its boundaries are in a state of slow 
flux, as our understanding of the behavioural traits that comprise the condition 
evolve in step with research, expertise and society’s demands. This was a striking 
statement from a leading autism researcher.
Like ADHD, autism can be thought of as a multi- dimensional collection of 
psychological traits that interact with each other and the environment; traits that 
may alter with development. These traits are identified from behaviours that 
recur in multiple settings and at multiple times. They are bound together not 
only for medical diagnostic reasons but also for historical, pragmatic and pol-






autism but interacts with social and environmental factors at every level and how 
in clinical practice autism is identified by pervasive behaviours rather than bio-
logical tests. In common with all diseases and disorders, autism is both a real 
neurodevelopmental difference and socially framed.
The social construction of autism’s boundaries, vis- à- vis its neurological 
actuality, can be illustrated using Covid- 19. Like autism, Covid- 19, as a disease 
entity, can be considered an object around which a boundary is placed (although 
it is unclear whether this qualifies it as a ‘boundary object’, as described by 
Leigh Star23). In the UK, a person’s primary cause of death is categorised by 
the Office for National Statistics (ONS). The ONS attributes deaths to a dis-
crete cause, usually a disease, such as cancer, dementia or cardiovascular/ heart 
disease. Or Covid- 19. The record therefore reports a decision about what that 
one person died from. Covid- 19, or any other disease, is a distinct cause which, 
from the ONS statisticians’ point of view, must be distinguished so that statis-
tical analyses can be carried out. The reality, in many cases, is that a Covid- 19 
infection affects functioning across multiple biological systems, especially the 
respiratory system, leaving a person susceptible to underlying health issues. It is 
plausible some deaths resulted from a tipping over due to unrecognised infection 
by Covid- 19, even if the person were asymptomatic and the infection therefore 
unidentified; the infection may have undermined the person’s defences against 
their pre- existing conditions, which predisposed their exacerbation. Inversely, 
underlying conditions may make a person more vulnerable to Covid- 19. Elderly 
people with pre- existing health conditions are the most at risk from Covid- 19 
infection: pre- existing frailty means vulnerability. People’s biological and psycho-
logical resilience may also be undermined by the response to Covid- 19: the lock-
down, social isolation, lack of access to services, and so on. Distinguishing one 
‘cause’ of death is a pragmatic construction, whereas the interaction of biological 
and social systems being tipped over by infection is closer to reality.




I think autism may be a ‘boundary’ object, in that there is a reality of 
neurodevelopmental difference. But like Covid- 19, and like most diseases, a con-
tinuum is converted to a category, while the boundaries of ‘what counts’ are 
permeable and policed, certainly by medical professions but increasingly, since 
the mobilisation of parents, also by charities, autism organisations and autistic 
adult self- advocates. There is the ‘interpretative flexibility’ of a boundary object.24 
There are underlying neurodevelopmental differences, of course, but there is no 
‘real’ or ‘not real’ autism, no correct or incorrect diagnosis, no misdiagnosis, no 
under- or over- diagnosis, because diagnosis depends on where the boundaries 
are set, and by whom. There is autism, but how it is identified, described and 
classified is a human endeavour and determines what autism looks like. Autism is 
what we say it is. If we define it as a multi- dimensional set of behavioural traits at 
a certain severity, that is what it is. There is no autism to be discovered ‘out there’. 
But that does not mean it is not an enormously important and useful construct 
that describes, and helps meet, impairing and challenging difficulties.
In his response to the question about ADHD, Rutter acknowledged that the 
group of people who are diagnosed with a condition might change as a slightly 
different (or expanded) collection of symptoms is identified. When does a 
collection of symptoms become a diagnosis? Robert Aronowitz25 draws an ana-
logy with the question of when does a dialect become a language? His answer is 
the well- known quip that a language is a dialect with an army. There are many 
discourses about the signifiers of autism and varying theories of the underlying 
biological, psychological and social mechanisms that lead to its development. 
Providing a comprehensive definition of autism is problematic. Autism inevitably 
means slightly different things to different tribes; to parents, clinicians, research 
groups and activists. None of the tribes are homogeneous; there are many parents 
in the neurodiversity movement, for example, and within each there are different 
takes. The army of activists of autism, the tribes, has strongly influenced the def-
inition of autism. The Autistic Self Advocacy Network (ASAN), for example, 
lobbied and advised the workgroup producing the fifth edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM- 5) and can point to tangible 
changes in the DSM criteria that their arguments solidified. An account of their 
actions is included in Kapp’s Exploring Diagnosis collection.1
Probably the easiest way to answer the question ‘what is autism?’ is to refer to 
widely used, standardised manuals such as the DSM, which at the time of writing 
is in its fifth edition (DSM- 5),26 most commonly used by clinicians in the USA, 
and increasingly in the UK, and the International Classification of Diseases, cur-
rently in its 11th iteration (ICD- 11),27 more commonly used in Europe. For the 
purposes of definition, let us consider autism to be what the DSM- 5 says it is 
(Figure I.4).
The DSM positions autism as a characteristic of a person’s development, yet 
acknowledges that social context affects how well a person with autism copes, 
and hopefully thrives. Both ICD- 11 and DSM- 5 list two core symptoms of 
autism:  persistent deficits in social interaction and social communication and 














enhanced or diminished sensory perception. If a person shows these behaviours in 
different settings, a clinician would be able to give a diagnosis of autism. Because 
the behavioural traits show regardless of setting, they can better be attributed to 
atypical brain development than to social context.
The onset of autism typically occurs in early childhood but the ICD- 11 notes 
that autism may not become obvious until later, which suggests the underlying 
way of functioning psychologically may already be present but that expression 
is less obvious because of the particular demands placed on children’s roles at 
different ages. Of course, things may also develop differently given the exposures 
the child has as they grow up, which clearly affect these patterns of functioning. 
The point the criteria make is that autism can exist undetected in very young 
children. Both sets of diagnostic criteria describe behavioural traits as symptoms 
and look at the impact of said symptoms. According to the DSM- 5, autism might 
‘limit or impair everyday functioning’. This emphasises the impact autism has 
on a person’s ability to live a fulfilled and functioning life and paints autism as a 
condition that is primarily a set of psychological or behavioural traits, or an aspect 
of a person’s character. Autism affects both other people and the person’s ability 
to thrive.
Various psychological theories to explain autism have been put forward,28 
all of which have their supporters and detractors; no model seems comprehen-
sive.29 The merits of the various theories, many of which seem plausible, are not 
my focus. Autism might stem from sensory- processing differences,30 including 
enhanced perceptual functioning,31 weak central coherence,32 lack of theory of 
mind,33 an extreme male brain,34 defects in the mirror neuron system35 or the 
impairment of executive function,36, 37 to name but a few. In a slow state of flux, 
its theories and diagnostic tools are somewhat circular or tautological. We study 
autism and derive a new psychological theory or diagnostic test. If this is how we 
then understand or measure autism, the new test or theory starts to shape the 
object that we subsequently understand autism to be. And this regulates who is 
in the category for study: a loop.
The presentations and abilities of people with autism are notoriously diverse.38 
Maija Nadesan goes so far as to suggest people diagnosed with autism today 
are united merely by being people who do not fit their social environment.8 
Those who qualify include people with severe intellectual disability and people 
with PhDs, those living independently and those in residential care, those with 
hyper- sensitivity and those with hypo- sensitivity, those who are remote and those 
who are over- attached, those who lack emotional response and those with anger 
problems, those who lack interest in others and those with apparently good 
(through feigned) social skills that allow them to ‘blend in’. People diagnosed 
with autism might be completely non- verbal, be highly articulate or use idio-
syncratic language; they might have repetitive motor movements, have special 
focused interests, lack imaginative play or the use of gestures or show great talent 
in acting, humour and the arts. Or any combination. Because of its heterogeneity, 
several attempts have been made to differentiate different forms by sub- typing.39 











predispositions and perhaps separate cognitive profiles.40 Responses to treatment 
also vary, which has led to calls for treatment and intervention studies to investi-
gate outcomes for sub- types.41– 43
Since the mid- 1990s, the notion of a ‘spectrum’ has been central to autism 
research. The range and nature of the broader spectrum were brilliantly illustrated 
by Colin Steer and his colleagues,44 who analysed more than 90 traits linked to 
autism in more than 13,000 children, both autistic and non- autistic. We adapted 
the idea in a later study based partly on the same dataset.45 The results of our 
study, illustrated in Figure I.5, show autistic traits in a population- based sample 
of all children, regardless of whether they had a diagnosis. The y- axis represents 
the number of children in the study and the x- axis gives a score for each child 
on autistic- type traits. The results show autistic traits are reasonably normally 
distributed throughout the whole child population. Our measures also showed 
a ‘tail’ of more severe autism traits; unsurprisingly, many in this ‘tail’ received an 
autism diagnosis.
The spectrum that crosses the diagnosis boundary is known as the broad 
autism phenotype.46 As Figure I.5 shows, almost all people have some measure of 
autism traits; some people have almost none, most people very few and some have 
many. It is only those with very severe traits who are diagnosed. A fairly arbitrary, 
culturally determined cut- off (Figure I.5) is used to separate people who have 
diagnosable autism from those who have less severe autistic traits. People with 
diagnosable autism near this boundary may not have a radically different profile 
from those beyond. It is a good jumping- off point for reviewing the evidence to 
show that autism- as- diagnosed is on the rise and address the reasons why.
As well as delineating who is eligible for diagnosis, the defining criteria have a 
huge impact on how people identify themselves, how others think of them, how 










they act and even perhaps how underlying neurological differences are expressed. 
Diagnoses describe biological differences but, once assigned, are used to interpret 
patients’ differences and frame the differences within the diagnostic explanation 
or narrative. This book considers both how diagnostic classifications can trans-
form the defined populations and, in turn, how these new populations can trans-
form our understanding of the categories.
This book has taken more than a year to write and draws on ten years of 
research, particularly my work in epidemiology and qualitative research 
from my PhD studies, as well as later work from a study of time trends in 
neurodevelopmental diagnoses, funded by the Economic and Social Sciences 
Research Council (UK). The bulk of the work described here comes from quali-
tative research studies that were conducted as part of a Wellcome Trust- funded 
Investigator Award, Exploring Diagnosis. Broadly, the epidemiological work has 
been about autism diagnosis at a population level and the qualitative work about 
the meaning people make of diagnosis.
During these ten years, I have learned that understanding autism comes as 
much from the politics and processes of research as from the data that emerge 
from that research. This has allowed me to reflect on how our institutional 
practices – the way science is done – shape our work and consequently the stories 
that are told. Interacting with autistic adults and activists has equally shaped my 
work and I hope to describe how. As the book was finished during the 2020 cor-
onavirus pandemic, I will be using the example of Covid- 19 to punctuate a few 
of my points.
Does the world really need another social science book about autism? I hope to 
add something new by grounding the story in empirical studies and statistics, 
together with quotes and illustrated by graphics, an approach I hope will appeal 
to clinicians and visual thinkers like me. By looking at the identification of autism 
and ‘risk of autism’ through different stages of human life, I will consider the pos-
sibility that environmental changes and other modern- day phenomena have led to 
increased levels of autism and, I hope, move beyond the somewhat weary polar-
isation of autism as either neurodevelopmental difference or social construction.
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1  Establishing the trend
The rising use of the autism diagnosis
My academic research has involved analysing data, both quantitative (numbers) 
and qualitative (texts or conversations). In epidemiological studies, I  have 
examined the numbers of children with autism diagnoses and their change over 
time.1,2 Many other researchers have covered similar ground, measuring autism in 
different ways, sometimes using a research diagnosis, sometimes clinical reports 
or parental reports of diagnosis.3– 8 The graphs in this chapter show some of the 
published data on autism time trends in Europe and the USA. To establish the 
trends, I have used multiple datasets from many sources. Rather than reading as 
monotonous, I hope this will harness the power of repetition.
Prevalence is the number of people in a population who have a condition, rela-
tive to the total population, typically shown as a percentage. Each data point in 
Figure 1.1–1.5 represent the estimated percentage of children who had autism 
at that time. Figure 1.1 shows the time trend in prevalence estimates from the 
1970s into the 2000s; the earlier data (up to 2011) originate from an article in 
Nature (‘The prevalence puzzle’9) and the later data from the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) in the USA.10
The earliest estimates hark back to the first epidemiological studies of autism 
that were carried out in the UK by Victor Lotter and his team in 196611 and 
in the USA by Darold Treffert, published four years later.12 Lotter estimated 
about one in 2,500 children had autism and the first study by Treffert estimated 
that fewer than one child in every 10,000 had autism. At that time, autism was 
considered an extremely rare condition and was almost always associated with 
intellectual disability.
Figure 1.1 gives an overall, and quite compelling, impression of an exponential 
increase in the use of the label of autism. But it is debatable how directly com-
parable the early data in Figure 1.1 are with the later data, as studies use different 
methods to establish exactly who has autism, as well as having a wide geographic 
spread.
To get over some the limitations of Figure 1.1’s geographical and methodo-
logical disjointedness, it is worth looking at other datasets. The data in Figure 1.2, 














16 Establishing the trend
American centre has repeatedly used the same methods to measure how many 
children (from an enormous sample of more than 300,000) have autism.10 The 
data, of children of eight years old, are recorded in 11 sites around the USA, a 
process repeated every few years. In this huge study, researchers obtain children’s 
evaluation records from data sources in the community. Experienced clinicians 
review these records to determine whether the behaviours described are con-
sistent with the diagnostic criteria for autism. Children with a documented autism 
diagnosis are also included in their case definition. The period it covers, 2000– 
2012, therefore uses comparable methodology and sampling methods to create 
the time trend and so gets round some of the problems of compatibility. Because 
methods of case ascertainment remained more or less stable, the numbers through 
time are more directly equivalent. Figure 1.2 illustrates how the estimated preva-
lence of autism has risen year on year. In 2014, there was a 15% increase from two 
years before (2012), when 1.7% of children reportedly had autism, and a 150% 
increase since 2000. The last estimate, reported in 2014, included in Figure 1.2, 
is that by the age of eight 1.68% of children have autism, which translates to one 
in every 59 children. The linear time trend provides the best fit, according to 
some post hoc work done by our PhD student, Rhianna White.
Another dataset, plotted in Figure 1.3, is taken from the US National Health 
Interview Survey (NHIS). These results were published in 2018 in a letter in the 
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) and estimated the preva-
lence of autism in 2016 at 2.7%.13 Unlike the CDC study, this is a nationally 
representative sample, meaning one in every 37 American children is reported 
to have identified autism in 2016. The estimates from the NHIS are obtained in 
telephone interviews with parents of children and adolescents. The latest sample 
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comprised around 30,000 parents of children between the ages of three and 
17. They were asked:  ‘has a doctor or health professional ever told you that 
[your child] has autism, Asperger’s disorder, pervasive developmental disorder 
or autism spectrum disorder?’ These are all conditions on the autism spectrum – 
forms of autism as we know it today.
The NHIS data also have their limitations. Arguably, the question’s phrasing 
has led to an over- estimate of the number of children identified as having a diag-
nosis of autism. Parents could interpret ‘health professional’ to mean a number of 
Figure 1.2  Twenty- first- century time trend from prevalence estimates.
Figure 1.3  National Health Interview Survey data.
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professionals, for example a school psychologist who may have mentioned autism 
as a possibility, without it being confirmed. Nevertheless, using the same question 
in consecutive years, the estimates show a consistent, although not statistically 
significant, rise. The overlapping confidence intervals shown in Figure 1.3, indi-
cating non- significance, are not surprising, given the short, two- year, timeframe 
under study. Despite this, the work was framed in the press as evidence that 
autism was stable, a somewhat dubious interpretation; from the observed data, it 
would more accurately be described as a non- significant rise.
This draws our attention to language and interpretation. In an article reporting 
the reducing chances of autism for children receiving the measles, mumps and 
rubella (MMR) vaccine, such an effect is described as ‘a non- significant decrease’.14 
There is no link between MMR and autism; this is well established. The point 
is rather that how the data are interpreted and language used to describe effects 
seems to be shaped by the body politic: whether the interpretation fits the accept-
able scientific narrative. This is a theme I will return to.
A fourth set of data (Figures 1.4 and 1.5) harks from a global systematic review 
of autism prevalence published in 2012 by Mayada Elsabbagh and colleagues. 
They drew on more than 25 epidemiological studies that estimated autism 
prevalence in different locations around the world,15 using a variety of methods 
to identify autism cases. The authors published prevalence estimates from 11 
European countries as well as US estimates (Figure 1.4 shows their European and 
Figure 1.5 their US data). The European data from this systematic review show 
steadily rising estimates from the 1960s to 2010. The US data cover the trend 
over 40 years and again show a steady increase. Exponential increases are signifi-
cant in both the European and American datasets but the shallow best- fit line for 
the European data suggests the trend was less marked than in the USA during 
the early 2000s, and in both there was wide variation by region. The authors 
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conclude that their review provides clear evidence of increasing estimates over 
time in both continents. The exponential trend is significant in both datasets but 
not as good a fit to the data as other figures seen here.
These data suffer from the same limitations as the data in Figure 1.1, in that 
data points on the graphs use different methods of case ascertainment and each 
is from a different place. In Europe, in particular, there is wide variation in geog-
raphy, culture and the methods used to ascertain autism. On the other hand, 
these data are valuable because they draw on many studies which were sampled in 
a systematic, and therefore replicable, way.
This brief review provides pretty compelling evidence for the rise of autism inter-
nationally, although the data are somewhat dated, as there is a time lag between 
gathering and publication. I am writing from the UK, so what of the UK situation?
We examined the increase in incidence of autism diagnosis as recorded by family 
doctors, known as general practitioners (GPs) in England.1 GPs report on their 
patients using diagnostic codes, providing an enormous population- based sample 
of more than nine million people. We examined incidence – in other words, new 
recordings – of cases of autism (Figure 1.6 shows the best fit line of the index 
number: that is, starting at 100% in 1998, which was the baseline year, and plotting 
the increase in percentage relative to 100% at each year. So 120% represents 20% 
increase in recorded cases). Again, we found the exponential trend was the best 
fit to describe the time trend over a 20- year period – an exponential trend in new 
cases, not a cumulative prevalence estimate which would have shown an even 
steeper trend. Year on year there have been more new cases of autism recorded 
than in the previous year, over the 20- year timeframe. Granted, the GP dataset is 





20 Establishing the trend
not ideal for studying autism, as autism diagnoses are mostly made in secondary 
care diagnostic assessment services, which accept school, public health nursing and 
sometimes self- or parent- referrals, as well as referrals by GPs. This means diagnoses 
may not always be sent back to GPs from secondary care. Additionally, some GPs 
are better at recording than others and their diligence may have increased with 
time. The figure shows the rate of growth in cases recorded not absolute prevalence 
of autism increasing.  Nevertheless, an overall increase in incidence of diagnosis of 
autism is consistent with other reports and datasets in the USA and Europe.
In 2013, we published data from the UK Millennium Cohort Study (MCS) 
which covers more than 19,000 British children.16 Our estimates from these data 
suggested that at seven or eight years old, 1.7% of children had been identified 
with autism. Like the NHIS studies, this was based on parents’ reports of diag-
nosis. In our MCS study and the GP dataset we were concerned not with the 
absolute prevalence of autism, but of autism diagnosis as our object of study; on 
rates of recognition of autism, rather than on the number of children with high 
levels of behavioural traits characteristic of autism with or without recognition. 
The MCS is a longitudinal study, tracking children through time, with some drop- 
out of participants as time passes (known by epidemiologists as attrition), which 
sometimes skews results. Having said that, the survey provides data weightings 
designed to estimate findings that are generalisable to the UK (that is, represen-
tative of the national picture).
In 2018, we re- estimated the percentage of children in the UK with autism 
using MCS data from when they were 14, an update from eight years old. The 
new number gave us pause for thought. We found a prevalence of 3.07% (95% 
confidence interval (CI) 2.64– 3.57) – higher than we had ever seen reported. If 
we simply reported what the data told us, we were concerned our estimate might 
be misinterpreted, as it seemed exceptionally high – too large an increase from 
eight years old. By misinterpreted I mean that people might read that autism rates 
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had jumped, rather than that recognition (and possibly parental reporting) of 
autism had jumped. Although the increase might partly be due to more children 
being diagnosed after eight and before 14 years old, the increase was too marked 
to explain away completely and we decided not to publish our report. In a sense, 
we self- censored our findings; an example of one small mechanism of shaping 
what comes to be published. I will delve into the context of why we made this 
choice later.
Looking for an absolute prevalence is perhaps misguided. As discussed in the 
introduction, autistic traits are a normally distributed set of multi- dimensional 
traits in the broad population;17 who qualifies as having autism is shaped by where 
an arbitrary cut- off for severity is imposed. There is no ‘true’ prevalence; the 
severity of autism that qualifies as ‘having autism’ has clearly changed over time. 
No magic number can tell us how many people have autism; it all depends where 
the inclusion criteria, the boundaries, are drawn. Instead, prevalence estimates tell 
us about how we conceive autism, at how good we are at identifying it in a given 
place and a given era.
The flawed NHIS question means neither NHIS nor the MCS employs the 
best methods for estimating the prevalence of autism. Each source of data can 
be criticised; each has its strengths and limitations. In particular, there is often 
a trade- off in epidemiology between collecting data from huge samples on a 
national scale and those studies with smaller, more focused samples in which 
the methods of case ascertainment can be addressed more thoroughly. Smaller 
samples often have the capacity to use more comprehensive measures of autism, 
the so- called gold- standard approach, in which clinical raters confirm a diagnosis. 
But such methods may not be nationally representative, so estimates may not be 
generalisable to the population of a whole nation, for example.
Epidemiology is quite a contested science and prevalence estimates are 
generated in quite different ways. Global systematic reviews of prevalence 
often depend on the underlying assumption that there is an identifiable fixed 
psychiatric construct with a primarily biological/ genetic aetiology; a univer-
sality. Conditions should, in theory, be stable in their prevalence everywhere. 
Therefore, global prevalence studies of autism (and attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD), and other medical diagnoses) have emphasised interpretations 
that show a steadiness of rates across borders, another mechanism of shaping 
understandings of categories as universal. Variations in rates globally (which are 
wide) are dismissed as likely to be artefacts of measurement.
Ironically, estimates that try to establish the prevalence of condition X are 
themselves used to reify conditions as having a fixed prevalence. One example 
is the estimate of global prevalence of ADHD; that around 5% of children have 
ADHD.18 Because this figure was widely published and disseminated, it has 
become a baseline against which to assess under- or over- diagnosis. For example, 
UK ADHD prevalence estimates are lower, hovering around 3%.19 This lower 
rate than the global estimate is attributed in the psychiatric literature to use of 
more stringent International Classification of Diseases (ICD) criteria in the UK. 
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the global estimate shows that ADHD is under- diagnosed in the UK. This makes 
little sense: if you set a boundary of severity of ADHD at 5%, it means the 5% 
of the population that is most hyperactive and inattentive qualifies for diagnosis. 
If the boundary were 2%, the top 2% would have ADHD and if set at 10%, 
then 10%, and so on.20 Although neurological differences are real, the borders of 
neurodevelopmental categories are artefactual. There is no one ‘correct’ situation 
or practice.
The focus of this book is not the absolute prevalence of autism in any given 
population but rather the time trend; why autism, as diagnosed in the clinic, by 
researchers, or by other people, is on the rise. Taken together, the figures and data 
illustrate with confidence that the time trend in autism diagnosis and identifica-
tion is upward. All the datasets give a similar picture, despite their various limits, 
fluctuations and problems, so we can say with some certainty that more children 
are being classified with autism. Taken overall, all the sources of evidence seem 
to point to one conclusion: there is a consistent rise in the use and application of 
the label and category of autism over time. Autism diagnosis has been on the rise.
Different interpretations
My question is why more children are identified with autism today than before. 
To recap, most epidemiologists, clinicians and researchers have argued the rise is 
solely an artefact of changing diagnostic practice, the expanding boundaries of 
the diagnostic category of autism and other cultural changes.21, 22 They contend 
that the observed change is not due to more people having autism; we simply 
apply the label more frequently. In this view, an autism diagnosis is a categor-
ical class, whose boundaries are constructed by human agency and shifts in its 
construction are solely responsible for the observed rise. Nobody denies artefac-
tual changes have led to a massive increase in the use of the diagnosis but other 
groups, mostly parent activists and some notable clinicians, have argued the rise 
may also be attributable to an actual increase in the proportion of children who 
display traits characteristic of autism. For this group, the rise is likely to be par-
tially real; there really are more children with autism today than ever before.
On both sides of the argument the more extreme proponents hold entrenched 
positions. Some parent advocates vociferously declare there is an autism ‘epi-
demic’ and produce evidence they cite as a fact. In authoritative tones, respected 
scientists declare autism rates are stable and produce evidence to attest this. Many 
researchers in the autism field fall between these two camps; they admit that both 
arguments are plausible, that the trend is clearly artefactual but there is possibly 
also a ‘true’ component. The debate as to whether autism is really on the rise 
remains unresolved, as acknowledged by the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM- 5):
It remains unclear whether higher rates reflect an expansion of the diag-
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differences in study methodology or a true increase in the frequency of autism 
spectrum disorder.23
In their global review, Elsabbagh and colleagues15 conclude that, while it is clear 
that prevalence estimates have increased over time, the findings most probably 
represent a broadening of the diagnostic concept, a diagnostic switching from 
other developmental disabilities to autism, service availability and awareness of 
autism in both the lay and professional public; that is, artefactual shifts. This 
is pretty typical of the constructivist interpretation of most epidemiologists and 
academic researchers: the rise in autism can be attributed to changes in the way 
autism is measured, the broadening of the category and improved identification 
as clinicians become more knowledgeable about autism and parents are more 
forthcoming about their children’s differences and difficulties. Artefactual shifts 
such as these highlight the constructed nature not perhaps of the category of 
neurodevelopmental difference but of the human agency in deciding where the 
boundaries of the category lie and how they are defined and measured.
No one can seriously doubt that artefactual shifts have accounted for a huge 
rise in cases. What is striking in the conclusions of the aforementioned authors15 
is that, although they declare their findings show the marked rise and explain it 
in terms of the three points made above, they make no mention of the obvious 
fourth possible explanation: that there really are more children with autism today 
than previously. Put another way, there is a higher proportion of children and 
adults displaying traits characteristic of autism (and consequently also a higher 
proportion with identified autism) in more recent generations than can be 
accounted for by artefactual shifts alone. This would mean there has been a true 
increase in prevalence of autism world- wide.
Biopolitics of autism
The reason for silence, and why we were nervous to publish our MCS finding, 
may be because the suggestion of any real increase is so inflammatory. Most prob-
ably, if there is truly a rise in autism cases it is attributable to a new environmental 
or social risk factor.
One ‘tribe’ was at the centre of what has been described as the biggest scandal 
in public health in the last three decades.24 The story of how autism was linked 
to the MMR vaccine by the notorious (and now retracted) scientific paper by 
Andrew Wakefield and colleagues, and how this paper subsequently became a 
rallying call for anti- vaccine parent activists, sends shivers down the spines of 
public health experts. Writing in the British Medical Journal, David Oliver24 
claims every scientific paper that could be cast as being in support of the anti- 
vaccine cause (whatever its quality) and every commentator sympathetic to the 
anti- vaccine cause (expert or not) is selectively harvested and cited by anti- vaccine 
activists.
Despite many studies showing there is no link between autism and vaccines,25 
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review,27 there are still many anti- vaccine activists and many parents loath to vac-
cinate their children. In 2018, the UK rates of vaccination against MMR in under- 
10s fell for the sixth consecutive year. Between 2010 and 2017 an estimated half 
a million children missed their MMR vaccination. 24 Public health bodies have 
issued dire warnings about the rise of measles due to an ‘epidemic’ of unvaccin-
ated children.
Anti- vaccine activists are a committed bunch of people, who have been hugely 
successful in disrupting the roll- out of vaccines. In the USA, active groups 
of parents, known as the ‘Mercury Moms’, have focused on concern about 
the mercury- based preservative thimerosal which, although it has now been 
eliminated from routine childhood vaccines, is present in many vaccines in the 
USA. Parent vaccine activists mobilised around autism have been vociferous in 
arguing their position in both Europe and the USA, as evidenced by the on- going 
newsletter The Age of Autism, which calls itself the ‘Daily Web Newspaper of the 
Autism Epidemic’. The lack of uptake of vaccines has prompted an outbreak of 
measles in the UK and was termed ‘a public health timebomb’ by the head of 
National Health England, who also called for a ban on social media sites of anti- 
vaccination propaganda, such as anti- vax endorsement from celebrities such as 
Jim Carrey and Robert de Niro.28
In this loaded bio- political climate, it is not surprising there is nervousness in 
the scientific establishment about how reports of increasing rates of autism will 
be received. The political environment also plays a role in both the muted inter-
pretation of results and the decision not to publish studies. The US NHIS report 
in JAMA (the time trend shown in Figure 1.3) is a good example. The report 
was covered by multiple media platforms, including CBS News, Fox News, Time 
and Scientific American. To me, the data in Figure 1.3 look like a small snapshot 
of the larger trend: that year on year there is a rise in the use of autism as a diag-
nostic label. However, in media coverage, it was reported as evidence to show 
that autism was stable. ‘US autism rates appear to be stabilising’ declared CBS, 
whilst Scientific American led with ‘The prevalence of autism in the US appears 
to be steady’.
When I  asked a senior professor involved in the US NHIS study why 
the trend had been reported as stable, she expressed the authors’ concern that the 
study would backfire; in other words (the wrong) people might misinterpret the 
results. The ‘wrong people’  – meaning anti- vax activists – might use the study 
as further ammunition to support claims that there is a real rise in the levels 
and preponderance of autism, one triggered by an environmental risk. Anti- vax 
activists, on the other hand, would argue the ‘acceptable’ autism narratives are 
those the scientific establishment are telling and what is heard is determined by 
power relations, that is, they have to be active and take extreme measures to get 
their voices heard, compared to the scientific establishment. Similarly, despite 
simply reporting the data in front of us, we were worried about publishing the 
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Omitting to mention of the chance of a ‘real’ rise in the systematic review, 
countless media articles arguing the rates of autism are stable, the hesitancy to pub-
lish on UK increases – these are mechanisms that shape the story of suppression 
and selective interpretation. Perhaps not a conscious suppression but one born of 
the current climate set by anti- vaccine activism and the declarations of national 
public health institutions. When reading papers, it is important to remind our-
selves from which discipline the conclusions originate and against what context 
the position is taken and the conclusion is drawn.
Looking across all the material, including some of our own (more on this later), 
it seems suggesting that the rise of autism could in any sense be ‘real’ is strongly 
discouraged by establishment science, perhaps for understandable reasons. The 
global systematic review’s caution in naming a real rise as a possibility and the 
JAMA paper’s press coverage that autism rates are stable suggest skewing and 
shaping of what can and can’t be published. Is the institutional pressure to only 
publish the ‘correct’ medical narrative around autism diagnosis helpful?
The more established narrative is that:
 1. There is no objective rise in the prevalence of autism.
 2. It only seems that there is because:
 (a) changing diagnostic thresholds and other artefactual issues inflate fig-
ures, thereby creating a misperception of increased prevalence; neverthe-
less, reduced thresholds remain socially and culturally desirable because 
people who have a recognised disability can get better support.
 (b) scholarly studies claiming that there is a real increase are methodologic-
ally flawed.
 (c) non- scholarly anecdotal reports for causes of a real rise are misperceptions 
(the sub- text is they are made by unhinged people without tangible 
expertise).
My argument is that there needs to be methodological rigour; this is a disciplinary 
given. Despite this, the data in this chapter, taken together, demonstrate signifi-
cant shifts over time that are, at the very least, thought provoking. Completely 
denying the possibility that autism really is more prevalent is difficult to justify. 
The rise in autism is a case in which selective interpretation of data, selective pub-
lication and the political context in which scientific institutions sit have shaped 
scientific discourse.
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2  Babies and infants
Age of identification
‘The earlier intervention can begin, the better the outcome.’1
Data from both the USA (e.g. California2) and Europe (e.g. Denmark3), show 
that the average and median ages at which childhood autism diagnoses are made 
are steadily dropping. However, there are some subtleties in the pattern; for 
example, our analysis4 suggested that in England the average age of diagnosis for 
the youngest children (0– 2 years) went up marginally between 1998 and 2018, 
perhaps because of increased demand for diagnoses and long waiting times.
Claims for identification of pre- symptomatic predictors of autism are now 
being made for very young babies.5, 6 Using brain imaging, one group has noted 
autism- specific ‘features’ in six- month- old babies,7 while another, which received 
world- wide media attention, used eye- tracking technology to identify subtle 
differences in the way affected babies responded to visual prompts:8 ‘Autism can 
be identified in babies as young as two months, early research suggests’.9 Studies 
such as these, and others, are used to define infants ‘at risk’ of autism. To be ‘at 
risk’ is to be in danger of falling outside the statistical norm – a state requiring 
expert advice, intervention, parental regulation and surveillance.
The narrative of earlier- is- better (EIB) transcends autism to pervade child 
psychiatry, education and infant development and beyond:  dementia, dia-
betes and hypertension spring to mind as examples of ways in which medicine 
has extended its jurisdiction.10 Identifying potential early signs and signals of 
autism makes earlier diagnosis, detection and intervention possible. However, 
although the evidence base is regularly reviewed, the evidence that earlier inter-
vention results in more successful outcomes for the child is poor.11, 12 A recent 
UK review of evidence on screening infants for autism, conducted in 2011, 
concluded:
• Diagnoses of very young children may not be stable.
• Current screening tools are insufficiently sensitive and may not be accepted 
by a significant proportion of parents.
• The outcomes of interventions are variable.















The collection of studies known as ‘baby- sibs’ research gives ‘at- risk’ status to 
new- born and unborn children who have siblings with autism.14 At- risk status 
is given because autism is heritable and geneticised.15– 18 Sharing a genomic pro-
file with autistic siblings, that is, being a sibling of someone with autism, there-
fore puts you at risk of autism. Estimates of the extent of familial heritability 
over 40 years ago were that around 90% of variance in autistic traits is attribut-
able to inherited factors,19 whereas today around 50% of variance is attributed to 
inherited factors.20
These two types of identification of the youngest children (an autism diag-
nosis in babyhood and the ‘at- risk’ status given to babies and unborn chil-
dren) are related but distinct processes. Earlier autism diagnosis has consistently 
been associated with more severe autism and more severe impairment.21– 26 In 
childhood studies, the factors associated with an earlier diagnosis include greater 
language delay, need for a greater degree of support, more cognitive and intel-
lectual disability, greater parental concern, an autism (as opposed to Asperger’s) 
diagnosis and the severity of autistic beahviours.21– 26 The picture is one in which 
more severe autism is more obvious, therefore is picked up earlier in a child’s life. 
Put simply, babies with more extreme neurodevelopmental difference are, and 
were before 1990, easier to spot.
A raft of EIB studies tells the story of how the earlier a child can be recognised, 
the more effective early intervention is, and so it must be brought into place.27– 30  
The longer diagnosis is delayed, the greater the chances of missing a critical 
developmental period.22 Once this window is missed, brain plasticity is lost and 
interventions may be ineffective.
At- risk babies (such as baby siblings, through their shared inheritance of a 
genetic predisposition) may be anywhere in the broad autism phenotype, which 
includes sub- clinical (milder) levels of autistic traits.31 Baby- sibs studies look for 
early indicators of autism but necessarily include children who go on to develop 
milder, and in some cases, few or zero, autistic traits. Many but not all, baby- sibs 
studies follow up on later autism diagnosis.
Precursor signs of autism in infants, which have been deduced from baby- 
sibs and retrospective studies, can be loosely divided into behavioural signs, 
genetic predisposition and neurological differences. Behaviours include types 
of movements or lack of motor skills, imitation impairments, lack of physical 
exploration of objects in the environment with less object manipulation32 and 
lack of joint attention. Many studies identify abnormal movement as a pre-
cursor, including gross motor, fine motor and postural control28, 33– 36 and babies’ 
head lag.37
The larger catchment of ‘at risk’ of, as opposed to diagnosed with, autism 
presumably results in some studies widening the net of potential early signs of 
autism gleaned from siblings’ behaviours and abilities. An aspect that is not often 
dwelled on is that a researcher denoting a baby sibling as ‘at risk’ surely makes 
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see their baby as being in a proto- autism group. This, one would assume, will 
increase the likelihood of referral to a clinic and, once in the clinic, the interpret-
ation of behaviour as autism. At the same time, by defining new signs of precursor 
autism using behaviours in the ‘at- risk’ group, all ‘at- risk’ babies’ behaviours start 
to be understood as signalling autism. It seems circular: what counts as a specific 
‘signifier’ of autism, most often motor difficulties, becomes connected to identi-
fication of autism in the group from whom the ‘signifier’ was determined.
Earlier diagnosis and risk
As well as identifying early indicators, autism studies have early diagnosis of 
autism as a core objective.38 EIB is most commonly operationalised in interven-
tion research. The assumption is that there is a fixed disorder that is present from 
birth, can be correctly identified soon after birth and which intervention will 
ameliorate. Advocacy, funding and charity organisations also strongly promote 
earlier diagnosis; for example, Autistica’s report, One in a Hundred, emphasises 
the importance of diagnosis at the youngest possible age.39 This report is typ-
ical of policy guidelines in higher- income countries but the rhetoric of early 
diagnosis is also visible in narratives aimed at broader publics. In the USA, five 
million coffee cups were released by Starbucks in a campaign aimed at raising 
the profile of autism, put together by the founder of the charity Autism Speaks 
(Figure 2.1).
In an inspired analysis, Anne McGuire argued the Coffee Cup casts the non- 
normatively developing child as non- valuable and perhaps even non- viable in a 
market- driven economy (of Starbucks).40 Certainly, this widely distributed dec-
laration contributed to the cultural recognition of autism as a threat, something 
to be dreaded and something to be identified (by parents’ surveillance) as early 
as possible so that it can be fixed. And the younger the better. It also invokes a 
moral obligation for parents to monitor their children, if they wish to qualify as 
good parents.
The Coffee Cup uses non- gender- specific language. Despite this, it is inter-
pretable as an exhortation to good mothering. The word ‘parent’ is gender- blind 
and obliterates oppressive imbalances in the roles and experience of mothers by 








using the gender- neutral language of ‘parenting’.41 In autism discourse, ‘parent’ 
is often a synonym for ‘mother’, because the vast majority of primary carers of 
autistic children are mothers. Studies of parental attitudes, parent- rated behaviour 
scales and parent- mediated interventions often overwhelmingly rely on mothers 
to participate. Good mothering tacitly means offering as much therapy as possible 
to the child, at the expense of any other career; Gil Eyal and colleagues42 refers to 
this as the ‘vocation’ of autism parenting.
The threat of autism, this framing of risk, prompts anxiety which demands 
action. EIB targets the family, in partnership with medical institutions, as the 
site of early detection and intervention. Intervention may involve one- to- one 
teaching or up to 40 hours of speech, occupational and Applied Behavioural 
Analysis (ABA) therapies a week.42 One US survey suggested parents use as many 
as 111 different therapies;43 the mean number used at any one time was seven. The 
more severe the autism, the more types of treatments parents experimented with. 
In her work on attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), Singh situates 
mothers’ actions in the context of the multiple pressures they feel from so many 
sources, such as the Coffee Cup campaign.44 A patriarchal culture that allows 
mothers to be culpable of their children’s behaviour, responsible for monitoring 
the progress of the child and for ‘doing something’ if autism is detected, is a 
driver for the adoption of highly suspect therapies. The neurodiversity movement 
(Chapter 4) encourages better choices by situating autism as non- problematic – a 
condition that cannot, and perhaps should not, be ‘fixed’.
The moral obligation for mothers to treat, monitor and report to clinicians 
is not new;45 through a sociological lens, it is a form of surveillance medicine.46, 
47 Surveillance medicine, the screening, monitoring and establishment of early 
risk factors, involves monitoring across a whole population, including healthy 
people.46 Sociologists such as Ulrich Beck have pointed to a ‘politics of anxiety’ in 
the risk society.48 David Armstrong writes about how infants were the first popu-
lation to be scrutinised and surveyed for potential risks to normal childhood, such 
as being of a height and weight that fall outside statistical norms.46
Concepts of surveillance draw on Michel Foucault’s work, particularly his 
book Discipline and Punish,49 in which he describes how people are monitored, 
understood and regulated via institutions, which for babies include nurseries, 
research institutes, health visits and baby clinics. Foucault describes how people 
are first trained and observed in institutional settings to produce knowledge 
about disciplinary norms (for example, the observation of babies in maternity 
hospitals that produces knowledge about paediatrics, or the knowledge produc-
tion of baby- sibs studies) and subsequently populations become monitored and 
subject to regulatory controls. Screening and surveillance therefore promote 
framing and recognition of differences as problems that were formerly not part of 
a medical remit. Hence, for good or ill, surveillance fosters medicalisation. The 
community is encouraged to monitor others in the community, providing nor-
mative standards of behaviour. This community policing and neighbourly surveil-
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Foucault wrote about the historical steps from a past model of external 
monitoring and top- down surveillance by powerful actors in the establishment, 
such as monarchs and lawyers, to community surveillance that provides a net- like 
power structure in which everyone is responsible for upholding normal behav-
iour, to the inculcation of internalised self- surveillance, the internalisation of 
bio- power, so that one comes to ‘subjectivise’ oneself and discipline one’s own 
body.49 Mothers’ internalisation of vigilance and responsibility for the monitoring 
of their child seem to be an example of a relational form of bio- power.
In the case of the Coffee Cup, an exhortation for parents to perform sur-
veillance of their child invokes anxiety, with autism described like a threatening 
disease. The Coffee Cup therefore promotes both pathologisation and vigilance 
and invokes autism as an object in itself, distant and removed from the individual 
person, meaning a person may become alienated from it.50 For Foucault, a condi-
tion such as autism is objectified or ‘spatialised’ by its description as an entity that 
exists independently of the person (in texts and on coffee cups, etc.). Diagnosis 
locates autism in a second space, the brain, but autism also requires a third space, 
the social realm, because it is rendered in interaction. According to Foucault, 
‘truth’ is produced through these levels of spatialisation, exercised by the profes-
sional gaze.51 Once objectified, autism (or any condition) is subject to discipline, 
and through its control, subjection leads to the subjectification of people who are 
diagnosed. Although young children may not be able to resist this, adults can – a 
topic I will return to in Chapter 4. But Foucault was a master of the rhetorical 
device; others see power dynamics very differently, with less sinister overtones.
A similar rhetorical device to that of the Coffee Cup (risk, threat, requiring 
action) appears in most medical funding applications that try to identify early signs 
of autism. Research into either biomarkers or behavioural markers in infancy usu-
ally starts with a statement about autism’s terrible impact on personal outcomes, 
families and the economy. Autism is often positioned as an object that is thor-
oughly bad news, the threat of which provokes anxiety and should be eliminated 
as early as possible.
Selective interpretation of data justifies the use of language to back up the 
EIB story, such as Green and colleagues’ study of intervention for at- risk babies 
in which parents delivered the intervention.52 Results were described as ‘encour-
aging’ despite there being no significant improvement in the primary outcome 
(attentiveness to parent); indeed, a few babies had a worse outcome. The abstract 
describes first how ‘point estimates suggest the intervention increased the primary 
outcome of infant attentiveness’, although qualifies this as ‘including possibilities 
ranging from a small negative treatment effect to a strongly positive treatment 
effect’ (actually it had a non- significant effect). The positioning and wording of 
reporting, in this and other literature, bolster the EIB narrative by accentuating 
the positive and diminishing the negative of EIB. Green and colleagues correctly 
reported the possibility of a negative outcome but the results were nevertheless 
framed as ‘exciting’ in the promise of intervention research.
Another example is a research paper, published in the journal Autism, 







diagnosis.26 The discussion describes how children are at risk of late diagnosis 
(after five years old): ‘our understanding of “red flags” for missed diagnosis, that 
is early characteristics for children at risk of receiving a late diagnosis’ (my italics). 
The phrase ‘red flags’ indicates autism is something that should raise an alarm and 
being ‘at risk’ of receiving a late diagnosis is troubling.
The Coffee Cup, and other forms of the EIB narrative, exhorts parents (specif-
ically mothers) to perform surveillance and early childhood monitoring, to report 
proto- autism behaviours and, if possible, to intervene early. This surely leads to 
more early referrals and ultimately more diagnoses, contributing, perhaps in a 
small way, to autism’s rise.
Caveats to EIB
There is a lack of evidence that diagnosis is stable at younger ages.13 At very 
young ages, it is difficult to distinguish an autistic from an allistic (non- autistic) 
child, to distinguish a toddler who is not speaking because they may continue to 
display traits of autism later in life from a toddler who is a slow developer and will 
catch up. Some children grow out of autistic traits: 30% of children who are given 
a diagnosis at two years old no longer meet the criteria for an autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD) diagnosis at four.53
There is more uncertainty about future trajectories when screening procedures 
for autism begin before the child is two.54 Our work followed the trajectories of 
two groups of children from two years old to 12; both groups were measured 
with comparably severe autistic- type traits at age two. The children in one group 
received an autism diagnosis, while those in the other did not.55, 56 At adolescence, 
the children without an autism diagnosis were better on a range of outcomes. In 
other words, some pre- school- age children who have autistic traits can improve 
to sub- clinical levels without having ever been diagnosed or treated. In these 
cases, ‘wait and see’ may indeed be the best strategy.
To me, our work underlined that the human child is born in an immature 
state and learns adaptive behaviours as they grow. Many behaviours characteristic 
of developmental disorders are noticeable in all younger children: hand flapping, 
hyperactivity, inattention and motor difficulties are all common in toddlerhood. 
Resolving, at a very early stage, who has a lifelong impairment (and what impair-
ment) and who will catch up is extremely difficult. In medical parlance, the spe-
cificity of these early signs in predicting autism may be very low, with many false 
positives. In a prospective Danish cohort of more than 75,000 children, in infancy 
the signs that distinguished autism from intellectual disability were unclear and at 
18 months old, the positive predictive values (the probability that subjects with 
a positive test truly have autism) were below 10% for both individual predictors 
and aggregated risk scores.57
In addition, as children grow up the extent of autistic behaviours tends to 
diminish.58 The age effect is illustrated by the seasonal influence on ADHD diag-
nosis. Summer- born children are more likely to be diagnosed with ADHD; a sys-
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who are young for their school year (which starts in the autumn in the UK),59 
not because they have more ADHD but simply because, relative to their peers, 
younger children display more behavioural characteristics of ADHD. Taking a 
developmental perspective therefore throws up challenges to the current recom-
mendation for the reduction of age of diagnosis of autism to very young children.
Another counter to EIB is that diagnosis is not a neutral process of identifica-
tion but shapes how others react to the baby. Given a specific childhood diagnosis, 
the people around the child (parents, teachers and clinicians), tend to interpret the 
child’s behaviour in the diagnostic frame.60 This may lead to an expectancy bias, in 
the classroom for example, that negatively affects outcomes.61– 63 Thus, very early 
labelling is problematic even if you consider a young baby either categorically has 
autism or does not, which is debatable. If the diagnosis is a false positive, those 
around the child might look at them through an autism lens; could this not nega-
tively affect their trajectory?
Advocates of early diagnosis, on the other hand, see early identification as 
a crucial step to enable access to support and accommodations that benefit all 
children; diagnosis opens the gateways to intervention.64 Autism can certainly 
act as an explanatory frame for differences in a child’s biological and psycho-
logical make- up, which can radically improve the functioning of the family. As we 
have seen, autism researchers have emphasised the critical importance of inter-
vening early in autistic children’s lives to give them the best chance of meaningful 
communication.
A final caveat is that, despite the overwhelming call for early intervention, sys-
tematic reviews suggest research into early interventions is of poor quality and the 
effectiveness of early intervention is not proven for children with autism.12 The 
rhetoric around early identification is widespread, and therefore should be under-
pinned by a rigorous evidence base. In fact, randomised controlled trials (RCTs) 
on early interventions are rare. One systematic review uncovered a replicated 
finding that many children who receive early intensive intervention, across meth-
odologies, do not demonstrate dramatic gains in social, cognitive, adaptive and 
educational functioning or autism- specific behaviours.12 A more recent review on 
the effects of ABA concluded there is weak or very weak evidence that ABA is a 
useful behavioural treatment for some children with autism and none that it alters 
core autism symptoms.65
The best that can be concluded is that some interventions improve some areas 
of functioning and sometimes improve cognition, in some young autistic chil-
dren, some of the time. What is not often acknowledged is that early interventions 
for autism have high costs both for the children and in terms of parents’ financial 
and time commitment. Programmes involving more than 40 hours of intensive 
therapy a week may be exhausting for parents (disproportionately mothers) and 
children alike.42 The extra parenting work (usually mothering work) is implicitly 
expected to be done at home, even though a better outcome is not guaranteed. 
Nor is it currently possible for a clinician to confidently recommend a particular 
treatment for a particular child. There seems to be a disjunction between the 










I would term the rhetoric of early intervention and surveillance that designates 
good mothering.
Biomarkers
‘At- risk’ status can also be assigned from the evidence of biomarkers: objective, 
biological, measurable differences. For some conditions, biomarkers are physical 
attributes such as weight or heart rate; for autism, the biomarkers are usually 
neurological or genetic differences.
Some researchers use indices of risk or algorithms that calculate from a com-
bination of biomarkers. For example, for ADHD, a genetic risk profile combines 
a number of genetic markers into an overall at- risk- of- ADHD score, a poly-
genic risk score.66 In this way, researchers increase the predictive power of their 
models and, based on a risk index, can calculate a person’s estimated probability 
of developing a condition. Considering an at- risk group in this way often gives 
access to larger and younger populations than would be possible if only confirmed 
cases were considered.
Perhaps the ultimate in baby surveillance is an electronic romper suit that 
monitors all aspects of the wearer’s behaviour for ‘warning’ signs. In 2015, 
I interviewed a technology expert with many years’ experience of designing com-
puter algorithms to detect mouse movements in the laboratory. He described 
his company’s on- going project to design romper suits to be used in the home 
to recognise the autism behavioural phenotype and help detect autism.67 This 
‘smart’ baby suit has sensors woven into the fabric that monitor the baby’s heart 
rate, respiration, mobility and movement against normal parameters and auto-
matically and securely transmit the data to the researchers’ lab. The design was 
commissioned by at- risk- of- autism researchers but perhaps will be rolled out to 
the general population. Late development and missed milestones will ring ‘alarm 
bells’, raise ‘red flags’ and provide the required ‘early warnings’.
For many years, there has been a push to detect biomarkers of autism because, 
as some argue, a biomarker is considered to be a more objective measure, and 
potentially a better mechanism of identification, than behavioural clinical 
assessments68 which are subjective and dependent on the settings in which they 
are recorded. Plausible biomarkers for autism are measures such as brain cir-
cumference, genetic profile or a particular pattern of activity in the brain during 
a certain task, normally revealed by magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), but 
studies have identified many others.69 Some scientists have advocated the fusing 
of behavioural definitions with biological, particularly neurological, indicators, 
for all psychiatric classes.70 Perhaps, neither is ‘better’; just different. Publicising, 
operationalising or adjusting either definitions or indicators will both influence 
our understanding of the autism category and alter who is in it. Autism is partly 
a product of how it is measured and identified.
In medical discourse, ethical arguments regarding ‘at- risk’ status are often 
founded on the notion of false positives. Statements about diagnosis and at- risk 
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language, being named at- risk- of- autism may not accurately reflect your status 
(you may be a false positive), leading to misdiagnosis and raising questions about 
the validity of the at- risk category. These terms confer notions of ‘truth’, ‘fact’ 
and an ‘objectivity’ to be striven for. Again, these words assume there is a true 
fixed autism to be measured against and that conferring at- risk status does not in 
itself shape how we understand and define autism, how often we refer for autism 
and how deeming babies at risk could alter their developmental trajectory.
To take an example, let’s say a neuro- marker is discovered, for example 
differences in white- matter tracts,69 that forms a biomarker to identify autism. 
The at- risk group of babies thus identified will be a slightly different bunch to the 
babies identified as at risk by their behaviours, such as head lag. In this hypothet-
ical example, publicising the neuro- work leads to understandings of autism as a 
neural condition (the white- matter tract difference). Atypical white- matter tract 
at- risk babies are more likely to be referred and diagnosed. Thus, the net effect 
of finding biomarkers contributes to what being ‘at risk’ of autism looks like, and 
who qualifies as having autism may be very slightly reshaped.
Although biomarker results are frequently described as ‘promising’, they are 
not often replicated or applicable to the whole spectrum. However, the search 
for genetic markers for autism has revealed some very useful markers of rare 
syndromes, for example Williams syndrome. The genetics of autism are complex, 
with different genetic sub- profiles that involve multi- faceted interactions with the 
environment.71– 73 Because what is diagnosable as autism is a slowly moving target, 
the search for a fixed set of biomarkers against which to compare is like having 
moving goalposts; it may be better to search for sub- groups across the spectrum. 
The latest iteration of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM- 5) has dropped the distinction between Asperger’s disorder and autistic 
disorder but acknowledges differences within the autism spectrum, which is now 
stratified by the severity both of social communication impairment and restricted 
and repetitive patterns of behaviour, and with and without co- occurring intellec-
tual disability. In DSM- 5 the autism spectrum is also codified by known genetic 
conditions, biomarkers, although only a small percentage of cases have known 
genetic markers.
Despite the move towards sub- grouping, there is still investment in discovering 
the genetics of autism across the whole spectrum. Some research groups aspire to 
create a genetic test for autism that could be administered before birth, and some 
commercial laboratories offer parents a non- invasive pre- natal test they claim can 
screen for mutations in a range of genes, including some related to autism.74 This 
claim has provoked an outraged reaction from the autistic community. In 2005, 
the autistic activist Meg Evans created the Autistic Genocide Clock as part of her 
Star Trek fanfiction website, Ventura33. Evans became mobilised after joining 
the autistic forum, Aspergia, and later the chatroom Aspies for Freedom, founded 
by Amy and Gareth Nelson, who also published a declaration that autistic people 
should be recognised as a minority group.75 The Autism Genocide Clock was a 
ten- year countdown in the image of a clock; it responded to and resisted a pro-






within ten years. Evans’s point was that a pre- natal genetic test for autism could 
lead to abortions of foetuses that test positive for autism – in her view, a form of 
genocide. Writing in a collection of stories about autistic activists released as part 
of our Exploring Diagnosis project,76 she described her timer clock as a reaction 
to autism discourse that, as she puts it, says ‘the world should not have autistic 
people in it’. Evans took the clock down in 2011.
Certainly, the work towards pre- natal testing positions autism as a suitable 
rationale for abortion. Presumably such a test would be accompanied by genetic 
counselling for parents who chose to take it, to support them to decide whether 
to abort a baby with autism. Having been through such a scenario myself (when 
I  was pregnant, my daughter screened positive for being at risk of Edwards’s 
syndrome; it turned out to be a false positive), I know both how stressful this 
process can be for parents, and how powerful and potentially life changing the 
medical concepts can be in practice.
Evans’s argument parallels those made by members of the disability rights 
movement, that pre- natal genetic tests are a form of eugenics, leading towards 
the elimination of people like them, and that allowing abortion on the grounds of 
disability is discriminatory.77 Others argue quality of life is important to consider. 
Edward’s syndrome leaves babies with heart, respiratory, kidney and gastrointes-
tinal conditions, with 87%  dying before one year old. The Autistic Genocide 
Clock illustrated the tension between a newer progressive, affirmative model of 
autism-as-identity and an older model of severe autism with co-morbidity and 
complications in a medical frame. Evans’s strong language has parallels with his-
toric resistance to the elimination of other minority groups.78
The twin processes of pushing back age of diagnosis into infancy and defining 
infants as ‘at-risk’ may have both contributed to the rise in autism observed in 
Chapter 1, if in a minor way. Earlier diagnosis contributes directly as a younger 
cohort is eligible for diagnosis. ‘At -risk’ status may contribute indirectly through 
widening ‘what counts’ as autism.  Yet a more seismic shift in diagnostic practice 
occurred at the life stage covered in the next chapter: childhood.
References
 1. Woods, J. J. & Wetherby, A. M. Early Identification of and Intervention for Infants 
and Toddlers Who Are at Risk for Autism Spectrum Disorder. Lang. Speech Hear. Serv. 
Sch. 34, 180– 193 (2003).
 2. King, M. D., Fountain, C., Dakhlallah, D. & Bearman, P. S. Estimated Autism Risk 
and Older Reproductive Age. Am. J. Public Health 99, 1673– 1679 (2009).
 3. Parner, E. T., Schendel, D. E. & Thorsen, P. Autism Prevalence Trends Over Time in 
Denmark: Changes in Prevalence and Age at Diagnosis. Arch. Pediatr. Adolesc. Med. 
162, 1150– 1156 (2008).
 4. Russell, G. et al. Time Trends in Autism Diagnosis Over 20 Years: A UK Population- 
based Cohort Study.
 5. Ibañez, L. V., Grantz, C. J. & Messinger, D. S. The Development of Referential 
Communication and Autism Symptomatology in High- Risk Infants. Infancy Off. 










Babies and infants 41
 6. Teitelbaum, P., Teitelbaum, O., Nye, J., Fryman, J. & Maurer, R. G. Movement 
Analysis in Infancy may be Useful for Early Diagnosis of Autism. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. 
U. S. A. 95, 13982– 13987 (1998).
 7. Shen, M. D. & Piven, J. Brain and Behavior Development in Autism from Birth 
Through Infancy. Dialogues Clin. Neurosci. 19, 325– 333 (2017).
 8. Jones, W. & Klin, A. Attention to Eyes is Present but in Decline in 2– 6- Month- Old 
Infants Later Diagnosed with Autism. Nature 504, 427– 431 (2013).
 9. Briggs, H. Autism Detectable ‘in First Months’. BBC News 11 August (2013).
 10. van Dijk, W., Faber, M. J., Tanke, M. A.  C., Jeurissen, P. P.  T. & Westert, G. P. 
Medicalisation and Overdiagnosis:  What Society Does to Medicine. Int. J.  Health 
Policy Manag. 5, 619– 622 (2016).
 11. Clark, M. L. E., Vinen, Z., Barbaro, J. & Dissanayake, C. School Age Outcomes of 
Children Diagnosed Early and Later with Autism Spectrum Disorder. J. Autism Dev. 
Disord. 48, 92– 102 (2018).
 12. Warren, Z. et  al. A Systematic Review of Early Intensive Intervention for Autism 
Spectrum Disorders. Pediatrics 127, e1303– e1311 (2011).
 13. Allaby, D. M. & Sharma, D. M. Screening for Autism Spectrum Disorders in Children 
Below the Age of 5 years. A Draft Report for the UK National Screening Committee. 
Solutions for Public Health. (2011).
 14. Chen, I. Understanding Autism: Baby Steps. Spectrum | Autism Research News. www.
spectrumnews.org/ features/ deep- dive/ what- baby- siblings- can- teach- us- about- 
autism/ (2017).
 15. Bumiller, K. The Geneticization of Autism: From New Reproductive Technologies 
to the Conception of Genetic Normalcy. Signs J.  Women Cult. Soc. 34, 875– 899  
(2009).
 16. Giovanni, M. A. et al. Health- care Referrals from Direct- to- consumer Genetic Testing. 
Genet. Test. Mol. Biomark. 14, 817– 819 (2010).
 17. Hedgecoe, A. Schizophrenia and the Narrative of Enlightened Geneticization. Soc. 
Stud. Sci. 31, 875– 911 (2001).
 18. Latimer, J. The Gene, the Clinic, and the Family: Diagnosing Dysmorphology, Reviving 
Medical Dominance (Routledge, 2013).
 19. Folstein, S. & Rutter, M. Infantile Autism: A Genetic Study of 21 Twin Pairs. J. Child 
Psychol. Psychiatry 18, 297– 321 (1977).
 20. Sandin, S. et al. The Familial Risk of Autism. JAMA 311, 1770– 1777 (2014).
 21. Brett, D., Warnell, F., McConachie, H. & Parr, J. R. Factors Affecting Age at ASD 
Diagnosis in UK: No Evidence that Diagnosis Age has Decreased Between 2004 and 
2014. J. Autism Dev. Disord. 46, 1974– 1984 (2016).
 22. Daniels, A. M. & Mandell, D. S. Explaining Differences in Age at Autism Spectrum 
Disorder Diagnosis:  A Critical Review. Autism Int. J.  Res. Pract. 18, 583– 597  
(2014).
 23. Shattuck, P. T. et  al. Timing of Identification Among Children with an Autism 
Spectrum Disorder:  Findings from a Population- based Surveillance Study. J. Am. 
Acad. Child Adolesc. Psychiatry 48, 474– 483 (2009).
 24. Sheldrick, R. C., Maye, M. P. & Carter, A. S. Age at First Identification of Autism 
Spectrum Disorder:  An Analysis of Two US Surveys. J. Am. Acad. Child Adolesc. 
Psychiatry 56, 313– 320 (2017).
 25. Zwaigenbaum, L. et al. Developmental Functioning and Symptom Severity Influence 
Age of Diagnosis in Canadian Preschool Children with Autism. Paediatr. Child Health 






















 26. Hosozawa, M. et  al. Determinants of an Autism Spectrum Disorder Diagnosis in 
Childhood and Adolescence:  Evidence from the UK Millennium Cohort Study. 
Autism Int. J. Res. Pract. 24, 1557– 1565 (2020) doi:10.1177/ 1362361320913671.
 27. Sivberg, B. Parents’ Detection of Early Signs in their Children Having an Autistic 
Spectrum Disorder. J. Pediatr. Nurs. 18, 433– 439 (2003).
 28. Gliga, T., Jones, E. J. H., Bedford, R., Charman, T. & Johnson, M. H. From Early 
Markers to Neuro- developmental Mechanisms of Autism. Dev. Rev. 34, 189– 207 
(2014).
 29. Landa, R. J. Diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorders in the first 3 Years of Life. Nat. 
Clin. Pract. Neurol. 4, 138– 147 (2008).
 30. Baranek, G. T. Autism During Infancy: A Retrospective Video Analysis of Sensory- 
motor and Social Behaviors at 9– 12 Months of Age. J. Autism Dev. Disord. 29, 213– 
224 (1999).
 31. Le Couteur, A. et al. A Broader Phenotype of Autism: The Clinical Spectrum in Twins. 
J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 37, 785– 801 (1996).
 32. Mulligan, S. & White, B. P. Sensory and Motor Behaviors of Infant Siblings of 
Children with and Without Autism. Am. J. Occup. Ther. Off. Publ. Am. Occup. Ther. 
Assoc. 66, 556– 566 (2012).
 33. Gallagher, S. & Varga, S. Conceptual Issues in Autism Spectrum Disorders. Curr. 
Opin. Psychiatry 28, 127– 132 (2015).
 34. LeBarton, E. S. & Iverson, J. M. Fine Motor Skill Predicts Expressive Language in 
Infant Siblings of Children with Autism. Dev. Sci. 16, 815– 827 (2013).
 35. Sacrey, L.- A. R., Bennett, J. A. & Zwaigenbaum, L. Early Infant Development and 
Intervention for Autism Spectrum Disorder. J. Child Neurol. 30, 1921– 1929 (2015).
 36. Leonard, H. C., Elsabbagh, M., Hill, E. L. & Basis Team. Early and Persistent Motor 
Delay in Infants at- risk of Developing Autism Spectrum Disorder:  A Prospective 
Study. Eur. J. Dev. Psychol. 11, 18– 35 (2014).
 37. Nickel, L. R., Thatcher, A. R., Keller, F., Wozniak, R. H. & Iverson, J. M. Posture 
Development in Infants at Heightened vs. Low Risk for Autism Spectrum Disorders. 
Infancy Off. J. Int. Soc. Infant Stud. 18, 639– 661 (2013).
 38. Watson, L. R. et al. The First Year Inventory: Retrospective Parent Responses to a 
Questionnaire Designed to Identify One- year- olds at Risk for Autism. J. Autism Dev. 
Disord. 37, 49– 61 (2007).
 39. Wallace, S., Parr, J. & Herd, A. One in a Hundred. www.autistica.org.uk/ wp- content/ 
uploads/ 2014/ 10/ One- in- a- Hundred- Autisticas- Report.pdf (2012).
 40. McGuire, A. E. Buying Time: The S/ pace of Advocacy and the Cultural Production 
of Autism. Can. J. Disabil. Stud. 2, 98– 125 (2013).
 41. Traustadottir, R. Mothers Who Care. J. Fam. Issues 12, 211– 228 (1991).
 42. Eyal, G., Hart, B., Onculer, E., Neta, O. & Rossi, N. The Autism Matrix (Polity, 
2010).
 43. Green, V. A. et al. Internet Survey of Treatments Used by Parents of Children with 
Autism. Res. Dev. Disabil. 27, 70– 84 (2006).
 44. Singh, I. Doing Their Jobs: Mothering with Ritalin in a Culture of Mother- blame. Soc. 
Sci. Med. 59, 1193– 1205 (2004).
 45. Nadesan, M. Constructing Autism:  Unravelling the ‘Truth’ and Understanding the 
Social (Routledge, 2005).























Babies and infants 43
 47. Armstrong, L. And They Call It Help: The Psychiatric Policing of America’s Children 
(Addison- Wesley, 1993).
 48. Beck, U. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (Sage, 1992).
 49. Foucault, M. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Vintage, 1995).
 50. Taussig, M. T. Reification and the Consciousness of the Patient. Soc. Sci. Med. [B] 14, 
3– 13 (1980).
 51. Vakirtzi, E. & Bayliss, P. Towards a Foucauldian Methodology in the Study of 
Autism: Issues of Archaeology, Genealogy, and Subjectification. J. Philos. Educ. 47, 
364– 378 (2013).
 52. Green, J. et al. Parent- mediated Intervention Versus no Intervention for Infants at 
High Risk of Autism: A Parallel, Single- blind, Randomised Trial. Lancet Psychiatry 2, 
133– 140 (2015).
 53. Turner, L. M. & Stone, W. L. Variability in Outcome for Children with an ASD 
Diagnosis at Age 2. J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 48, 793– 802 (2007).
 54. Rutter, M. Autism: Its Recognition, Early Diagnosis, and Service Implications. J. Dev. 
Behav. Pediatr. JDBP 27, S54– S58 (2006).
 55. Russell, G., Ford, T., Steer, C. & Golding, J. Identification of Children with the 
Same Level of Impairment as Children on the Autistic Spectrum, and Analysis of their 
Service Use. J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 51, 643– 651 (2010).
 56. Russell, G. et al. Social and Behavioural Outcomes in Children Diagnosed with Autism 
Spectrum Disorders: A Longitudinal Cohort Study. J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 53, 
735– 744 (2012).
 57. Lemcke, S., Juul, S., Parner, E. T., Lauritsen, M. B. & Thorsen, P. Early Signs of 
Autism in Toddlers:  A Follow- up Study in the Danish National Birth Cohort. J. 
Autism Dev. Disord. 43, 2366– 2375 (2013).
 58. Shattuck, P. T. et  al. Change in Autism Symptoms and Maladaptive Behaviors in 
Adolescents and Adults with an Autism Spectrum Disorder. J. Autism Dev. Disord. 37, 
1735– 1747 (2007).
 59. Whitely, M. et  al. Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder Late Birthdate Effect 
Common in Both High and Low Prescribing International Jurisdictions: A Systematic 
Review. J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 60, 380– 391 (2019).
 60. Fogel, L. S. & Nelson, R. O. The Effects of Special Education Labels on Teachers. J. 
Sch. Psychol. 21, 241– 251 (1983).
 61. Jussim, L. Self- Fulfilling Prophecies: A Theoretical and Integrative Review. Psychol. 
Rev. 93, 429– 445 (1986).
 62. Jussim, L., Palumbo, P., Chatman, C., Madon, S. & Smith, A. Stigma and Self- 
fulfilling Prophecies. Soc. Psychol. Stigma 374– 418 (2000).
 63. Rosenthal, R. & Jacobson, L. Teachers’ Expectancies:  Determinants of Pupils’ IQ 
Gains. Psychol. Rep. 19, 115– 118 (1966).
 64. Crais, E. R., Watson, L. R., Baranek, G. T. & Reznick, J. S. Early Identification of 
Autism: How Early Can We Go? Semin. Speech Lang. 27, 143– 160 (2006).
 65. Reichow, B., Hume, K., Barton, E. E. & Boyd, B. A. Early Intensive Behavioral 
Intervention (EIBI) for Young Children with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). 
Cochrane Database Syst. Rev. doi:10.1002/ 14651858.CD009260.pub3 (2018).
 66. Brikell, I. et  al. The Contribution of Common Genetic Risk Variants for ADHD 
to a General Factor of Childhood Psychopathology. Mol. Psychiatry 1– 13 (2018) 
doi:10.1038/ s41380- 018- 0109- 2.























 68. Atkinson, A. et  al. NIH Biomarkers Definitions Working Group Biomarkers and 
Surrogate Endpoints:  Preferred Definitions and Conceptual Framework. Clin. 
Pharmacol. Ther. 69, 89– 95 (2001).
 69. Wolff, J. J. et al. Differences in White Matter Fiber Tract Development Present from 
6 to 24 Months in Infants with Autism. Am. J. Psychiatry 169, 589– 600 (2012).
 70. Zeman, A. Neurology is Psychiatry  – and Vice Versa. Pract. Neurol. 14, 136– 144 
(2014).
 71. Folstein, S. E. & Rosen- Sheidley, B. Genetics of Autism: Complex Aetiology for a 
Heterogeneous Disorder. Nat. Rev. Genet. 2, 943– 955 (2001).
 72. Persico, A. M. & Napolioni, V. Autism Genetics. Behav. Brain Res. 251, 95– 112 
(2013).
 73. Yang, M. S. & Gill, M. A Review of Gene Linkage, Association and Expression Studies 
in Autism and an Assessment of Convergent Evidence. Int. J. Dev. Neurosci. Off. J. Int. 
Soc. Dev. Neurosci. 25, 69– 85 (2007).
 74. The Problems with Prenatal Testing for Autism. Spectrum | Autism Research News. 
www.spectrumnews.org/ features/ deep- dive/ the- problems- with- prenatal- testing- for- 
autism/ (2019).
 75. Nelson, A. Declaration From the Autism Community That They Are a Minority 
Group. www.prweb.com/ releases/ 2004/ 11/ prweb179444.htm (2004).
 76. Kapp, S. K. Autistic Community and the Neurodiversity Movement:  Stories from the 
Frontline (Springer Singapore, 2020).
 77. Woman with Down’s Syndrome Takes UK Govt to Court Over Allowing Abortion up 
to Birth for Disabilities. Right To Life UK https:// righttolife.org.uk/ news/ woman- 
with- downs- syndrome- takes- uk- govt- to- court- over- allowing- abortion- up- to- birth- 
for- disabilities/ (2020).
 78. Dyck, E. & Russell, G. Challenging Psychiatric Classification: Healthy Autistic Diversity 
the Neurodiversity Movement. In Mental Health in Historical Perspective:  Healthy 















Since it was first introduced as a diagnostic class, autism has been thought of 
as a disorder of childhood. In higher- income countries, most autism diagnoses 
are made when children are between three and ten years old, the early to mid- 
childhood period.1– 3 Developmental psychologists tend to approach childhood 
as one of a series of pre- determined stages (infancy, childhood, adolescence), 
in which developmental milestones such as language acquisition, awareness of 
self and the ability to attribute mental states to others occur, milestones that are 
recorded as absent or delayed in children with autism. This view of developmental 
milestones at fixed stages of development harks back to the Swiss psychologist, 
Jean Piaget’s, work in the 1930s, a universalist view that early human life stages 
follow the same pattern everywhere and, if not, there is aberrant development.4
Defining what achievements are characteristic of a given developmental stage 
or age band operates in a somewhat context- free model. Talcot Parsons, and 
other sociologists of the post- war period, brought the child’s environment to the 
fore, introducing the idea of socialisation.5 Socialisation takes place in a child’s 
expanding sphere of influence; for tiny babies, the mother; as the maturing 
infant’s horizons expand, the family; for children in schools and for adolescents, 
peer groups. Resistance, like youth subculture, was often viewed as socialisation 
gone wrong. An autistic trait, in this light, is the inability to be socialised or to 
grasp rules inculcated through socialisation.
Madeleine Leonard gives a historical account of the sociology of childhood.4 
She describes how, in the 1980s, the top- down idea of children as passive sponges 
soaking up social messages was challenged by sociologists. They countered that 
childhood is itself a construct, in which the child influences all aspects of their 
environment as well as being influenced by it;5 the everyday lives of children 
should be the focus of research, not just the ‘deviance’ of developmental psycho-
pathology.6 She describes how schools were painted by neo- Marxists as places to 
learn the value of oneself in terms of being a future productive worker and to be 
taught that ‘people who work with brains are paid more and valued more than 
people who work with hands’. That is, schools are sites of children’s socialisation, 









The concept of autism as a category has radically shifted in the same time 
span as these revisions to our ideas about childhood. Originally described in 
1943, autism was thought of as a form of child schizophrenia throughout the 
1960s and 1970s. The third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM- III), published in 1980, established autism as a separate 
diagnosis and described it as a ‘pervasive developmental disorder’, distinct from 
schizophrenia. DSM- III was revised in 1987, significantly altering the autism cri-
teria. It broadened the concept of autism by adding a diagnosis (pervasive devel-
opmental disorder not otherwise specified, PDD- NOS) at the mild end of the 
spectrum and dropping the requirement for onset before 30 months. Both DSM 
and the International Classification of Disease (ICD) expanded their definitions 
of autism spectrum disorder in the 1990s to include Asperger’s syndrome or 
Asperger’s disorder, meaning that children with typical and above- average intel-
lectual ability were included. DSM- IV, released in 1994 and revised in 2000, was 
the first edition to categorise autism as a spectrum.
As a consequence, over the last 20 years in high- income countries, there has 
been an increased and ongoing application of autism diagnoses to children of 
normal and above- average intelligence. In the USA, the modern shift from a pre-
dominantly ‘lower- functioning’ autistic child population to a ‘higher- functioning’ 
one has been documented in a sequential cohort study, published in 2012, of 
more than six million children in California.7 This work reported an overall 
upward time trend, from 1994 to 2003, for any autism diagnosis. It was striking 
that the odds of autism diagnosis were 15 times greater for ‘high- functioning’ 
children in 2002 compared to 1992, whereas the odds of diagnosis increased only 
four- fold for the ‘lower- functioning’ group. Clearly, diagnosis of the group of 
children at the higher- functioning end of the spectrum is a driver of the dramatic 
rising trend in identification and diagnosis of autism.
A study in Sweden found that children aged seven to 12  years old who 
received a diagnosis of autism in 2014 had a 50% lower autism symptom score 
than did those diagnosed in 2004, whereas the diagnosis of autism simultan-
eously increased five- fold. They concluded that less severe autism symptoms have 
been required for diagnosis as time has passed.8
Figure 3.1 shows autistic traits in the whole population, including the sub- clin-
ical population called the broad autism phenotype (BAP);9 as already shown, aut-
istic traits are roughly normally distributed.10 The arrows illustrate the threshold 
for diagnosis moving to the left over time, and with time, more children included 
in the diagnosable tail of the distribution. The key point is that even a minor shift 
of threshold for diagnosis to the left, moving less severe cases into the mainstream 
‘threshold’ region, means a much bigger jump in the proportion of children who 
become ‘diagnosable’. This is because the new bars that are encompassed each 
contain a larger percentage of the population, hence the exponential rise in diag-
nosis. Note, that although the distribution bars are derived from our study,11 the 









A paper in JAMA Psychiatry, published in 2019, provided a meta- analysis of 
studies between 1966 and 2019 and suggests that differences between people 
with autism diagnosis and those without have decreased over time, on average. 
The constructs the study measured, such as emotion recognition, theory of mind 
and brain size, had become nearer to the typical in the diagnosed group, or nearer 
the mean values in a population- based histogram. The authors suggested that 
changes in the definition of autism, from a narrowly defined and homogeneous 
population toward an inclusive and heterogeneous population, may reduce our 
capacity to build mechanistic models of the condition.12
Functioning
In medicine, functional impairment refers to limits due to an illness; functions 
in their daily lives that people with a disease cannot carry out. For young chil-
dren with autism, functioning means the ability to carry out everyday tasks, 
such as getting dressed, cleaning their teeth, mixing with peers at school, eating, 
learning, communicating and taking an active part in family life. For adolescents, 
functioning might be indicated by mixing with peers, buying things in shops, 
tidying, maintaining personal hygiene and general life skills. Clearly, measuring 
functioning is mixed with social norms, particularly the idea of reaching milestones 
at certain ages/ developmental stages. As level of functioning is adaptive it can’t 
really be considered an individual characteristic, because one’s ability to function 
is completely dependent on what one is required to do, one’s support and one’s 





circumstances.13 There has been debate about the overlap between Asperger’s 
disorder and ‘high- functioning autism’; the latter is an informal diagnosis some-
times given in the UK when a child or adult has an average or above- average 
intelligence quotient (IQ) and/ or is coping reasonably well with life issues such 
as housing, school or employment and relationships.14,15 Some in the autistic 
community resist the use of terms such as ‘high’ and ‘low’- functioning because 
people given the ‘low- functioning’ label are seen as devalued.16
Nevertheless, a child’s functioning is a term and measure widely used in child 
psychiatry. In autism research it is particularly used to describe and quantify a 
child’s ability to cope with the demands of daily living. We studied the age at 
which various autism diagnoses were given in the UK using data from the Avon 
Longitudinal Study of Parents And Children (ALSPAC).3 Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
we found a markedly older average age of diagnosis for people with a diagnosis 
of Asperger’s than those with a diagnosis of infantile autism (Figure 3.2). This 
implies (as do other studies) that age of diagnosis of autism in childhood is typ-
ically later for the group of children with autism who do not have an intellec-
tual disability (ID). In another study using the same dataset, Colin Steer and 
colleagues found the average age of autism diagnosis was lower for children 
with more severe autistic traits.10 As noted in Chapter 2, children who have a 
lower IQ and very severe autistic behaviour or who do not meet early develop-
mental milestones as expected are probably going to be referred earlier in their 
life. Their parents and carers are likely to reach out for medical and educational 
help sooner than parents whose children are nearer the threshold, whose intel-
lect is above average and whose language, although it may be idiosyncratic, is 
Figure 3.2  The average age of autism diagnosis in the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents 









developed and allows the children to cope in early- years settings, which tend to 
be less demanding.
Although there is not a perfect mapping between functioning and IQ, the 
inter- relationship between IQ, autism severity, setting, support and demand, all 
play a role in determining good functioning.17 Adaptive functioning (how well 
one copes or deals with various day- to- day tasks) has been strongly correlated 
with IQ in some autism studies, especially in the work of Susana Mouga and 
colleagues.18 Their work, in which adaptive functioning has been associated with 
cognitive ability, suggests lower IQ means less success in learning to cope with 
the demands of everyday life although this does not speak to the quality of life 
more generally.18
Children present for diagnosis in later childhood when their behaviours 
become problematic as ‘social demands exceed limited capacities’, according to 
DSM- 5.19 This change may be due to changes in circumstances, such as moving 
to a new school.20 Our analysis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) 
diagnoses in the UK showed a distinct spike during the period of transition from 
primary to secondary school,21 presumably because parents wanted more support 
for their children in the less- supported learning environment of secondary school. 
This is reminiscent of the Foucauldian ‘surface of emergence’22 – the field in which 
an object first arises. Foucault writes that pre- existing fields, such as family, social 
group or school, are always normative to some degree and will have developed a 
‘margin of tolerance’ that roughly defines the field of what it considers unaccept-
able.22 The field may be secondary school, the object is diagnosable autism, 
because for an autism diagnosis to be considered there must be a negative impact 
on children and their carers; perhaps a child’s behaviour only becomes problematic 
in the secondary school environment, where there are more demands. Between 
younger childhood, older childhood and adolescent childhood groups, it was in 
secondary school- aged children, that we saw the biggest increases in the recording 
of new autism diagnosis between 1998 and 2018 (see Figure 4.1).
In another study we conducted, parents reported their autistic children 
‘holding it together’ and behaving well at school but, due to the intense effort 
needed,23 ‘melting down’ when they returned home. In the threshold region 
(Figure  3.2), located at the boundary between sub- clinical and clinical, there 
are clearly circumstances that are more difficult (school is more demanding than 
home) and consequently children learn to ‘mask’ more. (Masking is the use of rote 
or learned behaviours and speech to cover up difficulties with social interaction, 
discussed further in Chapter 5.) There seems to be an interaction between biology, 
level of functioning, social expectation, masking and diagnosis. The issues of when 
and where diagnosis is rendered necessary raise questions about whether autism 
can be located in an individual person or only in interaction.
The lobbying and organisation of the various neuro- tribes are partly what 
have driven the shift of diagnostic threshold to the left in Figure 3.1, to older 
children.24,25 Milder traits before secondary school may not have been considered 
diagnosable as an autism spectrum disorder before 1990, but later diagnosis is 














support and understanding. Some have argued that, if resources are scarce, the 
broader diagnosis may become an issue, because more diagnoses creates greater 
pressure on resources in health, education and other services, leading to a displace-
ment of services from those who need them most.26 A counter policy argument 
might be to target support for all people who struggle, and want a diagnosis, per-
haps deflecting money from areas other than health. In other words, expanding 
the services ‘pot’ where there is more diagnosis, rather than leaving the size of 
the pot unchanged.
Looping
Looping is the idea that the diagnostic classifications we use to define illness (and 
other sorts of categories) can transform the people in the classified populations 
and they in turn can transform our understanding of the categories (Figure 3.3).27 
Ian Hacking, who writes somewhat rambling but brilliant philosophy papers in 
the London Review of Books among other places,27,28 has written about autism 
several times. Hacking’s original idea was that looping in diagnosis entails feed-
back operating through the patient’s and others’ self- awareness and shifts in their 
behaviour. The diagnostic category into which patients are grouped leads patients 
to reflect on themselves differently and others to treat them in a different way. 
Being classified as ‘autistic’ changes how a person acts and how others perceive 
them. People familiar with psychology and sociology, especially those familiar 
with Howard Becker on labelling theory29 and Robert Merton’s theory of self- 
fulfilling prophecies,30 which sparked more than 50 years of empirical research,31 
might suggest Hacking is re- inventing the wheel, or rather the ‘loop’. However, 
these theories concern people who are labelled (for example, by diagnosis) and 
how diagnostic labels can transform identities and outcomes. Hacking’s looping 
covers these aspects but has an additional focus on how the diagnostic category 
itself and scientific classification may be transformed by the actions of those who 
are labelled (Figure 3.3).
Hacking writes about the concept of ‘human kinds’ in classifications such as 
‘autism’. Unlike ‘natural kinds’ (for example, ‘stones’), these are classes that are 
themselves altered by the act of classification. Autism, or any other diagnostic 
class, is a ‘human kind’, demarcated by its shifting through its classification.32 For 
Hacking, looping means that diagnostic categories are ‘moving targets’ and their 











reification as static objects is misplaced. There is plenty of highly technical debate 
in philosophy about the notions of ‘kinds’, of which I understand little. Luckily, 
this is not my concern here.
In later work, Hacking described a more complicated model.28 As configured 
by Serife Tekin,33 Hacking’s revised model is less of a loop; rather, all points 
influence all others (Figure 3.4). In this model the category (such as autism) is 
in a constant flux of remaking through negotiations among scientific experts, 
people with autism, parents and professionals – an interplay of social movements, 
health institutions and scientific experts that creates and shapes our knowledge, 
diagnostic classification and ‘how we view autistic people and ultimately how we 
understand autism’.34 One problem with this model is that it puts knowledge 
in one homogenous box, begging the question of whose knowledge and whose 
understanding. Others have criticised Hacking’s ideas because it is not clear how 
much patients’ shifted behaviour and self- awareness might be due to the act of 
labelling, how much to the consequences of labelling (such as treatments) and 
how much to the progress of the condition.
The review we conducted, which covered all the autism research published in 
12 months in high- impact autism- specific journals, provides a candidate looping 
effect. We wanted to find out whether most autistic participants who took part 
in autism research studies had either an IQ in the normal range or an intellectual 
disability. The review included more than 300 autism studies, which together 
had recruited more than 100,000 participants with autism. In 75% of the studies, 
the average age (Figure 3.5) of participants with autism was under 20 years old, 
meaning the majority of autism research was conducted on or with children and 
adolescents. Moreover, you will recall (see Introduction, Figure 1) that we found 
only a handful of published autism studies from South America or Africa; more 
than 95% were from European or anglophone countries.








We found that, across all autism studies, only about 6% of participants with 
autism had ID; in other words, approximately 94% of people participating in this 
sample of autism research did not. If researchers were aiming to create a repre-
sentative sample of the population with autism according to published prevalence 
estimates,35 each study should have had a stratified autism sample, with around 
50% of participants with ID. These autism research studies therefore showed a 
selection bias against autistic participants with ID.36 This phenomenon has been 
documented elsewhere: in the US National Database of Autism Research, which 
has 47,400 participants, only 11% have either ID or a borderline ID (an IQ 
below 85).
The causes of the ID bias are easy to identify. Research instruments are rarely 
designed for people with severe to profound ID, who may not readily understand 
research protocols and the potential benefits of participation, making it more dif-
ficult to obtain their informed consent to participate. And parents caring for an 
autistic child with ID have little time or energy to participate in research. Verbally 
fluent participants are easier to recruit for trials and other forms of research; we 
estimated the proportion of non- or minimally verbal autistic participants to be 
even smaller, just 2% of the pooled sample of participants.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of our review was the way that the know-
ledge generated by the studies included was passed on. Ninety per cent of authors 
who cited the 300 studies included in our review applied the knowledge generated 
to the entire autism spectrum. Even studies that did not include any participants 
with ID were cited as if they applied to the entire autism spectrum. Daisy Elliott, 
a gifted member of our team, established this by meticulously tracking and 
checking citations of the studies we reviewed. Daisy’s findings reflect how busy 






scientists operate, how science is done, how citations are frequently made after 
reading only the paper’s abstract. Her work illustrated how ‘facts’ travel and how 
autism knowledge is primarily drawn from participants with specific profiles. It 
was clear there were inherent biases in the characteristics of who participated in 
published research studies about autism, who they were and where they came 
from. To return to looping effects, if the participants were primarily intellectually 
able, verbal children and adolescents (I shall call them IVCAs) from high- income, 
largely anglophone countries, then this profile underscores the research evidence 
base which in turn informs the diagnostic criteria.
Referring to the revised model of looping (Figure 3.4), one way in which diag-
nostic categories shift over time is through revisions to diagnostic criteria, such 
as the DSM and ICD. Revisions are discussed and implemented by work groups, 
using an evidence- based approach, assessing the strongest and latest research evi-
dence to determine tweaks to the parameters of the category. Every family of 
medical diagnoses has its own specific work group, formed of the most respected 
scientific experts in their field, who undertake the highest- impact studies. For 
autism, the neurodevelopmental work group that revised the DSM- 5 criteria 
published in 2013 comprised a band of eminent professors considered to be the 
authorities in autism research. This evidence- based process means, in theory, that 
the best scientific research- based evidence is used to construct and refine the 
diagnostic delineations of disease and disorder. Of course, the experts are also 
subject to lobbying from various mobilised tribes, as for any diagnosis.37
In this example, the American Psychiatric Association, which commissions the 
DSM, is the institution in Figure 3.4. As research evidence underpins any changes to the 
criteria, looping could occur if autistic people with ID are under- represented 
in the evidence base, assuming they have differing phenotypic and aetiological 
profiles from IVCAs. If IVCAs with autism are over- represented in research 
studies, the evidence base will reflect the characteristics of IVCAs and knowledge 
about autism will be mostly drawn from IVCA profile. Selection bias will lead to 
slight shifts in the definition of the category, as new knowledge and new criteria 
consequently emphasise the characteristics of IVCAs. Changes to the classification 
of autism, in turn, alter who is eligible for diagnosis. The new shape and bound-
aries of the category, who it contains, determine who will be eligible to partici-
pate in future autism research studies. And so the loop continues (Figure 3.6). 
Unlike Hacking’s classic earlier description, this type of looping does not require 
a person to alter their behaviour because they are so classified.
This presumed loop (Figure 3.6) could lead to an entrenchment of autism as 
a condition most common in children with typical or above- average IQ. As there 
are many more children who have typical IQ than those who do not, the net 
effect of selection bias on ID loop could be to broaden the pool of children who 
are eligible for diagnosis.
The description of autism that encompasses people with above- average IQ has 
produced a range of cultural representations in high- income countries, ranging 
from children’s television classics such as Sesame Street to the Scandi- noir thriller 







Night- time, have been adapted into hit plays and, in cinema, autistic characters are 
common. First- wave autistic autobiographies, such as Donna Williams’s Nobody 
Nowhere,38 Temple Grandin’s Emergence39 and Oliver Sacks’s account of their 
meeting in An Anthropologist on Mars,40 have led to an explosion in so- called 
‘autie- biography’. Through autie- biography, adults without ID have become the 
most obvious voices of lived experience. Such works are discussed by Hacking 
as a route to access the experience of autism in a new way, leading to a new 
type of person.41 And increasingly, these autism stories provide an accessible and 
powerful lens to explain differences in adults, as well as in children.
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Our 2020 analysis of time trend data covered nine million patients registered 
in English general practitioner (GP) practices between 1998 and 2018.1 We 
compared the trends in diagnosis we derived for pre- school children, primary age 
children, adolescents and adults. Figure 4.1 illustrates the relative pace of increase 
of diagnosis in adults compared to other groups, showing how the rate of increase 
in new autism diagnoses was most rapid in adults. Note that, in Figure 4.1, the 
baseline in 1998 is held at the same level for all four groups, although far more 
children and adolescents were diagnosed each year than adults. But the graph 
well illustrates how the rate of increase in diagnosis was greater for adults than 
other groups.
As already noted, In the first and second editions of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM I and II), autism was a sub- type of 
childhood schizophrenia; it became an independent condition, infantile autism, 
in DSM III, published in 1980. As the name implied, autism was then exclusively 
a diagnosis of childhood. DSM- III- R, which came out in in 1987, dropped the 
requirement that onset should happen before the child was 30 months old, and 
in 1994, DSM- IV categorised autism as a spectrum. Adult autism diagnosis is 
therefore a relatively new concept and practice.
Diagnostic services
In the UK, The Autism Act (2009) made it a statutory requirement for every local 
authority to provide access to diagnosis for adults, with costs provided by central 
government, leading to the creation of a national network of adult assessment 
services in England in the 2010s.2 The Autism Act was drafted by a coalition 
of UK autism charities, led by the National Autistic Society3 and supported by 
Cheryl Gillan, a Conservative Member of Parliament.
The Autism Act has a place in history as the first disability- specific Act of 
Parliament in the UK. There is no attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD) act, no cerebral palsy act, no dementia act. Autism seems to be a par-










of autism’s long history of professional and parental waves of advocacy (see 
Introduction, Figure  2, and multiple texts4– 7) which created an infrastructure 
of well- established, well- organised charities and advocacy organisations. A cynic 
might suggest because there is a well established drug treatment for ADHD it is 
in the interests of the pharmacological industry to locate  ADHD within a med-
ical framework (see Sergio Sismondo’s seering account of the ghost management 
of resistance and advocacy by the pharma industry).8
The emphasis of autism lobbying at that time was on the area of least- met 
need: adulthood. In 2009, very few local authorities in England had adult diag-
nosis services. By spring 2019 almost all (93%) did.9 This reflects Roy Richard 
Grinker’s point that rising prevalence estimates inevitably follow an increase in 
services, with diagnostic (and possibly therapeutic) service availability influencing 
rates of diagnosis.10 Jennie Hayes, while researching for her PhD in the Exploring 
Diagnosis team, studied the practice of diagnosing adults in the network of adult 
autism assessment services, as well as examining the process of autism diagnosis in 
child services. The network of adult autism assessment centres was distinguished 
by being founded with the specific task of assessing adults for autism diagnoses.3 
Many adults have come forward for referral since 2010; waiting lists are long, up 
to four years in some places.11
Hayes’s work, which analysed discussions in multi- disciplinary diag-
nostic teams, raised the question of whether the institutional requirements 
and practices of adult diagnostic services, although founded on the neutral 
premise of meeting a need, inadvertently co- constituted a growing demand 
for adult autism diagnosis. The presence of adult assessment services gave 
oxygen to the idea of a new category of autistic adults. The new network of 
services, together with culturally available materials such as autie- biography, 
fictional accounts, neurodiversity and so on (Figure 4.2), means adults (and 











the parents of adults living in the parental home) are now far more likely 
to consider an autism diagnosis as a possibility for explaining their, or their 
offspring’s, experience.
‘Autie- biographers’12– 15 are adults with autism who have written about what 
autism looks like. Their texts have become prototypical accounts of experience on 
the spectrum. In the UK, we heard that many adults who come to clinic directly 
cite such stories when seeking an autism diagnosis. UK adults related in par-
ticular to the autobiographical accounts of two successful self- proclaimed autistic 
people: Greta Thunberg15 and Chris Packham.16 Packham (who co- incidentally 
I briefly worked with in a previous life at the BBC’s Natural History Unit) is a 
hugely talented naturalist and presenter, may line up clothes in his wardrobe, 
yet manages to sustain multiple complex social relationships at work, has a long- 
term relationship and has been able to nurture his step child into a co- presenting 
opportunity, is gifted with language, having been highly articulate for many years 






as a forthright spokesperson on the loss of biodiversity, during a very public and 
altogether stellar career. These qualities – absolute autonomy, ability to manage 
complex relationships, extreme fluency in the spoken word – are very far from 
autism pre- 1990. Autism has come a long way. Identifying with autie- biographers 
like Packham prompts self- identification which may lead to a medical diagnosis, 
as Tom Lister noted.17 Autie- biographies help provide the language to style what 
it is to be autistic, a vocabulary that, for some adults, begins to constitute what it 
means to be autistic.
Autie- biography is just one of many areas of activity that have made autism 
culturally accessible (Figure  4.2). Many adults who self- identify as autistic 
recognised the signs of autism not via the official DSM- 5 criteria but through 
the de- stigmatised lay understandings offered by culturally accessible resources. 
Lay understandings of what autism is appear to be broader than clinical 
understandings. People employing biosocial identities do not passively accept 
them but actively construct the biology on which their identity is based.18 The net 
effect of autie- biography is that more people who relate to the autie- biographer 
opt into the autism community. And they too can then tell their autism stories. 
Twenty- five years ago, this possibility did not really exist or at least was not cultur-
ally accessible; ten years ago, there was no infrastructure (in the UK) to support 
its realisation.
As noted earlier, an autism diagnosis is usually given to adults because they 
were not picked up in childhood. Autistic people who have severe neurological 
impairments, severe developmental delay, are non- verbal or minimally verbal 
and/ or need constant care are normally identified in early life. Adults who come 
to diagnostic services are most often in the ‘higher- functioning’ group of aut-
istic people, often with less glaring needs.19– 24 The earlier the diagnosis is made, 
the more likely an autistic person is to have cognitive and severe autistic impair-
ment, and later diagnoses are more likely to come from the ‘threshold’ region 
(Figure 3.1). Members of the group identified in adulthood were ‘missed’ as 
children partly because their differences were less obvious and partly because, 
with time, autism thresholds have crept left in the figure. As adults, the group 
has been encompassed as diagnosable, whereas when they were children, years 
ago, they may not have qualified. This is not to say such adults do not struggle 
with everyday life and face challenges. Some studies suggest adults with higher 
intellect are more likely to suffer from mental health issues, such as depression, 
than people with lower25 perhaps because of a greater self- awareness and con-
sciousness of a discrepancy between their high intellect and ability to achieve 
success in relationships and at work.26 Autism severity has been associated with 
fewer bouts of anxiety/ depression, lower IQ and smaller number of reciprocal 
friendships.27
The group identified at adulthood is formed of people who have managed 
school life without a diagnosis of autism. As with the transition to secondary 
school, the transition to fulfil society’s expectation of an independent adult 
life, and associated decrease in support, may prompt the need for diagnosis 









is simply harder to negotiate; workplaces may lack the support offered by the 
educational system and families may be unable to provide housing. Adult diag-
nosis can provide access to services but, more commonly, the adult services in 
our studies provided diagnosis but not additional services. Nonetheless, many, 
and perhaps most, adults and their parents found their newly minted autism 
diagnosis a useful explanatory model for a lifetime of difference: ‘I didn’t fit 
in’; ‘there was something a bit different about my behaviour’; ‘I had some-
thing wrong with me’; ‘I can always say “Sorry, I have got Asperger syndrome” 
… the excuse if you like but excuse is not a very good word … the reason … 
the explanation’.28
Hayes’s studies of diagnostic services underlined how medical practices, new 
technologies or new infrastructure create, as well as report on, phenomena, 
underlining a point made beautifully by Annemarie Mol.29 Therefore the prac-
tice of diagnosing autism cannot be separated from the ontological question of 
what autism is. As Astrid Schrader puts it, what we know cannot be separated 
from the way that we know it.30 Autism is an object of knowledge – it is what we 
know – but it is an object partly delineated by the process of knowing it. This 
is not in itself problematic but claims that practice, technology or infrastruc-
ture are simply the neutral processes of identification that have no impact on the 
phenomena of interest are unfounded. Autism is rendered an object through the 
process of its identification by health care professionals.31 Hayes goes on to discuss 
how clinicians involved in diagnostic decisions were constrained and informed 
by institutional demands. Adult diagnostic services exist solely to confer (or not) 
an autism diagnosis, so complex behaviours were inevitably reduced to a yes/ no 
decision, with a cut- off for diagnosis necessarily imposed somewhere in the broad 
autism phenotype; giving a diagnosis was metaphorically ‘drawing a line in the 
sand’, as one clinician pointed out.31
To be clear, the adults who came to the services all had autistic traits but 
the question of whether they did or did not have autism was less clear. Hayes 
collected fascinating data, some of which (at the time of writing) she continues 
to work on as part of a fellowship.32 Her data reveal clinicians are in a position 
of authority – people who, through training and experience, expressed as their 
‘feel’ for autism, can decide who has and who does not have autism. What autism 
looked like, who could ‘sense’ it and what it signified to the patient were points of 
discussion in clinicians’ discussion about diagnosis.33 The strength of the autism 
‘signal’ is an important factor in determining diagnostic outcome but deciding 
exactly what that signal is returns us to the question of ‘what is autism?’ For 
clinicians, this seemed to be negotiable, perhaps due to the uncertainty inherent 
in autism’s heterogeneity, its diverse presentation and its aetiological variation – 
what Gregory Hollin refers to as autism’s ‘ontological indeterminacy’.34
None of this is to suggest that troubling behaviours – ‘symptoms’ in med-
ical parlance – are not ‘real’ but rather that it is nigh- on impossible to disen-
tangle the assessment process: the ways clinicians determine the diagnostic 
story. The processes through which diagnostic stories are constructed from dis-










sociologists, including Joanna Latimer,35 who writes about conferring a diag-
nosis in her ethnographic study of genetic clinics covering dysmorphology. Other 
sociological scholars show how clinicians give the impression they are discussing 
something objective, something ‘out there’, but, in their discussion of the results 
of diagnostic tests, testimony and evidence, become the central narrators of diag-
nostic stories through structured talk and formal spaces.36
Autism in Adulthood, the first academic journal specific to adults with autism, 
was founded in 2018. Its existence shows autism in adulthood now has a strong 
research, as well as diagnostic focus. The flow of knowledge and attention toward 
the topic of autism in adulthood boosts the processes of self- identification 
and lay diagnosis by and of adults. Adults diagnosed with autism often have a 
strong autistic identity and many in Europe (particularly the UK), and North 
America (particularly the USA), are self- advocates and have mobilised around 
the category.
Reasons for mobilisation: the motive
Millions of dollars in funding and investment have been raised on the back of 
the tragedy narrative of autism. The 2007 Starbucks Coffee Cups and first- wave 
activism often positioned autism as thoroughly bad, something to be eliminated 
or cured, a tragedy. The Coffee Cup warning was written by a representative of 
Autism Speaks, a bastion of pro- cure parent activists, who used biological caus-
ation of autism to deflect from the earlier, damaging, mother blame theories.
Aligned to the Coffee Cup’s dire warnings, the diagnosis of autism as a dis-
order automatically positions people with autism as people who have something 
wrong with them. The current definitions of autism spectrum disorder specify 
a range of behavioural ‘deficits’. DSM- 5 describes the behavioural traits that 
constitute the core symptoms of autism as ‘persistent deficits in social commu-
nication and social interaction across multiple contexts’ and ‘restricted, repeti-
tive patterns of behaviour, interests or activities’, which may include ‘hyper- or 
hypo- sensitivity or unusual interest in sensory aspects of the environment’. 
Social deficits are primary, including ‘deficits in social- emotional reciprocity’, 
which include ‘failure of normal back- and- forth conversation’, ‘reduced 
sharing of interests, emotions or affect’, ‘poorly integrated verbal or non- verbal 
communication’, ‘failure to initiate or respond to social interactions’, ‘lack 
of facial expressions’, ‘deficits in developing, maintaining and understanding 
relationships’, ‘difficulties adjusting behaviour’ and ‘absence of interest in peers’ 
(my italics).37, 38
Thus, the definitive medical text basically describes the condition as a collection 
of deficits, inevitably damning the person with autism as having something fun-
damentally amiss: ‘You’ve been officially declared to be this awful dud’, as one of 
the participants in our short film series put it.39 Autism, as cast in these autism- as- 
tragedy texts, has traditionally been, a highly stigmatised identity.40– 42 Stigma, as 
a sociological concept, was developed by Erving Goffman in his pioneering book 









sociological literatures are rife with studies of stigma and how to combat it. Bruce 
Link and Jo Phelan describe a trade- off between treatment benefits of a diagnosis 
and effects of stigma, concluding that diagnostic labelling can of itself exert an 
independent effect on the rejecting responses of the public.44
In our study of the accounts of adults with an autism diagnosis we heard how 
autistic adults experienced autism not as a separate phenomenon but as a core 
part of their personality.45 To hear messages reinforcing what they regarded as 
their core selves as entirely deficient, broken, damaged and disordered, a con-
dition that should inspire fear and panic, is not helpful. Such messages may be 
internalised and damage self- esteem.46 Able autistic adults have been, and have 
felt, heavily discriminated against in very tangible social and economic ways, as 
well as in interpersonal interaction. Such messages may instead inspire; this group 
has been motivated to stage a mobilised fight- back and reclaim the autistic iden-
tity as their own, casting it in a much more positive light – a process of resistance 
predicted by social identity theory.47
Reasons for mobilisation: the means
Since the 1990s, many autistic adults have had not only the motivation but also 
the means to mobilise. These are adults with the ability to use a computer and 
the Internet has enabled them to meet and rally in virtual spaces.48 Autistic adults 
often have difficulties with face- to- face interaction but their fluency in on- line 
spaces has been well documented.48 The impact of the Internet is described by 
Judy Singer, a sociologist ‘somewhere on the autistic spectrum’,49 as being akin 
to the impact of sign language among the deaf.50
As noted, the group presenting to adult services is likely to have, on average, a 
higher IQ and lower support needs than those diagnosed in young childhood.19– 24 
Alongside them is now the group of children who became eligible for an autism 
diagnosis in the 1990s some now grown up into able, computer- literate adults, 
even as they faced challenges. Some of them are highly fluent in the visual world 
and have no intellectual impairment. The net result is a growing cohort of cre-
ative and intelligent Internet- using adults with an autism diagnosis.
In tandem with the growing use of the Internet as a communication tool, 
the late 1990s saw a rise in identity- based politics, such as transgender activism, 
mad pride and survivor movements. Another parallel trend was the growth in 
the neuro- centrist discourse (the tendency to explain people’s behaviour in terms 
of the biology or anatomy of their brains).51 Singer adopted the neuro- term to 
describe neurodiversity, to her a sub- set of biodiversity, in 1998.49
The parallels between the re- defining of autistic identity through neurodiversity 
and other health- based movements redefining theirs is a topic I have looked at 
elsewhere with Erica Dyck, a historian of mental health and medicine.52 By the 
early 2000s, disability rights, anti- psychiatry and social and medical models were 
well established and the political, technological and medical conditions were ripe 
for them to be adapted by a cohort of able autistic adults alienated by descriptions 













rights and neurodiversity movements to flourish: autistic adults had the numbers, 
the means (access to Internet- enabled computers), the motivation (as a group 
they are discriminated against) and the intellectual ability to come together in 
virtual spaces to change the landscape of autism.
Autistic activism and the neurodiversity movement
One way the landscape has changed is its encompassing of autism- as- identity or 
autistic identity, which is slowly making inroads into the medical bastions and 
troubling the notion of autism- as- disorder. Activists want autistic people to be 
identified but in an alternative, more holistic and realistic classification that places 
increasing emphasis on patient expertise and lived experience.53 This is a core 
concept in medical sociology; theorists such as Donna Haraway have been instru-
mental in replacing old ideas such as ‘non- compliance’ and physicians bending 
patients to their will with the concept that everyone’s ‘lay knowledge’ is valued 
and contextual.54 People’s beliefs about their health and identity are, in part, 
representations of the culture and society in which they live. Autism, and the 
way it is understood by different actors, becomes a social mirror that reflects 
our world.
The difficulty lies in reconciling the various forms of expertise. Kapp and 
colleagues have described the expertise of adults who have lived experience of 
autism.55 Clearly, lay expertise is different from lived expertise, which differs from 
professional expertise, although a person can have all three. There is a power 
imbalance, with the lay forms of expertise being treated as inferior to the profes-
sional forms. For this reason, in the Exploring Diagnosis volume edited by Kapp,56 
we foregrounded autistic voices. In the face of constructive criticism from Ari 
Ne’eman, I dropped off the editorial team, to allow solely autistic editorship and 
control. Although giving up my place was at the time painful, stepping back was 
undoubtedly for the best. The autistic voices were uninterrupted, able to tell their 
own story. And I was free to develop my idea for this book. It was a lesson that 
releasing control is sometimes the best contribution you can make.
Lay or lived expertise, according to Beck,57 has a distinct role in setting the 
research question of interest. In theory the lay positions are embodied by elected 
agents in government, while the role of the professional expert is to advise on 
methods and sometimes implement the methods of obtaining these goals. The 
aim of apportioning different roles to distinct forms of expertise is to enjoy the 
advantages of division of labour while treating each other as equals, as Thomas 
Christiano argues in his work on democracy.58 The mobilisation of autistic adults 
in the neurodiversity movement is an example of how lay knowledge is influen-
cing the professional medical agenda. As the response to Covid- 19 has shown, 
there is sometimes a need to defer to scientific experts but also to understand 
and critique all forms of expertise and demand transparency in how decisions 
are shaped. Otherwise, risk and resistance narratives, both scientific and lay, can 









Does a person with lived experience have more authority than other types of 
people? Their experience is valid and important, certainly. But people with lived 
experience are sometimes the most enthusiastic advocates of abhorrent practices. 
For example, 120 million girls and women have been subject to female genital 
mutilation (FGM) in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.59 FGM involves cutting 
out the external female genitalia of girls in infancy, childhood or adolescence, 
resulting in multiple and horrific short- and long- term health issues, including 
shock, bleeding, severe pain, pain during intercourse, menstrual problems, 
chronic infection, increased risk of problems in childbirth and death.60 In some 
regions, FGM is promoted and advocated by grandmothers who have them-
selves undergone this vicious and oppressive practice, that is, the people with 
lived experience. In the context of their lives, grandmothers understand that the 
mutilation may protect their granddaughters from early or unplanned pregnancy, 
ensures premarital virginity and marital fidelity and increases marriageability.61 
Lived experience does not necessarily lead to progressive resistance; it can also 
uphold oppressive and damaging norms. Such stories should be heard, and are 
valid. But they are not necessarily to be agreed with.
Kapp’s edited volume tells the stories of some of the main autistic players in the 
neurodiversity movement. The contributors include Martijn Dekker, who created 
InLv, the first autistic- run Internet forum, the late Mel Baggs, who inspired many 
with their video blog In My Language,62 a commentary on personhood and what 
it means to be excluded, and Ari Ne’eman, who, as president of the Autistic Self 
Advocacy Network (ASAN) in 2012, was the primary driver in the lobbying of 
the DSM- 5 neurodevelopmental working group.53
The history of autistic activism and the neurodiversity movement has been 
covered extensively, so I will not dwell on it.7, 8, 63– 65 However, two pieces of writing 
are worth mentioning:  the essays by the autistic pioneer, Jim Sinclair:  ‘Don’t 
Mourn for Us’ written in 1992– 199364 and ‘Why I  Dislike “Person First” 
Language’, written in 1999.65 Both were republished in 2012– 2013. The influ-
ence of these twin works has reverberated down the years. ‘Don’t Mourn for 
Us’ asked parents to accept children with autism, not treat them as a tragedy; to 
enter the child’s world, not normalise and force them into unwanted change.64 
In ‘Why I Dislike “Person First” Language’ Sinclair expressed similar sentiments 
to the participants in our research: autism was an important aspect of their sense 
of self.65
Traditionally, ‘autistic’ was thought to be stigmatising as a derogatory term 
because it implied that the person was a problem, rather than had a problem. 
Sinclair’s argument in support of person- first language (e.g. ‘autistic adult’) 
is that autism was an integral part of who he was, with both challenges and 
strengths, not an aspect that he cared to shed or recover from. ‘Autistic’ is equiva-
lent to any other characteristic of a person, such as their sex, gender or sexuality. 
Describing a ‘person with autism’ is equivalent to saying ‘person with femaleness’ 
or ‘person with gayness’ and implies that the gayness or femaleness or autism can 












to do so. ‘Cancerous person’ would never be used; cancer is a life- threatening 
disease, whereas autism is not, and should not be conceived as one.
Sinclair was pioneering in his descriptions of being autistic, re- casting autism 
as an identity and, by re- framing autism in an affirmative way, hitting a nerve. All 
the adult autistic activists I have met use the term ‘autistic’ to describe themselves. 
While many older psychiatry journals, such as the Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry, only allow authors to use the descriptor ‘person with autism’, pro-
gressive journals such as Autism allow the use of both terms, and in some newer 
journals, such as Autism in Adulthood, the use of ‘autistic’ is mandatory. In this 
book I use both, which may date the text.
The Internet means adults with autism can communicate over wide geo-
graphical spaces and share news. Autism was the banner around which posi-
tive collective identities were asserted and from which the identity politics of 
the neurodiversity movement emerged.66– 71 ‘Neurodiversity’ implies that neuro-
logical difference is an inherent and valuable part of human variation, not a path-
ology. The neurodiversity movement advocates de- medicalisation, as its intention 
is to class deviant (neurodivergent) behaviour as a normal human framework, not 
a diagnosable condition. However, at the same time, many of the autistic activists 
who founded the neurodiversity movement advocate for increased access to diag-
nosis, as diagnosis brings services, accommodations, identity and rights.
Kapp and I conducted an analysis of autistic adults’ responses to the question 
‘What is neurodiversity, in your own words?’, originally posed in a study Kapp 
co- led with Kristen Gillespie Lynch.55 We found that the data largely mapped 
on to definitions autistic adults in the movement have given. For example, Nick 
Walker described the neurodiversity movement as encompassing both human 
biological differences in cognition, brains and genes, while also serving as an 
activist device for change, promoting the acceptance and inclusion of autistic and 
other neurodivergent people.72
Collective identity based on shared biological difference is arguably a form of 
Paul Rabinow’s ‘biosociality’73 or Nikolas Rose and Carlos Novas’s ‘biological 
citizenship’.74 These ideas incorporate neurodivergent and autistic as an identity 
for adults who either have a diagnosis or self- identify, a phenomenon described 
at length by autistic activists and others.75– 78 Francisco Ortega has called the 
business of emphasising autism as brain- based the practice of ‘cerebralising’ or 
‘neurologisation’, understanding autism (or any condition) in terms of differences 
in brain ‘wiring’ or structure.79 An over- emphasis on a brain- based model tends to 
de- emphasise developmental and social influences. I covered this, and other major 
critiques of the neurodiversity movement, in a chapter for Kapp’s collection.80 
Some have argued that the higher- functioning autistic men who have dominated 
the neurodiversity movement represent those who least need help.80 Focusing 
attention on the brain can also underplay other physiological issues; epilepsy 
is clearly neurological but co- morbidities such as gastro- intestinal problems, endo-
crine, metabolic and motor difficulties are de- emphasised. One of the criticisms 
of the movement is that it pays rather little attention to the problems arising from 
these co- occurring ‘specifiers’ (DSM- 5) and it also leads to confusion when some 











specifiers/ co- morbidities. These semantic problems can lead to category errors 
and mutual suspicion between parent advocates and autistic adults.
Critiques notwithstanding, the neurodiversity movement broadly aims to 
counter discrimination, stigmatisation and prejudice. People aligned to the 
movement have put forward several broad principles:
 1. Use identity- first language (‘dyslexic’, not ‘person with dyslexia’). Thus, the 
neuro- attribute is re- designated as part of personhood/ identity, not framed 
as disease.
 2. Autism, ADHD and dyslexia and other neurodevelopmental conditions are 
best thought of as disabilities, not disorders.
 3. Acknowledge the advantages that autism and other neuro- disabilities may 
bring:  that having extreme neurodivergence may contribute to society in 
unexpected and positive ways and that it is therefore important to retain it in 
the gene pool, affirming the validity of impairment, in line with the affirma-
tive model of disability.
 4. Being autistic, having ADHD, diagnosed or not, is a valid way to be and 
neurodivergent people should be included and accepted.
 5. The principle of self- determination, encapsulated in the slogan ‘Nothing 
about us without us’.81 Autistic and other neurodivergent people claim 
expertise by dint of their lived experience. Advocates argue their point of 
view must be heard as valid.
 6. Children with neuro- disabilities are not problems to be fixed but people to 
be understood and supported in a mutually respectful relationship.63
 7. The movement is broadly anti- cure but neurodivergent people should have 
the right to various supports, including but not limited to facilitated com-
munication, support at school, accommodations and being protected, by the 
law, from discrimination.82 Autistic and other neurodivergent people require 
respect for their personal integrity, support for special talents and assistance 
with tasks they find difficult.63
Thus, the movement places the autism spectrum within the human spec-
trum, alongside other forms of diversity, including race, gender, sexuality and 
their accompanying discourses of rights, freedoms and self- determination.63 
Neurodiversity has simultaneously opposed, adopted and co- opted aspects of the 
biomedical discourse, using a primarily brain- based understanding. ASAN has 
advocated for broadened diagnosis while at the same time opposing a disease- 
and solely deficit- based concept of autism. Both activist (autistic- as- identity) and 
medical (autism- as- disorder) narratives seem to reify autism in different ways. 
Autistic rights activists use the diagnostic category to rally and to underpin rights- 
based discourse. Their strong identity has led some autistics to envisage a sep-
aratist autistic state, as Joseph Redford wrote in a personal communication, a 
fascinating story I was sadly unable to convince the editors to include in the 
resulting volume.
One way the movement shaped medical knowledge about autism was ASAN’s 







criteria for autism.53 This alliance was a symbiotic partnership that led to tan-
gible changes in the final DSM- 5 text. Although one might not think them nat-
ural bedfellows, both parties benefitted. The lived experiential expertise of ASAN 
lent credibility to and legitimised the efforts of the neurodevelopmental work 
group in the eyes of the autism community, benefitting the scientists. At the same 
time, the work group provided a successful platform from which autistic activists 
could lobby for changes to the diagnostic criteria. Kapp acted as ASAN’s scien-
tific officer, reviewing autism literature while researching for a PhD at UCLA 
and using the language of science. In this way ASAN co- opted the scientific dis-
course and became respected experts, able to converse fluently with the scientists 
involved. Their experience is reminiscent of the AIDS activists of the mid- 1980s, 
who campaigned to be allowed to participate in drug trials.83 Credibility tactics 
emerged, in which activist patients familiarised themselves with the language of 
science and employed scientific discourse, leading to a successful conclusion.
For some, neurodiversity has a broad definition, encompassing autism, dyslexia, 
dyspraxia, dyscalculia, dysgraphia, Tourette’s syndrome, anxiety disorders, obsessive 
compulsive disorder, ADHD, cerebral palsy, dementia and depression, although 
some operationalise narrower definitions, covering just the autism spectrum.84 Singer 
regards neurodiversity as a subset of biodiversity, in the sense that neurodiversity 
is as important for a viable culture as biodiversity is for a viable ecosystem.85 She 
is sceptical of the categorisation of people (for example, as ‘neurodivergent’), 
arguing this will stigmatise the category and become a way to denote ‘the other’. In 
autism research, ‘neurotypical’ is often used to describe the dominant ‘other’ – for 
example, a control group that does not have autism – although this is inaccurate, 
as such groups may contain many neurodiverse people. In this context, the word 
‘allistic’, coined by the autism community, is more accurate. Allistic simply means 
‘not autistic’, without the impossibility of ‘neurotypical’.
The more progressive term for neurodivergent is perhaps neuro- disability, 
which nods to the social model of disability.86 The social model differentiates 
between a person’s impairment and the disabling structures and practices they 
encounter, which interact to prevent their full participation in society. A person’s 
impairment might be paraplegia but their disablement would be caused by lack 
of wheelchair access to buildings. Of course, unless one delineates who qualifies 
as neurodivergent, one can’t use it as a marker for delivering rights or providing 
enhanced access or services. Whether qualification for the group of those who 
are neurodivergent should be through a medical diagnosis or self- identification is 
unclear. Who it incorporates may be vague because the neurodiversity movement 
rose spontaneously, in reaction to what were perceived as oppressive discourses 
and practices, not via a top- down doctrine.5
Despite being problematised, the work of neurodiversity activists has had 
the net result of reshaping the autism landscape into a more progressive, less 
stigmatising form. Autism is no longer seen as a withdrawal or inability to interact 
with the world but, rather, a different kind of contact with it. Manuel Castells’s 
seminal book, The Power of Identity, describes a resistance identity that challenges 








transformation of the overall social structure.87 Neurodiversity and autistic iden-
tity are forms of resistance to the dominant risk and tragedy discourses about 
autism. Activists have worked towards more legislation and increased access to 
support; many medical, social and cultural resources that de- stigmatise autism 
and reframe autism- as- identity have been produced as a result. This is undeni-
ably very good for autistic people and their self- worth and something we can all 
applaud. But there is a consequence: looping.
As autism becomes progressively de- stigmatised, so a more positive autistic 
identity is shaped. Subsequently, and in tandem, more adults are likely to self- 
identify and many (but not all) will self- refer for diagnostic assessment.17 The 
consequence of mobilisation and de- stigmatisation is thus more autism diag-
noses. And more autism diagnosis mean more adults acting for de- stigmatisation 
(Figure 4.3).
If self- diagnosis is the process through which an adult comes to believe they 
are autistic, lay diagnosis is the process through which someone who is not med-
ically qualified tags someone else with a diagnostic label. As diagnosis is technic-
ally something only a clinician can administer, some consider that lay diagnosis 
is an oxymoron, similar to the term lay expert.88 Many autistic adults prefer the 
term self- identification. Thomas Lister studied these twin diagnostic processes 
for autism as part of his PhD research.17 He found a lay diagnosis is often con-
ferred by a parent, relative or teacher on a child. Some people with autism even 
claimed to have a special ‘autie- dar’ (by analogy with ‘gay- dar’); the ability to 
spot another person with autism who has not ‘come out’. Thus, knowing about 
autism renders autism visible in others. And autism- as- a- label is easier both to 
assign and own when its connotations become more positive.
There are many interventions that aim to combat stigma. Perhaps the best 
way to promote de- stigmatisation of health conditions is to harness the power 
of resistance engendered by health- based activist collectives, such as the 
neurodiversity movement.89 Stigma is a relational process emerging from political 








       
    
  
 
          



















forces of dominance and oppression that maintains and creates relations of 
power and control, as it causes ‘some groups to feel devalued and others to feel 
they are superior in some way’. 89 Many years ago, Pierre Bourdieu argued that 
the dominated are taught to accept their lot through cultural hegemony, the 
understanding of social hierarchy. 90 In a culture in which people with autism, 
ADHD and other conditions have traditionally been devalued and have lower 
social status, a resistance identity can challenge this narrative through activism. 
Anti- stigma efforts can be most effective when they support and bolster existing 
activism and grassroots campaigns. 89 
 Since the 1990s, the rise in activity around autism as a diagnostic category 
for adults has led to both more diagnosis and a surge in mobilised activity in 
the autism rights and neurodiversity movements. It is worth remembering that 
autism in adulthood is a new, and escalating, concept. Adults have always had 
the type of behaviours that we now understand to lie on the autism spectrum 
but understanding autism as a diagnostic option for adults is relatively new. The 
founding of a network of services to diagnose adults and the mobilisation of 
adult autistic advocates in the neurodiversity movement who claim a progres-
sive autistic identity have created a more de- stigmatised and culturally accessible 
narrative about adult autism that has fuelled autism’s rise. 
 References 
  1.  Russell ,  G .  et al. Time Trends in Autism Diagnosis Over 20 Years: A UK Population- 
based Cohort Study (in preparation) (2020). 
  2.  Department of Health. Statutory Guidance for Local Authorities and NHS 
Organisations to Support Implementation of the Adult Autism Strategy. 66.  www.gov.
uk/government/publications/adult-autism-strategy-statutory-guidance (2015). 
  3.  UK Government. Autism Act 2009.  www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/15/
contents (2009). 
  4.  Evans ,  B .  The Metamorphosis of Autism: A History of Child Development in Britain 
( Manchester University Press ,  2017 ). 
  5.  Eyal ,  G ., Hart, B., Onculer, E., Neta, O. & Rossi, N.  The Autism Matrix ( Polity ,  2010 ). 
  6.  Silverman ,  C .  Understanding Autism: Parents, Doctors, and the History of a Disorder 
( Princeton University Press ,  2011 ). 
  7.  Silberman ,  S .  Neurotribes:  The Legacy of Autism and How to Think Smarter About 
People Who Think Differently ( Allen & Unwin ,  2015 ). 
  8.  Sismondo, S.  Ghost-managed Medicine: Big Pharma’s Invisible Hands . (Mattering 
Press, 2018). 
  9.  National Autistic Society . Autism Strategy Overview  www.autism.org.uk/about/
strategy/overview.aspx (2019). 
 10.  Grinker ,  R. R .  Unstrange Minds: Remapping the World of Autism ( Basic Books ,  2008 ). 
 11.  National Autistic Society . Autism Diagnosis Postcode Lottery Exposed (18 July 
2018).  www.autism.org.uk/get-involved/media-centre/news/2018-07-18-autism-
diagnosis-postcode-lottery-exposed.aspx (2018). 
 12.  Williams ,  D .  Nobody Nowhere: The Extraordinary Autobiography of an Autistic ( Avon , 
 1994 ). 
 13.  Grandin ,  T . &  Scariano ,  M. M .  Emergence: Labeled Autistic ( Warner Books ,  1996 ). 
Adults 71
 14. Tammet, D. Born on a Blue Day: Inside the Extraordinary Mind of an Autistic Savant 
(Free Press, 2007).
 15. The Guardian. Greta Thunberg Responds to Asperger’s Critics: ‘It’s a Superpower’. 
www.theguardian.com/ environment/ 2019/ sep/ 02/ greta- thunberg- responds- to- 
aspergers- critics- its- a- superpower (2019).
 16. Packham, C. Fingers in the Sparkle Jar: A Memoir (Ebury Press, 2017).
 17. Lister, T. What’s in a Label? An Exploration of How People Acquire the Label ‘Autistic’ 
in Adulthood and the Consequences of Doing So (University of Exeter, 2020).
 18. Wehling, P. The ‘Technoscientization’ of Medicine and its Limits: Technoscientific 
Identities, Biosocialities, and Rare Disease Patient Organizations. Poiesis Prax. 8, 67– 
82 (2011).
 19. Brett, D., Warnell, F., McConachie, H. & Parr, J. R. Factors Affecting Age at ASD 
Diagnosis in UK: No Evidence that Diagnosis Age has Decreased Between 2004 and 
2014. J. Autism Dev. Disord. 46, 1974– 1984 (2016).
 20. Fountain, C., King, M. D. & Bearman, P. S. Age of Diagnosis for Autism: Individual 
and Community Factors Across 10 Birth Cohorts. J. Epidemiol. Community Health 
65, 503– 510 (2011).
 21. Mandell, D. S., Novak, M. M. & Zubritsky, C. D. Factors Associated with Age of 
Diagnosis Among Children with Autism Spectrum Disorders. Pediatrics 116, 1480– 
1486 (2005).
 22. Shattuck, P. T. et  al. Timing of Identification Among Children with an Autism 
Spectrum Disorder:  Findings from a Population- based Surveillance Study. J. Am. 
Acad. Child Adolesc. Psychiatry 48, 474– 483 (2009).
 23. Williams, E., Thomas, K., Sidebotham, H. & Emond, A. Prevalence and Characteristics 
of Autistic Spectrum Disorders in the ALSPAC Cohort. Dev. Med. Child Neurol. 50, 
672– 677 (2008).
 24. Zwaigenbaum, L. et al. Developmental Functioning and Symptom Severity Influence 
Age of Diagnosis in Canadian Preschool Children with Autism. Paediatr. Child Health 
24, e57– e65 (2019).
 25. Sterling, L., Dawson, G., Estes, A. & Greenson, J. Characteristics Associated with 
Presence of Depressive Symptoms in Adults with Autism Spectrum Disorder. J. Autism 
Dev. Disord. 38, 1011– 1018 (2008).
 26. Kapp, S. K. Social Support, Well- being, and Quality of Life Among Individuals on the 
Autism Spectrum. Pediatrics 141, S362– S368 (2018).
 27. Mazurek, M. O. & Kanne, S. M. Friendship and Internalizing Symptoms Among 
Children and Adolescents with ASD. J. Autism Dev. Disord. 40, 1512– 1520 (2010).
 28. Punshon, C., Skirrow, P. & Murphy, G. The Not Guilty Verdict:  Psychological 
Reactions to a Diagnosis of Asperger Syndrome in Adulthood. Autism Int. J. Res. 
Pract. 13, 265– 283 (2009).
 29. Mol, A. The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice (Duke University Press, 2003).
 30. Schrader, A. Responding to Pfiesteria piscicida (the Fish Killer):  Phantomatic 
Ontologies, Indeterminacy, and Responsibility in Toxic Microbiology. Soc. Stud. Sci. 
40, 275– 306 (2010).
 31. Hayes, J., McCabe, R., Ford, T. & Russell, G. Drawing a Line in the Sand: Affect and 
Testimony in Autism Assessment Teams in the UK. Sociol. Health Illn. 42, 825– 843 
(2020).
 32. Hayes, J., MacCabe, R., Ford, T. & Russell, G. ‘Not at the Diagnosis Point’: Dealing 






















 33. Timmermans, S. & Haas, S. Towards a Sociology of Disease. Sociol. Health Illn. 30, 
659– 676 (2008).
 34. Hollin, G. Autistic Heterogeneity:  Linking Uncertainties and Indeterminacies. Sci. 
Cult. 26, 209– 231 (2017).
 35. Latimer, J. The Gene, the Clinic, and the Family: Diagnosing Dysmorphology, Reviving 
Medical Dominance (Routledge, 2013).
 36. Maynard, D. W. & Turowetz, J. J. Doing Testing: How Concrete Competence can 
Facilitate or Inhibit Performances of Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder. Qual. 
Sociol. 40, 467– 491 (2017).
 37. WHO. International Classification of Diseases, 11th Revision (ICD- 11). (WHO, 
2018). www.who.int/ classifications/ icd/ en/ .
 38. American Psychiatric Association & DSM- 5 Task Force. Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (American Psychiatric Publishing, 2013).
 39. Exploring Diagnosis. The State of Being Different. (2019). www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=AGn8OMGLo7Q&t=1s.
 40. Farrugia, D. Exploring Stigma: Medical Knowledge and the Stigmatisation of Parents 
of Children Diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder. Sociol. Health Illn. (2009) 
doi:10.1111/ j.1467- 9566.2009.01174.x.
 41. Gray, D. E. Perceptions of Stigma: The Parents of Autistic Children. Sociol. Health 
Illn. 15, 102– 120 (1993).
 42. Russell, G. & Norwich, B. Dilemmas, Diagnosis and De- stigmatization:  Parental 
Perspectives on the Diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorders. Clin. Child Psychol. 
Psychiatry 17, 229– 245 (2012).
 43. Goffman, E. Stigma:  Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (Touchstone, 
1986).
 44. Link, B. G. & Phelan, J. C. Stigma and its Public Health Implications. The Lancet 
367, 528– 529 (2006).
 45. Russell, G. et  al. Mapping the Autistic Advantage from the Accounts of Adults 
Diagnosed with Autism: A Qualitative Study. Autism Adulthood 1, 124– 133 (2019).
 46. Milton, D. & Sims, T. How is a Sense of Well- being and Belonging Constructed in the 
Accounts of Autistic Adults? Disabil. Soc. 31, 520– 534 (2016).
 47. Major, B. & Crocker, J. Social Stigma and Self- esteem: The Self- protective Properties 
of Stigma. Psychol. Rev. 96, 608– 630 (1989).
 48. Davidson, J. Autistic Culture Online: Virtual Communication and Cultural Expression 
on the Spectrum. Soc. Cult. Geogr. 9, 791– 806 (2008).
 49. Singer, J. NeuroDiversity: The Birth of an Idea (Judy Singer, 2016).
 50. Singer, J. ‘Why can’t you be Normal for Once in Your Life?’ From a ‘Problem with no 
Name’ to the Emergence of a New Category of Difference (Chapter 7). In Disability 
discourse (eds. Singer, J. & French, S.) vol. Disability, Human Rights, and Society 
59– 67 (Open University Press, 1999).
 51. Satel, S. & Lilienfeld, S. O. Brainwashed: The Seductive Appeal of Mindless Neuroscience 
(Basic Civitas Books, 2013).
 52. Dyck, E. & Russell, G. Challenging Psychiatric Classification:  Healthy Autistic 
Diversity, the Neurodiversity Movement. In Mental Health in Historical Perspective: 
Healthy Minds in the Twentieth Century (eds. Taylor, S. J. & Brumby, A.) (Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2020).
 53. Kapp, S. & Ne’eman, A. Lobbying Autism’s Diagnostic Revision in the DSM- 5. In 

























 54. Haraway, D. Situated Knowledges:  The Science Question in Feminism and the 
Privilege of Partial Perspective. Fem. Stud. 14, 575– 599 (1988).
 55. Gillespie- Lynch, K., Kapp, S. K., Brooks, P. J., Pickens, J. & Schwartzman, B. Whose 
Expertise Is It? Evidence for Autistic Adults as Critical Autism Experts. Front. Psychol. 
8, 438 (2017).
 56. Kapp, S. K. Autistic Community and the Neurodiversity Movement:  Stories from the 
Frontline (Springer Singapore, 2020).
 57. Beck, U. World Risk Society (Polity Press, 1999).
 58. Christiano, T. Democracy. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. Zalta, E. 
N.) (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018).
 59. Vogt, S., Efferson, C. & Fehr, E. The Risk of Female Genital Cutting in 
Europe:  Comparing Immigrant Attitudes Toward Uncut Girls with Attitudes in a 
Practicing Country. SSM – Popul. Health 3, 283– 293 (2017).
 60. WHO. Female genital mutilation. www.who.int/ news- room/ fact- sheets/ detail/ 
female- genital- mutilation (2020).
 61. Almroth, L. et al. A Community Based Study on the Change of Practice of Female 
Genital Mutilation in a Sudanese Village. Int. J. Gynecol. Obstet. 74, 179– 185 (2001).
 62. Baggs, A. In my Language. Video blog. www.youtube.com/ watch?reload=9&v= 
JnylM1hI2jc (2007).
 63. Waltz, M. Autism: A Social and Medical History (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
 64. Sinclair, J. Don’t Mourn for Us. Auton. Crit. J. Interdiscip. Autism Stud. 1, (2012).
 65. Sinclair, J. Why I Dislike ‘Person First’ Language. Auton. Crit. J. Interdiscip. Autism 
Stud. 1 (2013).
 66. Baker, D. L. Neurodiversity, Neurological Disability and the Public Sector: Notes on 
the Autism Spectrum. Disabil. Soc. 21, 15– 29 (2006).
 67. Brownlow, C. Re- presenting Autism: The Construction of ‘NT Syndrome’. J. Med. 
Humanit. 31, 243– 255 (2010).
 68. Bumiller, K. Quirky Citizens: Autism, Gender, and Reimagining Disability. Signs 33, 
967– 991 (2008).
 69. Cascio, M. A. Neurodiversity: Autism Pride Among Mothers of Children with Autism 
Spectrum Disorders. Intellect. Dev. Disabil. 50, 273– 283 (2012).
 70. Hart, B. Autism Parents and Neurodiversity: Radical Translation, Joint Embodiment 
and the Prosthetic Environment. BioSocieties 9, 284– 303 (2014).
 71. Fenton, A. & Krahn, T. Autism, Neurodiversity and Equality Beyond the ’Normal’. J. 
Ethics Ment. Health 2, 2 (2009).
 72. Walker, N. What is Neurodiversity? Autistic UK https:// autisticuk.org/ neurodiversity/  
(2014).
 73. Rabinow, P. Artificiality and Enlightenment:  From Sociobiology to Biosociality. In 
Anthropogies of Modernity (ed. Inda, J. X.) 91– 111 (Blackwell Publishing, 1996).
 74. Rose, N. & Novas, C. Biological Citizenship. In Global Assemblages:  Technology, 
Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems (eds. Ong, A. & Collier, S. J.) 439– 463 
(Blackwell Publishing, 2005).
 75. Sarrett, J. C. & Kapp, S. K. Self- identification and Self- diagnosis in the Autistic 
Community. In Disability in American Life (eds. Heller, T., Parker Harris, S., Gill, 
C. & Gould, R.) (ABC- CLIO, 2018).
 76. Yergeau, M. Occupying Autism: Rhetoric, Involuntarity, and the Meaning of Autistic 
Lives. In Occupying Disability:  Critical Approaches to Community, Justice, and 
Decolonizing Disability (eds. Block, P., Kasnitz, D., Nishida, A. & Pollard, N.) 83– 95 

























 77. Lewis, L. F. Exploring the Experience of Self- diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder 
in Adults. Arch. Psychiatr. Nurs. 30, 575– 580 (2016).
 78. O’Dell, L., Rosqvist, H. B., Ortega, F., Brownlow, C. & Orsini, M. Critical Autism 
Studies:  Exploring Epistemic Dialogues and Intersections, Challenging Dominant 
Understandings of Autism. Disabil. Soc. 31, 166– 179 (2016).
 79. Ortega, F. The Cerebral Subject and the Challenge of Neurodiversity. BioSocieties 4, 
425– 445 (2009).
 80. Russell, G. Critiques of the Neurodiversity Movement. In Autistic Community and 
the Neurodiversity Movement:  Stories from the Frontline (ed. Kapp, S. K.) 287– 303 
(Springer, 2020). doi:10.1007/ 978- 981- 13- 8437- 0_ 21.
 81. Charlton, J. I. Nothing About Us Without Us: Disability Oppression and Empowerment 
(University of California Press, 2000).
 82. Broderick, A. A. & Ne’eman, A. Autism as Metaphor: Narrative and Counter- narrative. 
Int. J. Incl. Educ. 12, 459– 476 (2008).
 83. Epstein, S. The Construction of Lay Expertise: AIDS Activism and the Forging of 
Credibility in the Reform of Clinical Trials. Sci. Technol. Hum. Values 20, 408– 437 
(1995).
 84. r/ neurodiversity  – What ‘conditions’, ‘disorders’, or other diagnoses count as 
neurodivergent? reddit www.reddit.com/ r/ neurodiversity/ comments/ 6u2gcx/ what_ 
conditions_ disorders_ or_ other_ diagnoses/ (2018).
 85. Singer. NeuroDiversity 2.0:  What is Neurodiversity? NeuroDiversity 2.0 https:// 
neurodiversity2.blogspot.com/ p/ what.html.
 86. Oliver, M. The Politics of Disablement: A Sociological Approach (Palgrave Macmillan, 
1997).
 87. Castells, M. The Power of Identity:  The Information Age  – Economy, Society, and 
Culture: 2 (Wiley- Blackwell, 2009).
 88. Prior, L. Belief, Knowledge and Expertise:  The Emergence of the Lay Expert in 
Medical Sociology. Sociol. Health Illn. 25, 41– 57 (2003).
 89. Parker, R. & Aggleton, P. HIV and AIDS- related Stigma and Discrimination:  A 
Conceptual Framework and Implications for Action. Soc. Sci. Med. 1982 57, 13– 24 
(2003).
















5  Women on the verge of the  
autism spectrum
Autism and women
Autism has long been a condition diagnosed primarily in men. A comprehensive 
review of 43 studies published between 1966 and 2008 found four men with 
autism to every one woman to be the median ratio.1 For Asperger’s syndrome/ 
disorder (the categories dropped by the most recent revisions to the fifth edition 
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM- 5) and the 
11th edition of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD- 11)), the gender 
ratio is thought to be higher: Lorna Wing’s famous study estimated 15 men to 
one woman.2
The gender ratio seems to interact with intelligence quotient (IQ) and/ or 
functioning. Most research since the 1990s indicates the male- to- female ratio 
for adults with autism increases with IQ.3, 4 An English study found there was 
no statistically significant difference in the proportion of adult men and women 
with autism and intellectual disability (ID).5 By contrast, there were between 
eight and nine men to every one woman in the group that did not have ID. 
The study concluded the problem of ‘missed’ diagnosis is particularly acute for 
higher- functioning women.
Various reasons for the preponderance of males with autism have been put for-
ward as theories to explain the gender ratio. First, sex- linked genetic differences 
mean that females are less likely to inherit autistic traits than males.6 There is also 
generally greater variation among males, meaning more men at both extremes 
for a range of traits, including intellectual ability,7 maths and reading ability8 and 
height. Many diagnosable cognitive difficulties are more common in males; for 
example, specific reading delay, hyperactivity, clumsiness, stammering, ID and 
Tourette’s syndrome.9 The sex linkage is known as the female protective effect;10 
women have two X chromosomes, meaning the inherited genes work in tandem, 
whereas men have an XY pair in which the Y chromosomes are unable to modify 
the effects of the X chromosomes. Most genetic mutations are by nature reces-
sive; for women (XX), this means mutations are only expressed when the same 
mutation occurs in both copies of the X chromosome. Men (XY) lack this pro-
tection, meaning a recessive mutation present in the X chromosome is expressed 












However, if the unequal gender ratio in autism is primarily due to the female 
protective effect, we might expect the ratio of inequality to be greater for people 
with very low cognitive ability, which is not seen in the data.3, 4
A second proposed reason is that infant boys are more susceptible than baby 
girls to many infections,12 some of which may be plausible risk factors for autism 
(see Part II). A  third suggestion, the ‘extreme male brain’ theory of autism,13 
posits autism could partially be caused by the effects of foetal testosterone on 
brain development.14 Other early sex- linked hormone exposures could also cause 
epigenetic change, altering gene expression in male foetuses more often than 
in female.15 It is plausible that a combination of these and other explanations 
contributes to the high male- to- female ratio seen in both autism and other 
neurodevelopmental conditions.
Since 2010, the four- to- one gender ratio has been questioned, and an 
autism narrative has developed around ‘missed’ girls and women; that is, girls 
and women who miss out on diagnosis because they are under- recognised.16 
Evidence of the missing- ness of women comes from a global systematic review 
that analysed 54 studies containing data about more than 50,000 participants 
with autism.3 This review found that the male- to- female ratio in participants 
with an autism diagnosis (those reaching clinics) was just over four to one, 
whereas in population- based studies, the ratio estimates were less, on average 
around three to one. The conclusion was that there are more women and girls 
with autism than receive a diagnosis or make it to a clinic. Epidemiological 
population- based estimates of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) 
also tend to give a lower gender ratio than estimates based on clinical data17 and 
there is a very similar narrative around the missing diagnosis of women in the 
ADHD literature.18
Missing women
At a clinicians’ workshop held in London at the end of 2019, I attended a talk 
entitled Women and ASD: Missed Diagnosis and Misdiagnosis, taken from a paper 
with a similar name.19 The speaker, a clinical psychologist, posed a question and 
immediately answered it herself:
‘Are women with autism missed?’
‘Yes’.
Missing- ness, it is often argued, is important if, through lack of or missed diag-
nosis, girls and women lose access to crucial services and self- understanding. My 
PhD work corroborated the ‘missed’ story: being female was a predictor of lack of 
autism diagnosis: we found that boys were more likely to receive a diagnosis than 
girls even when levels of their autistic traits were comparable.20 We wondered if 
stereotyping autism as ‘male’ (perhaps prompted by the ‘extreme male brain’ 
theory of autism) might lead to biases in recognition if clinicians, parents and 
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stereotype might contribute to girls being less often identifi ed with either autism 
or ADHD by their teachers, educational psychologists and even parents. Such 
work has reported and maintained a ‘women (chiefl y higher- functioning women) 
are missed’ narrative that now runs through both autism and ADHD research, 
clinical practice and media coverage. 19 ,  21 –  29 
 Recent sub- narratives to explain the missed- ness of women 
 The female autism phenotype 
 An infl uential narrative states that able females with autism are particularly under- 
recognised and have missed out on an autism diagnosis because their autistic 
behaviour and autistic traits are different from those of males with autism. 21 That 
is, there is a ‘female autism phenotype’ (FAP), a set of traits particular to women; 
 ergo , there is also a male autism phenotype (MAP). In the FAP/ MAP model, both 
men and women have underlying (biological) autism but their autism is expressed 
differently as they grow up due to social, developmental and environmental 
factors. Women and girls are missing from the statistics and miss out on diag-
nosis because the current diagnostic criteria and scales, such as Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule (ADOS) and Autism Diagnostic Interview- Revised (ADI- 
r), were developed from earlier concepts of autism that were oriented towards 
MAP traits. 30 Men and children were preponderant in the samples underpinning 
diagnostic scales originally developed in the days of ICD- 9/ DSM- III. 31 ,  32 
 If autism is delineated with reference to current diagnostic criteria and if the 
criteria of core autism are defi ned by MAP, autism is MAP. Therefore, FAP is 
not autism as we currently defi ne it, but is something else, unless core autism is 
re- defi ned to include FAP, in which case autism becomes FAP + MAP. My point 
being that autism is currently defi ned by behaviour and we decide what that 
behaviour is, rather than there being an identifyable biological marker underpin-
ning the word. This idea of FAP seems to be now playing out in UK clinical prac-
tice; clinicians in Jennie Hayes’s studies declared that ADOS would not identify 
women, therefore ADOS results were over- ruled on the basis that they would not 
show FAP and therefore would not be valid for women. 33 
 Scales that specifi cally recognise FAP are being developed. However, the pilot 
version of the Girls’ Questionnaire for Autism Spectrum Conditions (the GS- 
ASC) 34  – the components of which include ‘lack of gendered behaviour’ and ‘lack 
of compliance’ would make any feminist cringe. It includes questions designed to 
identify autism in women: preferring boys’ toys (footballs?) to girls’ toys, lacking 
interest in fashion or not preferring to look ‘feminine’. One might assume many 
girls like football, lack interest in fashion and reject ‘looking feminine’, without 
these being a sign of autism. Furthermore, the GS- ASC identifi es adolescent 
girls’ confusion about their sexuality as a sign of autism. Thus, the scale delivers 
a picture in which autism, oppressive gender norms and feminine stereotypes are 
unfortunately confl ated. The interweaving of what counts as appropriate behav-




A second persuasive narrative is that able women with autism have missed out on 
an autism diagnosis because they are able to effectively mask their autism. High- 
achieving women, it is thought, may be better at hiding their autism by imitating 
social interactions.22, 35 ‘Masking’ is generally thought of as the way a person 
with autism (or any other social impairment) disguises their underlying ‘true’ self 
and passes as socially competent by using rote or learnt behaviours or acting in a 
socially acceptable way.
Masking is also known as camouflaging, acting or passing. Each term has 
slightly different connotations. The term ‘passing’ has been used by gay rights 
activists to describe passing as heterosexual;36 for autism the analogy is ‘passing’ 
as neurotypical.37 Passing is situationally employed to resist social oppression and 
can be considered as a social interaction strategy that is ‘a performance in which 
one presents oneself as what one is not’.38
For autistic women, masking also means suppressing in public behaviours 
that are characteristic of autism, for example hand flapping or other repetitive 
movements. Our work on adults’ experiences of repetitive movements, known 
as stimming, found that such movements were frequently suppressed in public, 
despite stimming’s helpful function in the regulation of emotions,39 a study 
I describe in more depth in a later chapter (Chapter 9). Masking can also involve 
the use of rote learning or mimicked behaviours to ‘pass as normal’ in initiating 
and maintaining social interactions. In a UK- based study exploring the broad 
phenomenon of masking, researchers reported women using masking and other 
compensation techniques to pretend to be like other women, as one woman said, 
to:  ‘put on my best normal’.26 An ability to mask was mediated by how much 
energy people felt they could muster at any one time. In some cases, masking is a 
learned strategy that becomes almost automatic. In certain social spaces, women 
pass using the social and gendered signals that are expected in a given situation, 
such as acting sociably, being communicative or empathetic and being socially 
engaged at a party.40
The notion of masking behaviours poses problems for both feminist theory 
and for clinicians who are attempting to make diagnostic decisions. All women 
(and all men) adopt roles to fit into social interactions. All the world’s a stage, 
and all women play characters in social spaces, be it mother, interviewee, work 
colleague, party guest or friend in the pub. The philosopher Judith Butler, in her 
feminist classic Gender Trouble,41 argues that the notion of gender itself is a kind 
of improvised performance. How, then, is it possible to differentiate between 
autistic masking and a neurotypical (allistic) woman adopting a social role in her 
everyday life?
Masking is described in DSM- 5 as a way for women and girls to disguise autism,42 
and is included as a component of the above- mentioned GQ- ASC scale. Masking 
(the ability to read social norms, be adept at fitting in and not have behaviours 
that are pervasive across settings) is thus almost the polar opposite of pre- 1990 
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omnipresence of autistic behaviours across settings were indicators. Today, as Hayes 
observed, fitting into social expectations (if at a cost and in a limited way), even if 
not unique to autism, is interpreted as a sign and used to diagnose autism in prac-
tice.43 Butler argues that, if gender is performative, no identity exists behind the 
acts that supposedly ‘express’ gender and these acts constitute, rather than express, 
the illusion of the underlying stable gender identity.42 Could the same be true for 
autism? Could interpretation as masking partially constitute the idea of a stable 
underlying autism? When a person is masking, passing for normal in diagnostic 
assessment, how can a clinician tell what their version of normal really is?
The idea of masking has caught the imagination of writers on social media, 
in women’s magazines and mainstream newspapers and popular broadcasters.44 
Popular stories of missed or late- diagnosed autistic women are drawn from first- 
person accounts. Most are accounts of women diagnosed late in life who never 
realised they were autistic but to whom the diagnosis has been a revelation, with 
headlines such as ‘30 years trying to blend in’, ‘It all made sense when we found 
out we were autistic’45 or ‘The costs of camouflaging’.46 Such sources serve to 
make the masking narrative culturally accessible and available.
Masking was examined in some depth in the British network television pro-
gramme Are You Autistic?40 The programme featured an experiment in which 
four women speed- dated young men. The women were adept at flirting, eye 
contact and initiating conversation. All the men they met felt comfortable and 
engaged. The men were amazed to learn their dates were autistic. This, we were 
told, was evidence of camouflaging or masking in the autistic women, who went 
on to describe how the effort to ‘pass’ was draining. Delineation between autistic 
and allistic masking was made on the basis of effort and recovery.
Misdiagnosis
A final narrative explaining the missing women contends that, partly because diag-
nostic criteria and diagnostic scales are geared toward picking up MAP and per-
haps partly because autism is stereotyped as a ‘male’ condition, girls and women 
with FAP are either totally missed or misdiagnosed with other conditions,19 often 
mental health conditions. Co- occurring conditions such as borderline/ emotion-
ally unstable personality disorder,47 anxiety48 and eating disorders49 might conceal 
autism, or autistic women might be inappropriately labelled and thus never reach 
autism clinics.
‘Mis’- diagnosis, however, assumes an autism diagnosis is a fixed constellation 
of behavioural traits that does not shift, with a ‘correct’ way of defining it, and 
that other psychiatric diagnoses have similarly fixed meanings, hence the mis-
taken classification. Historically, as different diagnoses go in and out of fashion 
and represent different constellations of symptoms, this model seems to be a 
red herring,50 because previous diagnoses may have most accurately reflected the 
best understandings of women’s difficulties at the time. Only recently has autism 
expanded to become an appropriate label for high- achieving women; once iden-












misdiagnosis is a misnomer. Perhaps the better question about any diagnosis is 
not ‘is it correct?’, for that alters with the flux of knowledge, but rather how 
useful is the diagnosis? (see Chapter 10).
Our study of autistic women and clinicians’ perspectives
In 2019 and early 2020 I led a final qualitative study of women’s accounts for 
Exploring Diagnosis. We gathered data from 31 first- person accounts that were 
previously published52 and Jean Harrington, a sociologist, interviewed nine 
women (mostly by phone), with post-doc researcher Shelley Norman conducting 
follow- up interviews by e- mail due to Covid restrictions. I provided an inductive 
(theory- based) coding framework, which I applied together with Norman. With 
Harrington, I convened a discussion of masking at a clinician network meeting, 
in which approximately 30 clinicians from adult diagnostic services participated.
Most of the women in our interview sample were highly educated (often with 
post- graduate qualifications, including several with PhDs and one professor) 
and generally high achieving. Most had strongly autistic identities and most had 
actively sought an autism diagnosis. This was unsurprising, as our recruitment 
and sampling strategy called to those who wanted to write or speak about the 
transformative effect of a late diagnosis. All the women wrote or spoke articu-
lately and most of those who gave their relationship status were in long- term 
relationships. This sample of women illustrates the  difference between the very 
modern picture and the pre- 1990s’ version of autism, in which typically a diag-
nosis would be made for a male child with intellectual disability who might be 
non- verbal and have severe developmental delay.
We wanted to examine whether, and how, the women operationalised the aut-
istic sub- narratives, to explore clinicians’ perspectives and understand how gender 
norms and autism might intersect. More broadly, I wanted to find out what work 
an autism diagnosis did for the women, a slightly different focus to that of other 
groups.21, 26, 53– 55
The preliminary findings showed many of the women felt a deep sense of 
alienation and ‘otherness’ before diagnosis, particularly in relation to gendered 
expectations. Together, they expressed a feeling that, from a young age, girls have 
more social expectations placed on them, and more value is placed on social abil-
ities for women than men. A large proportion felt that, due merely to their sex, 
they were expected to conform to a submissive role and take on maternal, home- 
making and caring duties. They also projected a feeling that their differences 
were highlighted and exacerbated by such gendered expectations. For some, their 
female sex left them feeling adrift from typical girls:
Little girls and bigger girls are supposed to chatter and giggle and gossip and 
share secrets and have best friends and so on … I didn’t do that. My wiring (the 
neurological configuration of crucial parts of my brain) didn’t let me (s7).
I think it’s harder for women, because we’re expected to be more sociable, we’re 
expected to fit that gender stereotype. So if you break out of that mould then 
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you’re seen as … I think, well, boys and men can get away with more without 
being called odd (J3).
The things other girls did and wanted to talk about held little interest for 
me … they wondered what was wrong with me … I am not into clothes or makeup 
or shopping, decorating, cooking all the things that seem so very important to 
them (S16).
One of the things that being a woman involves is the role of caregiver; the one 
who responds to needs, who nurtures … I am aware of the expectation … but 
I don’t know what to do about it (S12).
In common with other studies,53 many recounted being told they had something 
wrong with them: ‘feeling like you’re wrong, rather than feeling like something’s 
wrong’ (V6). The sense of ‘otherness’ was expressed as a feeling of being told 
one was not quite right, not fitting in, and so being subject to others’ negative 
value judgements:
All my life there was a feeling of isolation … what’s more I was always blamed 
for this. People would say ‘if you could just enjoy the things other little girls enjoy, 
you would be much happier’ (S23).
The women also said they did not think in the same way or use the same lens as 
those around them. This feeling of isolation and lack of being understood was 
counteracted by identification as autistic, mediated through the act of autism 
diagnosis. The label of autism not only gave them an explanation but also gave 
others a way to make their differences acceptable. The diagnosis embellished 
an ‘illness narrative’ (a term from medical sociology) through which to 
re- interpret their lives.56– 59 Diagnosis can be a turning point for framing one’s 
own narrative – a form of biographical disruption.60 Diagnosis allows a person to 
make sense of their experience and construct their story around it.
For many, though not all, diagnosis gave entry to a sense of place or commu-
nity in which to understand themselves and their differences. As in a previous 
study, diagnosis was ‘experienced by several participants as facilitating transition 
from being self- critical to self- compassionate, coupled with an increased sense 
of agency’.53 The women experienced a change of identity that enabled greater 
acceptance and understanding of their self, positioning autism and its accom-
panying sub- narratives as an explanation for troubles rather than leading to any 
specific medical treatment or accessing of services. The healing power of diag-
nosis lay in its story telling and its ability to validate and legitimise difference:
[Diagnosis] claimed my right to actually be here, it legitimised it, I suppose or it 
created a space that I was entirely entitled to (J8).
It has changed just about everything. It has made it easier for me to forgive 
myself for the things I find difficult and mistakes I have made, things that have 
gone wrong … it is very helpful in allowing me to frame and contextualise some 







Narrative reconstruction involved resistance to normalising ideology. The autism 
diagnosis allowed the women to act in ways that might otherwise be unaccept-
able. It allowed them not to conform:
It’s just liberating and it really takes the pressure off … I  can withdraw 
from this situation because it’s too much for me and it gives me permission 
really. Because without that sort of diagnosis, people just expect me to be one 
way (V3).
For these high- achieving women, an autism diagnosis had the effect of substi-
tuting a neuro- explanation for what might previously have been seen as their 
personal responsibility or failing. In this sense, diagnosis exculpated them from 
others’ judgement of not living up to social norms:
It’s made me feel a lot better about myself, definitely … yes, you have these diffi-
culties for this reason, you are not just some kind of oddball, your autistic brain 
is different … it explains it, it validates it almost … it’s an actual condition 
that I have no control over really, I can’t change how I am (J7).
Diagnosis helped exempt the women from the expectations of traditional female 
roles. The liminal nature of these women’s previous experience of being outsiders 
was replaced by a sense of relief, and sometimes a confirmed place in the thriving 
autistic community.
The missing- ness of women with autism was another topic, which participants 
largely related to their experience of going undetected or undiagnosed for a 
long time. Experiences were interpreted in the light of FAP and several women 
recounted that they were misdiagnosed with mental health conditions, which 
they found stigmatising, before settling on what they regarded as the useful, and 
correct, autism diagnosis.
There were numerous accounts of masking, styled as acting a role to fit in and 
disguise differences that the women felt were innate. They also used words such 
as passing, acting, adopting personae or mimicking. UK participants more often 
used the notion of ‘masking’ to describe attempts to fit in, remain undetected 
as autistic or act in gendered social spaces. This might have been because masking 
is named and identified in many culturally accessible narratives in the UK (such as 
the Are You Autistic? flirting experiment).
I don’t know how good boys are at masking but I just feel that my camouflaging, 
my masking, is brilliant, because I can go into a place and nobody will know 
I’m autistic (J4).
For years, I tried desperately to conform and fit in and be one of the gang (S1).
If you’re like me and you’re intelligent enough to memorise what other people do 
and try and mask, blend in … you just do it, you’re just pretending to be like 
the other people (J5).
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The women described carefully studying others to develop their masks and how 
it took a large amount of energy to put on and wear them, and that they needed 
time to recover afterwards. Diagnosis absolved them from having to wear a mask:
With the diagnosis it’s that I’m free of that now because whatever people say is 
people judge me, it doesn’t matter any more because officially I don’t have to be 
like they expect me to be … it was about a need to be my true self (J3).
The women provided insights that I was not expecting. Regarding parenting, 
there was a strong sense of the benefits of being a neurodivergent parent with 
a neurodivergent child; they felt able to relate to their children’s perceptions of 
the world. Some said their autistic identities led them to reduce the expectations 
for their children to be something they were not, to have fewer expectations of 
what the child ‘should’ be like, particularly with respect to gendered norms and 
milestones. This might allow their children to grow up in a more positive envir-
onment than they themselves had experienced.
Interestingly, despite their academic achievements, and being outwardly 
perceived as successful, the women often recounted carrying a sense of failure. 
This may have been due to internalising, in their youth, the messages of not 
fitting in and having something wrong with them. They saw success as having a 
personal expense, in terms of the energy it took to continually keep wearing ‘the 
mask’ and be accepted. Some women felt that their abilities and strengths in the 
academic realm seeded expectations to be socially successful. They felt that others 
opined they were capable, so must simply not be trying, socially.
Underscoring earlier points about the situated nature of a need for diagnosis, 
some of the women described how profound life changes, such as divorce or 
losing a job, had led to the need for diagnosis becoming more pressing, as they 
were less supported. Looking at dementia, Baptiste Brossard and Normand 
Carpentier showed how perturbations in social networks can lead to diagnosis, 
as well as flow from it.61 Bereavement, moving house or losing one’s job may all 
prompt the interpretation of troubles (they define ‘troubles’ as social support 
interacting with impairment) in a diagnostic frame, prompting diagnosis, often so 
as to access additional support. This was true also for several of the parents in one 
of my first studies, who described a ‘tipping point’ created by circumstances such 
as school transition, that led them to pursue an autism diagnosis for their child.62 
Autism needed to be named only in relation to expectation, support received and 
social difficulties.
To recap, in common with the FAP study,21 many women felt they did not ‘fit 
in’ to the profile of a typical girl or traditional ideas about femininity, and used 
their autism diagnosis as an explanation for their differences. Autism diagnosis 
had a healing role and provided an explanation for a lifetime of difference, as seen 
elsewhere,26, 53 and in other conditions,56, 61 enabled them to disrupt or reposition 
their biography and gave a sense of community and belonging. All three sub- 








Conversations with clinicians in adult assessment services about masking and aut-
istic identity led to questions about how the clinicians identified ‘autistic’ masking 
(as opposed to everyday gendered and social roles). The clinicians’ responses 
elaborated on the question:
Is it the quality of the masking? … Or is it the degree of effort needed and 
the exhaustion? … and how are each of these features different to those in 
neurotypicals? So do I diagnose a person as ASD [autism spectrum disorder] 
if they say they have to have 30 minutes to themselves to calm down when they 
get home or should it be 2 hours? Or is time irrelevant and the reasons that 
matter – what reasons are we looking for? With all of this so varied depending 
on intelligence, self awareness and support levels through life is for me a fascin-
ating question.
(Psychiatrist, 2019)
At a meeting of UK autism adult assessment services in 2019, clinicians described 
how they could differentiate autistic masking from gendered and social role play, 
because masking behaviours were learnt or scripted. Clinicians also cited the 
increased recovery time for masking. Autistic masking might also involve elab-
orate efforts, for example laborious, perhaps months- long, planning for an event. 
Clinicians reported using their judgement and expertise to differentiate between 
allistic masking and autistic masking. Allistic people, they said, navigated social 
interaction more intuitively, whereas a higher- functioning autistic woman might 
adopt a logical approach.
However, some clinicians talked of their exasperation, those ‘heart sink 
moments’ when women with strong autistic identities, who clearly were not aut-
istic in the clinicians’ eyes, claimed their autism could not be identified because 
‘Yes, I’m socially skilled but I’m masking’. Masking had caused a re- thinking 
of what signifies autism. In borderline cases, those ‘on the verge’, in the sub- 
clinical, threshold region, clinicians were struggling to identify who ‘really’ had 
autism: the problem was ‘how to turn a smudged line into a real one’, as one 
psychiatrist put it. The clinicians said that an alternative diagnosis might be more 
appropriate, as other mental health conditions also involve masking. I have myself 
witnessed my mother increasingly use rote and scripted social conversation to 
mask her progressing dementia. As she struggles to think of things to say, she 
falls back on repeating known patterns of conversation that have served her well 
throughout her life. The clinicians pointed out that neurotypical people also ‘act 
roles through [a] desire to save face’ and/ or fit in. Women’s experience of ‘other-
ness’, they pointed out, could be due to myriad causes, not only autism; people 
who had experienced depression, or trauma, also felt ‘different’. The issue was 
where the feeling stemmed from; getting the correct formulation was tricky.
Nevertheless, in diagnostic spaces, both clinicians and clients invoked 
masking as evidence of autism in women.33 Diagnostic services require autism 
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to be a recognisable entity that is pervasive across settings. If autism is perva-
sive, a person cannot have autism in one situation and not in another. Masking 
allowed autistic women to behave in a non- autistic way in some contexts but not 
in others. For high- achieving women at a fuzzy boundary, the question clinicians 
had to answer (due to institutional demands) was if woman X had autism or not. 
It takes work to create and maintain a real, defendable boundary between who 
has autism and who does not; clinicians occasionally used the masking narrative 
to help protect it. Autism sub- narratives were operationalised in clinical practice to 
help steer and account for decisions, yet simultaneously questioned outside the 
diagnostic space.
The clinicians discussed how autism in adults has become a more positive 
identity, making it a preferable diagnosis to, for example, personality disorder. 
Autism, they pointed out, is more socially acceptable nowadays than it was in 
1990, at least in the UK, which is partly due to de- stigmatisation (see Chapter 4), 
including the very public testimony of the healing power of autism diagnosis 
in the written testimonies we reviewed.52 The act of de- stigmatising the cat-
egory meant other women would be more likely to adopt the label in future. 
Looping, again.
The clinicians felt deeply uncomfortable about having to ‘police identities’, 
questioning whether ‘we really have the right to do this?’ Some of the clients 
coming to adult assessment services were convinced of their autism and had 
strong autistic identities. Others had equally strong non- autistic identities. 
Clinicians recounted instances in which they saw clients who strongly self- 
identified as autistic but were not diagnosed, which felt tantamount to denying 
the person their identity. Some clinicians had been accused of epistemic violence 
by not giving a diagnosis and, in some cases, clients had threatened to kill them-
selves. ‘We are challenging people’s sense of self ’, said one clinician. This was 
really a social issue, not a medical one, and not part of their professional role, 
they felt.
The Exploring Diagnosis interviews included a woman who self- identified 
as autistic who, when a diagnosis was not granted, simply discounted her clin-
ical assessors as wrong. The assessors did not understand autism or masking, 
she concluded. A second woman with a strong autistic identity simply shopped 
around until she found a clinician in private practice who was prepared to confirm 
the diagnosis that she wanted. In some cases, there also seemed to be a level of 
performance during assessment: performing autism, almost. This is perhaps not 
surprising if they were practised actors; they were performing autism to get the 
diagnosis they desired:
You have to go in to the [clinic] and make a sales pitch and it’s got to be convin-
cing or they’re not going to let you do it (J5).
Clinicians described clients who, before assessment, engaged with forums and 
academic literature to find out what autism is. They felt clients with a strong 




outcome they wanted. We saw similar evidence of performing to achieve the 
desired outcome in our 2012 study, in which I  interviewed some parents who 
were resisting a diagnosis for their child, using ‘engineering’ and ‘spin’ to avoid 
a diagnosis:
I’ve coached her to be normal. She appears so much better than she is. I  still 
believe I  could play it any way I wanted to. You could play it so the opposite 
way and I absolutely would’ve done if we hadn’t had enough money … If you 
actually don’t want your child to be diagnosed as autistic … it’s very difficult 
to answer them completely honestly. I think this is semi- subconscious, I didn’t sit 
there thinking, ‘I’m going to fake this’ (mother of undiagnosed child).
Stories, especially diagnostic narratives, are not neutral descriptions but themselves 
shape the diagnostic categories and help form our interpretations of our own experi-
ence. In the last chapter, I referred to the rise of culturally accessible narratives, 
anorexia in Japan (mentioned in the previous chapter) being an example, of a 
prevailing diagnostic narrative leading girls to newly express their distress through 
eating patterns, rather than through other behaviours.63 There are power dynamics 
at play in the relative influence of these stories, as David Harper points out:
In mental health services there are a number of stakeholders’ voices which need 
to be attended to:  professionals of various disciplines; users of services; users’ 
relatives; care staff; neighbours and so on. A  social constructionist position 
would acknowledge that there are a variety of stories to be told but, when linked 
to a political analysis we must also acknowledge that some stories (e.g. those of 
professionals) are more powerful than others (e.g. those of service users). The 
decision about how to deal with these stories is a political one.64
Masking, missing- ness and misdiagnosis are discussed ‘in- group’ in texts such 
as those we drew on but also in on- line autism chat rooms, where the stories 
are iterated, repeated, recognised and reified.65 These virtual meeting spaces and 
public accounts not only help members and readers to locate and make meaning 
of their own experience but also co- constitute experience with others, pro-
viding the tools to experience it differently. The shared stories provide a point of 
connection and belonging.65, 66 Locating oneself as autistic, rewriting biography 
in the light of diagnosis, is so important for some that it seems to seed a form 
of autistic fundamentalism, an unwavering attachment to the belief in autism, a 
strong emphasis on in- group and out- group distinctions, accompanied by quasi- 
religious enlightenment: ‘when I got my diagnosis it all made sense’.45 Contrary 
views can be experienced as an attack on selfhood or community.67 The situation 
is reminiscent of the wider debates around censorship and denial of personhood 
that have risen in the trans- exclusionary radical feminist debates and other forms 
of identity politics. Such polarisation between who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ has 
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Gender and autism
For women, there seems to be an uneasy intersection between gender and 
autism. Issues of gender conformity and autism, lack of social conformity and 
sexuality seem conflated. An embodiment model, in which gender is performed, 
must incorporate hypotheses about initial biological vulnerabilities to autism – 
which may be differentially distributed in relation to biological sex – and their 
interactions with gender relations.69 Social theorists outline that both hegemonic 
masculinity and hegemonic femininity are implicated in, and intersect with, other 
systems of inequality, such as disability.70 There are clearly multi- faceted bio-
logical, psychological, social and bio- political interactions between autism and 
gender.69
Some women, as evidenced by our study, felt pressured to conform to gen-
dered social norms. Masking was one way to conform to such expectations. 
A  diagnosis of autism provides explanation, exculpation and exemption from 
‘deviant’ gendered behaviour, as some of their testimonies witnessed. Obtaining 
an autism diagnosis gave relief, as they were thus excused from moral obligations 
to perform a typical ‘womanly’ or feminine role: being sociable, making small 
talk, caring, putting others’ needs first, and so on.
Setting a ‘new normal’
In the context of their lived experience of the (normative) social rules, the idea of 
a person’s ‘normal’ was re- set by diagnosis, to a new autistic normal that was less 
demanding, less restrictive and more tolerant of unusual social behaviour. The 
re- setting to a ‘new normal’ has been seen in studies of disclosure of diagnosis.71 
Disclosure may lead to fewer negative evaluations of a child displaying autistic 
behaviour but simultaneously lower people’s expectations.71– 73
The notion of a ‘new normal’ for expected behaviour was a phrase used 
in the UK and other countries as populations were locked down in response to 
the Covid- 19 pandemic; new standards of behaviour were supported by shifts 
in infrastructure and the emergence of rules about social distancing, staying 
at home, on- line meetings, and so on, mostly policed by the community and 
through self- surveillance. This has been a shift in population- wide norms and 
expectations of behaviour required in response to risk. In contrast, norms that are 
shifted by the autistic frame are individualised norms of social conduct and the 
autistic frame creates a new normal in which deviant behaviour is more, not less, 
tolerated. Anecdotally we have heard that some people with autistic traits relish 
the solitude and on- line communication necessitated by lockdown. Perhaps the 
shift in population norms has bought one form of autistic cognitive style nearer 
the centre. What is considered population- normal can be fluid too.
The political consequence of diagnostic creep (Figure  3.1) into previously 
sub- clinical populations, such as high- achieving women and men, remains that 









allistic (non- autistic) group.74 If ‘healthy’ is defined by its opposition to patho-
logical or diagnosable,75 the boundary of what is healthy/ normal shrinks as med-
icalisation expands what can be diagnosed. By adopting exemption via diagnosis, 
expanding definitions of illness recon figure – shrink – the underlying category 
of ‘normality’.76 If a woman’s ‘deviance’ or lack of compliance is understood 
through exemption via autism diagnosis, conformist behaviour strengthens its 
grasp on allistic people; non- traditionally feminine behaviour becomes a sign of 
autism, for example, rather than an alternative acceptable form of normal behav-
iour for women. Diagnostic exemption gives norms the oxygen to tighten their 
grip on the shrinking normal. Some women seek a new identity to explain their 
personal experiences and difficulties. But an autism diagnosis is only one frame-
work, one lens through which a coherent narrative,58 and sense of relief, can be 
found by setting a ‘new’ normal.78 Diagnosis is not the only way to storify a biog-
raphy as I will discuss in the next chapter.
From the standpoints of diversity or feminism, it might be preferable to widen 
the ways all women (indeed, all people) are allowed or expected to behave. 
‘Feminine’ traits are not fixed but rather are heavily constructed by social norms 
and power relations.78 A  more progressive social model would widen what 
constitutes ‘deviant’ femaleness; acceptable ways to be a girl should include being 
asocial, struggling with small talk, not feeling a nurturing instinct, not adopting 
caring roles and finding make- up and shopping uninspiring, with no need for a 
diagnosis of disorder. The feminist theorist, Mimi Schippers, writes of hegemonic 
femininity, meaning traits such as compliance, nurturing and empathy. These, 
she explains, have become associated with female sex, which legitimises men’s 
dominance over women when paired with characteristics that supposedly differ-
entiate men and women – such hegemonic masculine traits as assertiveness, phys-
ical strength and self- promotion. The women in our study operated a biological 
understanding to claim the new autistic normal (in Schippers’s terms, creating a 
pariah femininity). In short, many traits various women in our study described as 
autistic were non- hegemonically feminine.70
Ideally, we would seek to overturn this system by replacing judgement with 
acceptance. But diagnosis is needed when acceptance is lacking. Diagnosis allows 
people to accept pariah femininity because it effectively reduces one’s complex 
behaviours to facets of one’s brain. By invoking diagnostic exceptionalism, the 
range of behaviour considered ‘normal’ in non- diagnosed women is maintained. 
Diagnosis therefore reinforces the rules for the majority and shores up gendered 
norms and values. The re- working of individual women’s difficulties in ‘fitting in’ 
to a diagnosable disorder helps them adjust to the conditions that caused their 
problems but it does not set the rest of the population free.
The testimony of the women in our study also raised the question of whether 
men are equally likely to mask to fit in to traditional masculine roles. Our study 
did not include men, so this question is outside my scope. Anecdotally, a trans 
male- to- female autistic person reported that their asocial qualities were tolerated 
better as a man than as a woman. Possibly, if asocial behaviours are less stigmatised 
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women. The study of masking, how it and what else counts as autism, what 
counts as feminine and masculine and how this interacts with culture and masking 
is a promising area for future research.
Masking, misdiagnosis and the missed- ness of women are now established, 
recognised problems in today’s autism landscape but only since the later 
twentieth century. Sub- narratives about women with autism not only pas-
sively reflect the facts but also have partially constituted the story. They have 
contributed to new understandings of autism and how it takes a different form 
in women. It seems stories of missing, masking and misdiagnosis are having an 
impact. Our analysis of general practitioner (GP) data showed a striking increase 
in the diagnosis of women, compared to men, since the early 2000s (Figure 5.1). 
(Note that the baseline of 1998 is held at the same level for women and men but 
far more men were diagnosed each year; the graph illustrates the pace of increase 
of diagnosis of women compared to men.)
I think it is inaccurate to think that women were ‘missed’ in the 1990s, because 
the boundaries of autism have moved. The women the clinicians described as 
‘on the verge’ would not have been diagnosed then, because concepts of autism 
were narrower; autism meant something different. Autism has only recently 
become a condition that encompasses fluent, financially independent, successful 
women in long- term relationships. Women who may have been considered ‘on 
the verge’ in 2010 now qualify for diagnosis.
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6  Beyond the living
What do Hans Christian Andersen, Steve Jobs and Marie Curie have in common? 
They have all been retrospectively diagnosed with autism. Anyone with a 
passing interest in autism might have noticed the media flurry accompanying 
‘diagnoses’ of dead historical figures, celebrities or fictional characters. This is 
psychopathography, the process of retrofitting a mental disorder after someone 
has died.1
One reason there are so many excellent candidates for retrospective diag-
nosis of autism is its current heterogeneity. Autistic traits are hugely varied; it has 
become a loose and flexible category that, combined with hazy and elastic inter-
pretations of the historical source evidence (diaries, artefacts, anecdotal accounts, 
biographies, and even pottery) makes extra- clinical diagnosis easy to apply.
The retrospective diagnosis of autism illustrates a general enthusiasm for 
autism, a diagnostic zeitgeist. Together with Katherine Foxhall,2 we have argued 
that retrospective diagnosis tells us little about the person diagnosed and more 
about the era the diagnosers live in, and the dominance of diagnostic frameworks.1
The godfather of retrospective autism diagnosis is Michael Fitzgerald, a pro-
fessor of child and adolescent psychiatry, who has made numerous retrospective 
diagnoses of autism in his books. He claims Lewis Carroll, Éamon de Valera, Sir 
Keith Joseph, Ramanujan, WB Yeats, Hans Christian Andersen, George Orwell 
and even Adolf Hiltler as autistic.3, 4 Other recent examples are Field Marshall 
Montgomery (1887– 1976), diagnosed by the historian Antony Beevor,5 and the 
walker and writer Alfred Wainwright (1907– 1991), diagnosed in the biography 
by the journalist Richard Else.6
Fitzgerald offers a detailed diagnosis with reference to the philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, who was originally described as on the spectrum by Gillberg.6 
Fitzgerald matches descriptions of Wittgenstein’s teaching techniques and 
reports of his cold personality with diagnostic criteria, describing philosophy 
as Wittgenstein’s special interest, pursued to the exclusion of other activities.7 
According to Fitzgerald, Wittgenstein ‘certainly did have a desire to interact with 
others in relation to his special interest, philosophy’ but at the same time ‘did 
not need philosophical co- workers’ (7 p. 62). This somewhat conflicting account 
illustrates the difficulty in pinning down what signifies autism and the difficulty 
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But this does not mean the diagnosis is incorrect in today’s terms. We can never 
know if Wittgenstein would have qualified for an autism diagnosis today, were he 
alive, or indeed whether he would have sought one.
Chris Timms criticises the retrospective autism diagnosis as applied to Field 
Marshall Montgomery, although he stops short of stating there was no autism as 
we know it in Monty’s lifetime.8 Timms suggests Montgomery’s lack of empathy 
was typical of a military leader of his time and argues the use of evidence to 
diagnose Montgomery as autistic is highly selective and ignores conflicting data. 
Montgomery’s diagnostic story gives descriptions of events in his life a mean-
ingful causal framework; in particular, the autism diagnosis provides a narrative 
frame to explain and classify Monty’s aberrant social communication and work- 
focused behaviour.
Popular texts have diagnosed many other historical figures with autism. The 
website History’s 30 Most Inspiring People on the Autism Spectrum claims both 
celebrities and historical figures, offering a short paragraph of evidence for each 
case to support the diagnosis of, among others, Charles Darwin, Stanley Kubrick, 
Michelangelo, Mozart, Sir Isaac Newton and the film director Tim Burton (based 
on an assessment by his ex- wife, Helena Bonham Carter). The wide range of signs 
and indicators cited as evidence by the diagnosers gives autism a catch- all tinge, 
allowing the use of autism as a generic explanation for deviance from a wide range 
of norms.
Retrospective diagnosis of autism is also used to provide encouragement and 
create inspirational role models for autistic children. The best- selling children’s 
book Different Like Me:  My Book of Autism Heroes lists Einstein, Warhol, 
Kandinsky, Turing, Tesla and Immanuel Kant as on the spectrum.9 By describing 
the amazing achievements of the historical figures deemed autistic, the book’s 
aim is to inspire and motivate children told they have autism.
Steve Jobs, the founder of Apple, was diagnosed by Michael Forbes Wilcox, an 
autistic blogger. Wilcox writes that Jobs did ‘think different’, was often described 
as ‘mercurial’ and was creative. According to Wilcox, Jobs was clearly a genius; 
he and his kin ‘push the human race forward’. The tentative diagnosis serves to 
explain focus, obsessive behaviours and a particular talent in a specific field and 
also associates Forbes Wilcox’s own group (people with autism) with the ‘genius’ 
Jobs. Forbes Wilcox thus highlights autism as a condition to be proud of, one 
that confers strengths as well as challenges. Autism is cast as valuable and neces-
sary for the progress of humanity. The green activist Greta Thunberg has similarly 
spoken of autism as her ‘superpower’.10
Our work on this topic indicated that traits associated with autism could act 
both as strengths and challenges, depending on the circumstances.11 Activists in 
the neurodiversity movement continue to cite strengths associated with autism, 
including high systemising skills, perfectionism and focus. All are potentially advan-
tageous but only in the right circumstances. As noted in Chapter 4, the idea of psy-
chological traits that bring strengths has underpinned arguments for neurodiversity 
as a valuable genetic variation.12 The retrospective diagnosis of famous, talented, 







The reach of the autism diagnosis has been extrapolated so far back from the 
present day (at least in the UK) that it is now inferred in the ancient world via 
archaeological finds. A British academic identified autistic traits in the creators 
of Palaeolithic cave paintings because of their ‘highly realistic detailed figura-
tive representation, a focus on parts … and a remarkable visual memory … in 
common with autism’.13 That autism is now able to stretch back thousands 
of years into prehistory and can be identified from artefacts, rather than in an 
embodied person, tells us how powerful the concept now is.
Retrospective diagnoses loop and influence the experts, health institutions and 
even people’s understandings of themselves and each other (à la Hacking; see 
Figure 3.4). In the process of making a retrospective diagnosis, ‘what counts’ as 
autism is reformulated and extended to include new signs, for example ‘detailed 
figurative representation’, looping back to more imprecise lay understanding of 
‘what is autism’ and spreading the use of the term.
The historian, Mathew Smith questions the idea of unchanging fixed cat-
egories in psychiatry, showing how diagnosing dead people as having attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) has allowed psychiatry to frame it as a 
fixed entity, rooted in biology.14 The diagnosis of the nineteenth- century fictional 
character Johnny Head- In- Air provides an example. Johnny was a character in an 
illustrated poem created by the German physician Heinrich Hoffmann in 1909. 
Despite being entirely fictional, Johnny is routinely cited in ADHD academic 
and research literature as an early account of a child with inattentive ADHD:15, 16
As he trudged along to school
It was always Johnny’s rule
To be looking at the sky
And the clouds that floated by;
But what just before him lay,
In his way,
Johnny never thought about;
So that every one cried out— 
‘Look at little Johnny there,
Little Johnny Head- in- Air!’17
The function of Johnny’s retrospective ADHD diagnosis is to show it is universal 
and has always been around. This may be particularly important for ADHD, 
because until recently, ADHD was a somewhat contested diagnosis in the public 
gaze, at least in the UK, as it has been a poster child for medicalisation.18– 20 
This level of scepticism may prompt a defensive reaction from ADHD scientists 
who feel the subject of their enquiry is threatened. They therefore pick examples 
to demonstrate the universality, stability and unchanging nature of behaviours 
that, if seen today, would prompt an ADHD diagnosis. Johnny having ADHD 
legitimises ADHD as a category. ADHD is a theory that we use, but it is so useful 
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The same legitimising function sometimes applies to those retroactively 
claimed as having autism. According to Gernsbacher and his colleagues:21
The phenomenon of autism has existed most likely since the origins of human 
society. In retrospect, numerous historical figures … fit autism diagnostic cri-
teria but were not so diagnosed in their day.
The universality of autism through time can be equated with its biological, essen-
tial nature. If people with ADHD, and autism, have always existed, these cat-
egories are valid constructs. Retrospective diagnoses thus do meaningful work 
when operationalised as scientific fact, demonstrating that the diagnostic cat-
egories are carving nature at the joints.
Table 6.1 shows how Shea and colleagues – somewhat irreverently – retrospect-
ively diagnosed the characters in AA Milne’s The House at Pooh Corner (1928) 
in their article, ‘Pathology in the Hundred Acre Wood: a neurodevelopmental 
perspective on A.A. Milne’.22 Christopher Robin has also been rather ironic-
ally diagnosed by Cheryl Adams Richkoff23 and MinJae Lee.24 Humorous, and 
intended as holiday reading, Shea and colleagues use retrospective diagnosis to 
entertain us. But their diagnoses have stuck. The story of Winnie- the- Pooh’s 
obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), Roo’s autism and Tigger’s ADHD have 
been replicated in PowerPoint presentations at scientific conferences,25 and 
teaching materials in schools, where the diagnoses of Pooh and his friends offer 
fluffy, non- threatening ways to introduce and talk about autism, ADHD and OCD 
to children.26 In such contexts, however amusing, the diagnoses work to illustrate 
Table 6.1  Retrospective diagnoses of characters in Winnie- the- Pooh




Demonstrates impulsivity; for example, his poorly 
thought- out attempts to get honey; obsessive 
fixation on honey, which has contributed to his 
obesity
Kanga Social anxiety 
disorder
Over- protective of her son, Roo; never lets Roo 
make his own decisions
Piglet Generalised anxiety 
disorder
Anxious, blushing, flustered, stuttering; anxiety 
possibly stems from a crippled self- esteem
Eeyore Depression/ 
dysthymia
Chronic negativism, low energy, never shows 
emotions such as joy or excitement
Tigger ADHD Impulsive sampling of unknown substances such 
as honey, haycorns and thistles; climbs tall trees 
and acts socially intrusively
Owl Dyslexia Gets his spelling wrong, with letters missing, 




Schizophrenia Believes that all the characters in Winnie- the- Pooh 
are manifestations of his mood









the psychiatric categories as unwavering and firm. Their use in teaching materials 
demonstrates that diagnosable disorders of childhood have existed throughout 
history, since they were on AA Milne’s mind, even though the disorders were 
unnamed until now. Thus the action of diagnosis has the function of reifying the 
diagnostic category. Pooh himself has been diagnosed by one autistic commen-
tator as having autism.27
Childhood diagnoses are now firmly a part of children’s landscape and lan-
guage; consequently they should be addressed in the classroom. For me, this 
diagnostic reading diminishes the innocence and magic of the childhood of 
Christopher Robin. Childhood was once about wandering, playing with sticks 
and building with dirt.28 Rereading via diagnosis means losing some of the 
romance. Piglet should probably be on Prozac, Adams Richkoff points out.23
The Pooh characters’ diagnoses  – ‘Tigger has ADHD’  – are knowledge 
objects, in social science terms.29 Tigger’s diagnosis now has its own life, used 
by generations of ADHD researchers to show ADHD has always been around. 
When they encounter hyperactivity, students learn to apply this knowledge to 
real- life phenomena and thus Tigger’s diagnosis becomes an agent in creating 
knowledge about ADHD.30
What cannot immediately be seen in the classroom (because we are currently 
in the midst of the age of diagnosis) is that autism, ADHD and OCD diagnoses 
are unlikely to survive unchanged. Historians of the future looking at our era 
might examine Tigger and Roo’s diagnoses as quirky artefacts that illustrate how 
people back in the old days thought about childhood behaviour and its classi-
fication as an attribute of a child. Retrospective diagnosis says more about the 
era, and the people doing the diagnosing, than it does about the person being 
diagnosed.
Svend Brinkmann has written about how mental health diagnoses comprise 
one of several possible explanatory frameworks for a person’s difficulties.31 Other 
frameworks include moral, existential, spiritual and political explanations. To 
illustrate his ideas, I drew Table 6.2 which gives a range of possible explanations 
for an adolescent working in a factory with very low mood.
Brinkmann argues diagnostic narratives often operate at the expense of other 
explanations. To take the political example above, many studies have shown that, 
as a person who is socio- economically disadvantaged is more likely to suffer very 
Table 6.2  Some possible explanatory frames for low mood of adolescent working in factory
Frame Very low mood due to Reason Action
Diagnostic Depressive disorder Biological imbalance Take anti- depressant
Moral Bad karma Immoral actions of self Behave better, atone
Political Low pay, no prospects Unjust society Join a union
Spiritual Ancestors angry Spirits not at peace Present offering, ritual
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low mood,32 the argument is that taking an anti- depressant depoliticises and 
masks a social justice issue.33
People often draw on multiple narratives, but diagnosis is currently the go- 
to explanation for health troubles or mental difficulties, edging out other pos-
sibilities. Furthermore, each frame of understanding moderates how troubles 
are experienced. Anthropological studies have shown how women experience 
late middle age very differently in Japan to the USA.34 US narratives revolve 
around menopause, whereas in more traditional families in Japan the end 
of menstruation is not considered significant; in contrast, late middle age is 
considered to be women’s prime of life, and the term ‘hot flush’ did not exist 
until recently.34 Although hot flushes are very often reported by women in the 
USA, they were rarely reported to be experienced by women in rural Japan.34 
Experience is thus mediated by how it is named or understood. Similarly, how 
a neurological difference is experienced is mediated by how it is named or 
understood and the sub- narratives this entails, as discussed in the previous 
chapter.
Child and adolescent psychiatrists like the excellent Tamsin Ford have 
positioned child mental health as everybody’s business35 through their work 
showing that disorders are highly prevalent in school- age children (estimates 
suggest one in nine children and adolescents were suffering from a prob-
able mental disorder in the UK in 2017, a rise since 1999 with a further jump 
during the Lockdown in response to Covid-19, to one child in six in 202036). 
Recognising the widespread nature of mental disorders destigmatises them, but 
such work also supplies an accessible language to think about children’s troubles 
in a diagnostic, pathological framework. That psychiatric diagnostic language is 
an everyday occurrence in the classroom returns us to the Hundred Acre Wood: 
that Pooh has autism, and that autism has been lifted by a rising tide of culturally 
accessible diagnostic narratives.
None of this is to suggest Tigger does not have ADHD; his ADHD is not 
‘invalid’. All knowledge is valid, just situated;37 valid in one situation, located in 
our time. The Winnie- the- Pooh diagnoses are well- intentioned ways of talking 
about difficult topics to children in an accessible way. They could also be seen 
as less benign, as establishing normal childhood ways of being as pathologies.19 
Instead of the wonderful thing about Tigger is him having boundless energy and 
being tons of fun, circa 2020, there is something amiss with him.
The autism lens
Rosenhan illustrated the diagnostic lens brilliantly in the 1970s’ observational 
experiment ‘On being sane in insane places’.38 Rosenhan and his research team 
(all of whom were ‘sane’) applied for admissions to psychiatric institutions, 
complaining of hearing voices. All were admitted and most were diagnosed with 
schizophrenia. The team members documented how, during their hospitalisation, 
they reverted to behaving completely normally, yet many of their behaviours, 












as pathological and illuminative of their schizophrenic state,38 according to the 
notes taken by the institutional staff. This experiment underlines the tendency to 
interpret human social behaviour using a particular diagnostic lens.
What I would call the autism lens is a similar concept to the ‘medical gaze’.39 
Medical trainees are taught to interpret bodies and behaviours in terms of their 
symptoms, producing the clinicians’ expertise through their ‘gaze’. This lens both 
actively constructs and renders pathology visible.40 Once you recognise autism, 
you see it everywhere.41
In 2017, we enrolled four commentators on the Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule (ADOS) professional training courses for clinicians and 
researchers, considered one of the best diagnostic tools to identify autism.42 
ADOS is a semi- structured assessment of communication, social interaction and 
play (or imaginative use of materials) for people suspected of having autism.43 It is 
widely used in diagnostic centres in Europe and North America. Like many other 
psychiatric instruments used to measure disorder, ADOS is not free. Training 
in, and use of, the tool is a commercial enterprise. Only accredited researchers 
and clinicians are allowed on the training course, creating a limited number of 
professionals who, after qualifying, ‘officially’ become able to read and decode 
who has autism.42 Two of the trainees we funded were autistic activist researchers, 
two were parents of children identified as being on the autism spectrum and 
one was a clinician noted for his critical perspective. The aim of ADOS is to 
observe autistic behaviour and repeatedly be able to rate it against a benchmark 
to a similar standard. In my reading of their accounts, ADOS training focused 
the autism lens. Training encouraged participants to interpret a child’s videoed 
behaviour as autistic, whereas at least one initially read the behaviour as not.42 
The hope is that identification enables effective intervention that enables children 
to thrive.
On the other hand, autism can become a master status that over- rides 
and subsumes other identities and knowledge, trumping them in the eyes 
of others. An old friend once bemoaned how he wanted to be known as an 
artist rather than a ‘black artist’. Art critics gave his ethnicity master status; 
it became the lens through which his every work was assessed. Katherine 
Runswick- Cole, a parent scholar, described how her child’s autism label 
‘drowns out other stories that might be told about them’.44 The autism lens 
of non- autistic others (engendered by the disclosure of her child’s diagnosis) 
provides a discursive framework to ‘story a life’. This applies to both the living 
and the dead.
Use of the lens can thus be a double- edged sword. More authority is given 
to those speaking in the field who have a diagnosis – diagnosis- as- asset, which 
can be deployed, can foster resilience,45 but, at the same time, diagnosis, once 
disclosed, also undermines people’s activities. The autistic academic, Melanie 
Yergeau, writes about her experience of the autism lens:
When my writing lacks transition, it is because I am autistic. When my fingers 
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autistic. When my eyes dart away or when my sentences grow long, it is because 
I am autistic.46
Non- professionals who frequently develop an ‘autism lens’ include adults who 
have a diagnosis of autism or an autistic identity or family members of those with 
a diagnosis: that is, members of the autism community.47 Adults diagnosed with 
autism in adulthood, and parents of autistic children, often educate themselves 
extensively about autism and develop a laser- like autism lens, a self- reported 
ability to spot autism in others, hence some retrospective diagnosing of dead 
people. I witnessed this first hand during my PhD research, when interviewing 
parents whose children had received a diagnosis of autism.48 Many of the parents 
I  interviewed discussed how autism had become visible everywhere since the 
autism diagnosis had come on their radar:
We were sat the other day having a meal and there was a family with a quite 
young lad and he was chattering away to the parents and Harry and I  just 
looked at each other and nodded. You kind of recognize it all the time. Watch 
things on television and say, ‘That’s Asperger’s definitely’ or autism (parent of 
diagnosed child).48
Friends, relatives and casual strangers were now visible (to them) as autistic. 
Occasionally, they approached others and offered the opinion that the other 
might have autism.
The autism lens could be considered as a mechanism of social contagion – 
the spread of information via social relations.49 A key US study showed that 
children were more likely to be diagnosed with autism if they lived near other 
children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD).50 Tom Lister looked 
at this process and identified two processes: more passive finding of autism 
and more active seeking of autism by autistic adults.41 He observed how the 
lens led to ‘lay diagnosis’, which in turn could lead to self- identification and/ 
or a later referral to a clinic. This is perhaps one mechanism through which 
social contagion takes place. The autism lens breeds more identification, more 
visibility and more diagnosis; in short, another looping effect potentially con-
tributing to autism’s rise.
Does my dog have autism?
Retrospective diagnosis is just one way the autism label is applied outside the 
doctors’ clinic. It shows that autism has become an entity that exists in our minds 
even without a living person to express it. Autism is now an idea separated and 
dislocated from the human body, neatly illustrated by another practice that has 
recently come to attention: diagnosing pets with very human disorders, a process 
we dubbed ‘anthropathography’.
There are websites and chatrooms dedicated to this practice. A US- based dog 










Can Dogs Get Autism?
Yes!
In some dogs who are suffering from autism, repetitive behavior such as inces-
sant tail chasing may be one of the more predominant symptoms. It is possible for 
the dog to become aggressive during an episode and care should be taken when 
approaching. In others, the condition may result in withdrawn behavior and a 
lack of activity. In some dogs, the symptoms may be so mild you don’t notice them 
but if you suspect your dog may have autism, you take him or her to your veter-
inarian for diagnosis.51
If humans display neurodiversity, no doubt so do other mammals. Dogs may or 
may not have similar types of neurodiversity. But diversity is not diagnosis! The 
diagnosis of autism in dogs relies on several assumptions:
• Autism is a category that can be transposed from humans to animals.
• The ‘symptoms’ listed have neurological origins and must be present from 
birth (indeed, Wag! states ‘present from birth’).
• Dog owners should look for neurological explanations for their pets’ aber-
rant behaviour.
There are many obvious problems with such assumptions, not least that human 
social behaviour can be equated with that of dogs, that the linguistic anomalies 
characteristic of autism are absent, that repetitive behaviours are instigated by 
under- stimulation of captive animals (see Chapter 9) and there is apparently no 
developmental aspect to autism- in- dogs. The risk factors that precipitate autism- 
in- dogs, according to Wag! are probably a bitch’s exposure to chemicals or 
inappropriate vaccinations during pregnancy.
The cardinal point is the transposition of autism from the human sub-
ject. Autism is transported wholesale as an idea. Autism- in- dogs illuminates 
the seductive power and reach of autism as a concept, strong enough to be 
dislocated from the human subject and survive the leap across the species 
boundary intact. Dislocation directly contradicts Sinclair’s experience of autism 
as an integral aspect of himself, underpinned by his preference for the use of 
person- first language – ‘autistic’ rather than ‘person with autism’ – designed to 
prevent dislocation.52
Forms of diagnosis
The different ways to confer a diagnosis have multiplied. The Exploring Diagnosis 
team brought together many types of diagnosis beyond the standard medical 
diagnosis of the type one would receive in a clinic:
• Pre- diagnosis:  identification of a person as being ‘at risk’ of being in a 
category
• Research diagnosis:  identification of a person as having a category by 
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• Self- diagnosis or self- identification: a person’s identification of themselves as 
being in a category
• Lay diagnosis: a person without medical training identifies someone else as 
having the condition
• Pathography: identification of dead person as being in a category
• Paleopathography:  diagnosis via artefacts or fragments from ancient 
civilisations
• Psychopathography: diagnosis of a dead person with a psychiatric condition
• Fictography (coined by Annemarie Jutel): a fictional person is identified as 
being in a category
• Anthropathography:  a diagnostic category developed in humans is trans-
ferred to the diagnosis of another species (for example, diagnosing dogs).
Today, different forms of diagnosis explain much of the current deviance beyond 
obvious disease: diagnoses are given for people who are seen to be too determined, 
too related, too self- aware, too sad, too bouncy, too aggressive, too frequently 
drunk, too stupid, too repetitive and too aloof. As diagnosis became the best- 
known, most powerful and dominant way for clinicians to explain deviance from 
the statistical norm, diagnostic ways of understanding people and their troubles 
have spilled over from being the exclusive domain of clinicians, giving rise to 
different types of diagnosis. Parallel practices of diagnosis have arisen, motivated 
by different reasons, using medical diagnosis as a frame of reference but adapting 
it to the diagnosers’ own ends. The process of diagnosis, whether by clinicians, 
lay people, family members or self-identifed, shapes the fabric of the diagnostic 
category as well as leading  their interpretations of own or others’ experience 
through its lens. In the modern context diagnosis, being named as this, or as that, 
also very often determines the pathway through care and through institutions. 
Eyal and colleagues suggest that autism was shaped in response to deinstitution-
alisation and the need to intervene and group children in the therapeutic frame. 
So as well as determining a pathway through care, a diagnostic category may be 
shaped by the need to delineate a pathway.
If autism has become an entity that can be removed and transposed to unborn 
babies, dead people, fictional characters and dogs, what next? Autistic plants? 
Autistic machines? Insects with autism? This may not be as far- fetched as it 
sounds; ADHD genetics researchers have published world- leading studies on the 
genetics of ADHD using hyperactive fruit flies, a well- respected animal model.53
Although autism diagnosis has been rolled out to new populations, I  do not 
want to suggest that neurological damage or differences are themselves ‘arte-
factual’; they are not. Part I of this book has not been about there being more 
neurodevelopmental difference but about the extension of diagnosis to new 
populations. Post 1990, new sections of the human population; infants, intellec-
tually able children, adults, and women have become eligible for autism diagnosis 
and inclusion of these new cohorts has directly increased the proportion of the 
people in our population with a diagnosis. Through this occurring, autism itself 
has been reshaped and reimagined, extending its reach even beyond the grave 
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and beyond the human. As what is autism has shifted, so has what it means to be 
autistic, and the power of diagnosis to transform or story a life.
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7  Epidemiology and lay epidemiology
Risk factors
In Chapter  1, we saw how population- based data have revealed an exponen-
tial increase in diagnosed autism in higher- income countries. This part examines 
whether there are plausible reasons for a ‘real’ increase; that is, a larger propor-
tion of children and adults with autistic- type traits since 1990. If so, it is likely 
that changes in social and technological practices and environmental risk factors 
since 1990 have elicited more divergent neurodevelopment.
Talking about ‘risk’ positions autism as a problem; being ‘at risk’ of autism, 
as discussed in the previous part, means someone is more likely than an average 
person to be identified. ‘Risk factor’ is a term that comes from medical research, 
and brings with it an influence on how we view people’s differences. Reading the 
literature on risk factors shows that only technical experts, trained epidemiologists, 
are able to quantify risks, that their studies originate from a medical standpoint, 
and they inevitably position the subject of the risk discourse (in this case autism), 
as being a problem that needs to be resolved. The idea of the ‘risk factors’ that 
precipitate autism and may have a role in increase of the proportion of people 
with autism traits, may be challenging for some in the neurodiversity movement, 
(see Figure I.2, Introduction) because the movement originated in resistance to 
parent-activism that positioned autism as distressing and  problematic, parent-
activism that strongly utilised this discourse of ‘risk’. Environmental trigger the-
ories were adopted by the hardcore faction in the this first wave of parent activists, 
whom may have seemed, to autistic self- advocates, to be intent on eliminating 
autistic people. Therefore the whole idea of risk and quantifying risk may be dis-
tasteful to leaders in this movement.
In the sections that follow, in order to review the evidence in the field, I have 
adopted the positivist framework, whilst hopefully, maintaining an awareness of 
the positions that various tribes have adopted, and why, utilising epidemiological 
language of ‘risk factors’. Exposure to a ‘risk factor’, as reported in this part, 
increases the probability that a larger proportion of the exposed population will 
have autism. Some exposures have profound consequences for neural develop-
ment and it is important to quantify them. Many risk factors have been studied, 
usually via epidemiological association studies that examine whether there are 





Vaccines and thimerosal have been the subject of controversy, yet have repeatedly 
been proven to have no link to autism.1 But what of other environmental and 
social risk factors; can they plausibly explain a portion of the rise?
Plausibility check
For any environmental or social explanatory risk factor to be plausible, even as a 
very partial explanation, it must fulfil these four criteria:
 1. Risk must have come into being or increased in the late modern age, circa 
1990.
 2. Risk must affect neurodevelopmental outcomes, especially eliciting autistic- 
type behaviours.
 3. Risk must have been present in high- income countries.
 4. Risk must have affected a significant proportion of the population.
Studies estimate the relative proportion of variance in outcomes of autism attrib-
utable to inherited risks, that is to familial (genetically inherited) factors. Autistic 
traits are heritable but the contribution of the environment is increasingly 
acknowledged. Up to half the liability for autism may be explained by environ-
mental influences;1 more recent studies attribute more variance to environmental 
factors, as discussed in Chapter 2.2
Studies that separate environmental from inherited influences often look at 
relatedness (siblings and especially twins) as a proxy measure of genetic inherit-
ance, yet also consider the shared environmental and cultural influences of fam-
ilies. Genetic predispositions cannot easily be disentangled from environmental 
factors, even though researchers try to, because people with the same genetics 
normally share very similar pre- and post- natal environments. For example, 
monozygotic (identical) twins not only share the same genetic make- up but 
the same womb, the same environmental exposures during pregnancy and the 
same birth traumas. Although studying monozygotic twins who are separated at 
birth through adoption is the gold- standard approach for disentangling inherit-
ance from environment, all these shared conditions still apply. Separated twins 
are likely to be placed in families from the same region, who will share cultural 
norms, including how autism is defined and recognised. In sibling and non- 
adoption studies, parenting style, school, experiences of childhood trauma, diet 
and local environmental exposures can usually be added to the list of shared 
environmental influences.
Another challenge to disentanglement is that, although a particular genetic 
profile predisposes an infant to atypical development, there is a complex inter-
play between genetic and environmental influences throughout development, 
leading to the expression of traits (perceptual, sensory, cognitive processing 
differences) as behaviours (Figure 7.1). Dichotomising the genetic and environ-
mental contribution is therefore fraught. For example, exposure to an infection 
during pregnancy might trigger the expression of a foetal genetic mutation that 
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autism being identified in childhood. Without that particular genetic anomaly, 
the infection might have had no impact on the foetus. The interplay may be fur-
ther complicated by multiple other environmental/ genetic interactions, overlaid 
by the recognition, understanding, social context and diagnosis of autism, which 
is the outcome in many gene/ environment studies.
Iodine is one example of a putative environmental risk factor. A  severe 
lack of iodine in the diet during pregnancy can lead to stunting, cretinism 
and other neurodevelopmental problems in the child.3 This is thought to be 
because the maternal thyroid hormone, which requires iodine, is crucial for the 
neurodevelopment of the foetus.4 Our systematic review found no clear link 
between thyroid insufficiency in pregnancy and autism in the child, although 
there was an association between mothers’ thyroid dysfunction and childhood 
indicators of intellectual disability.5 There is no serious iodine deficiency in the 
diet of the mainstream population of the developed world, especially not since 
1990. Therefore, iodine deficiency dose not pass the plausibility check and is an 
unlikely suspect for a risk factor to explain the rise in autism cases. But this is the 
type of environmental risk factor we might consider. To reiterate, for a risk factor 
to be a plausible contributor to a real rise in the number of neurodevelopmental 
diagnoses it must be:  (1) recent (post- 1990); (2)  associated with autism; and 
(3) present in high- income countries where the trend is observed.
In the next chapter, I will review some candidate risk factors and assess their 
plausibility as triggers drawn from a study of what the wider autism community 
as opposed to the autistic community, have put forward.
Lay epidemiology
The first research study I conducted covered this topic. In 2004, Jean Golding, 
at that time the director of the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children 







(ALSPAC), was awarded funding for an epidemiological study of environmental 
risk factors for autism. Her university put out a press release announcing the new 
research. Unsurprisingly, the press release prompted far- reaching media interest, 
with articles appearing in UK and international news outlets; Golding also gave 
several interviews to UK national radio and on local television. The publicity 
created a deluge of correspondence; Golding received around 100 unsolicited 
letters, e- mails and phone calls, many of which put forward theories about pos-
sible environmental triggers for autism.
By 2009, I was lucky to be co- supervised by Golding during my PhD. She 
suggested that I conduct an analysis of the correspondence (all of which she had 
carefully and conscientiously replied to) to see not only what correspondents 
were saying but how they were saying it. The unsolicited communications were a 
unique source of data, as they were not selected on the basis of any limiting cri-
teria imposed by researchers. The content reflected the correspondents’ views – 
very different from the ‘co- produced’ nature of data from traditional interview 
sources.6 I  re- contacted the correspondents to confirm they were happy to be 
included in the analysis, which we subsequently published.7
Almost all the correspondents were people who had close ties with autism. 
Some were parents with extensive experience caring for a child with autism, 
some were professionals with years in clinical practice and some were people with 
personal experience of autism, a group that Lorcan Kenny and colleagues loosely 
describe as ‘the autism community’.8 The correspondence broadly illustrated 
the strength of the correspondents’ belief that the true incidence of autism is 
rising and that this was due to the use of modern technologies and to changing 
lifestyles. For example, a retired teacher wrote:
I have been amazed at the increased incidence of autism – and pondered about 
the causes as have other people … since I left in 1995 something has happened – 
an explosion. The autistic did not exist in quantity pre- 1995 – so bearing in 
mind children enter schools at five years old – something changed around 1990 
onwards. I don’t think it can all be down to better detection of autism.7
At the time, we used the term ‘lay’ to describe the correspondents but this does 
not quite capture their relationship with autism. As the sociologist Lindsay 
Prior has pointed out, the term ‘lay- expert’ is an oxymoron.9 Together, these 
correspondents had enormous expertise. A few possessed traditional qualifications 
of scientific expertise, while others were non- traditional autism experts, having 
educated themselves extensively in autism literature; their expertise was not 
necessarily ‘scientific’ but none the less credible, valid and reflective of a view of 
expertise as fluency within a particular community.10
A handful of correspondents described how they had conducted mini- 
studies to test their personal theories. They were experts but in a different 
way to trained epidemiologists; hybrids who could best be described as ‘lay 
epidemiologists’.11– 13 In traditional epidemiology, the focus is on those causes 
which exert the largest effect; in lay epidemiology, the emphasis shifts to 
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frequently shows the imprints of both the environmental justice movement and 
of critical epidemiology among trained epidemiologists.13 The phenomenon has 
been discussed extensively by the sociologists Phil Brown13 and Brian Wynne.14 
Wynne points out that the lay community has technical expertise; they know 
the everyday exposures and lifestyles that may be associated with any outcome. 
Brown describes lay epidemiology as a form of citizen science – not only an 
appropriation of professional methods but also a form of social movement, 
often through a politically mobilised group coming together around the goal 
of identifying and ameliorating environmental stressors and their relationship 
to health outcomes. Erin Brockovich was a lay epidemiologist; after witnessing 
the deteriorating health in the community, she discovered toxic chromium6 was 
leaking into the groundwater sources in a Calfornian town, Hinkley. Her fight 
for social justice has been well documented and was the subject of an acclaimed 
Hollywood film.
My first study showed that lay epidemiology was an alternative form of 
expertise, harnessing information often drawn from insights hewn from the ‘coal 
face’ of autism. However, lay epidemiologists also co- opt the risk discourse to 
establish the causes of problems. Like traditional epidemiologists, being autistic is 
still positioned as something to be avoided, and risks to be mitigated; otherwise, 
there would be no reason to quantify risk.
Correspondents suggested more than 40 different environmental factors as 
potential reasons to explain autism’s rise. The vast majority related to medical tech-
nologies or practices, modern environmental risk factors or our changing way of life 
(Table 7.1 divides these theories into three categories: medical technologies, envir-
onmental exposures and lifestyle or social changes). Association studies that examine 
whether there are higher rates of autism for children who have been exposed to a 
factor of interest rarely afford the autistic participants, or their parents, teachers or 
relatives, any agency. Paying attention to people with lived experience, and their 
ideas about risk, by giving the lay epidemiologists’ questions and theories research 
time and credence may negate this.
The correspondence was unsolicited and there was so much of it! Its very 
bulk indicated a latent unease. Emotional investment, caring about autism, might 
seem antithetical to the objectivity of scientific enquiry. But in his book Risk 
Society Ulrich Beck warns against removing such human and emotional aspects 
from science.15 Science should consider instead what is culturally significant, 
he says:  ‘Social movements raise questions that are not answered by the risk 
technicians at all and the technicians answer questions which miss the point of 
what was really asked and what feeds public anxiety’.15
The risks Beck describes are invisible but become known, or are made visible, 
through scientific measurement (that is, epidemiology). Science identifies, defines 
and responds to risks. Correspondents suggested that the technological applications 
of modern life could be risk factors for autism (defining it as a problem), requesting 
the science of epidemiology to confirm their theories (to enable a solution). 
Meanwhile, the correspondents remained anxious. Some had even changed their 
working practices. One correspondent, a dentist by trade, had taken to removing 








Table 7.1  Putative risk factors for autism taken from correspondents’ theories
Medical technologies
Pregnancy and birth Ultrasound scans
Baby- induced
Early cord clamping/ cord wrapped around baby’s neck
Respiratory distress at birth
Caesarean section
Birth trauma, low birth weight, pre-term
Related to drugs/ toxins 
during pregnancy





DES (to prevent miscarriage)
Related to vaccines High levels of mercury due to dental fillings
Time of day of vaccination
Lack of aspiration when vaccine administered
Measles, mumps and rubella vaccine
Mercury due to thiomersal
Vulnerability to injections when teething
Polio vaccine




General Working mother leads to stress during pregnancy
Later motherhood
Amount of alcohol drunk during pregnancy
Time indoors
Overstimulation by cot toys
Too much television/ computer/ mobile phone
Related to modern diet Lack of cod liver oil
Food additives/ aspartame
Disaccharides and starches, sucrose
Food preservatives




Low- level radiation, e.g. computer monitors
Carbon monoxide exposure
Father works in nuclear power station/ exposure to 
radioactivity
Exposure to chemicals
Living near mobile phone mast/ exposure to low- level 
radiation
Mould from indoor environments
Air pollution/ air quality
Pollutants in water, pesticides
Previous miscarriage or bleeding during pregnancy
Dry birth (no amniotic fluid)
Child being born after twins
Notes: DES, diethylstilbestrol; DPT, diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus. 
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There are those who believe there is a correlationship between the rise in autistic 
spectrum disorders and the practice of early umbilical cord clamping. … As 
a midwife I find this very disturbing as this has been my practice and that of 
my colleagues. As a precautionary measure, I now leave the cord longer before 
cutting it, in order that the neonate might receive possibly 50% more of its blood 
supply from the placenta.
Such actions did not stem from ‘misconceptions’. On the other hand, they were 
not ‘correct’, more that many merited further investigation. In the following 
chapter I review the evidence for one theory from eachof the categories in Table 
7.2, using the epidemiological language of ‘risk factors’. The theories displayed 
logic and integrity, born from everyday exposure to autism in the context of their 
lives. Their intimate experiences with autism gave them a partial and located view-
point, a form of situated knowledge.16 The insights the correspondents provided 
came from varied sources of information, drawn both from personal and profes-
sional networks and the public arena.11, 17, 18 This close, personal connection meant 
correspondents often had a viewpoint, sometimes accompanied by tremendous 
emotional investment in their own ideas, that traditional epidemiologists lacked.7
Separating autistic traits from diagnosis
These theories of putative risk factors for autism inspired the next ten years of 
my work. Following the lay epidemiology work and to help settle the issue of 
autism’s diagnostic expansion versus more autism (or at least provide some par-
tial evidence), we conducted a traditional epidemiological study that attempted 
to uncouple increase in diagnosis after 1990 from increase in traits. We examined 
population- based data to see whether the growth of diagnosis in children with 
autism over a ten- year period was mirrored by a parallel increase in the number 
of children with mild or severe traits of autism; in essence, whether the increased 
rate of diagnosis was due to an increase in the number of children with autism or 
an increase in recognition by autism diagnosis.19
Data measured many years apart are not always directly comparable; different 
studies use different measures of case ascertainment. To account for this, we 
analysed data from two consecutive UK cohorts that had like- for- like measures: 
ALSPAC, which follows around 14,000 children born in 1991 or 1992, and the 
Millennium Cohort Study (MCS) of 18,000 children born ten years later, in 
2000 or 2001, which followed their cohorts from birth through childhood and 
into adulthood. Using data from both studies, we calculated the number of eight- 
year- old children with autism- type traits and the number with diagnosis in the 
late 1990s (the ALSPAC children), compared to the number of eight- year- olds 
with autism- type traits and the number with autism diagnosis in the late 2000s 
(the MCS children).
Had the levels of traits (as opposed to levels of diagnosis) increased? The 
important quality of these two datasets was that they both collected the same 
type of reports of autism diagnosis: how much eye contact children made, their 







abilities.20 Despite being ten years apart, both studies used the same measures to 
gather some of their information. We found eight common measures, taken from 
teacher and parent reports, that were highly associated with the autism diagnosis, 
including poor communication, being less able to sustain peer relationships, 
being afraid of new situations and not being able to share easily or empathise well 
with other children. We fused these into a rough measure of autistic traits.
Inevitably, some data were missing, as not all families and schools enrolled in 
the cohort studies had completed the reports. Because of this, we analysed data 
where more than half the scores were present, which provided a large sample of 
approximately 16,000 children. The merged traits produced a composite score 
for each child, a coarse measure of how ‘autistic’ children were. We called this 
‘the composite autism- type traits score’ (CATS).
The CATS were actually fairly normally distributed in the population of chil-
dren as a whole and gave us the approximate distribution of autism traits in the 
whole population already illustrated in Figure I.5 in the Introduction. Most chil-
dren fell into the mid- range. Of children who had an autism diagnosis at eight 
years old, 70% fell into the top 5% of scores. We also defined a threshold for 
‘severe CATS’, defined as the top 1% of CATS. This told us that, although not 
a perfect measure of autism traits, CATS was a reasonable approximation, and 
probably the best we could hope for given the limitations of the two datasets.
Our hypothesis was consistent with the ‘artefactual’ explanation of the rise 
in autism diagnosis:  that a larger proportion of children would be diagnosed 
in the later cohort but there would be no parallel increase in the proportion of 
children with autism- type traits. As predicted, there was a sharp rise in autism 
diagnosis between the two cohorts. In 1998, about 1.1% of eight- year- olds 
reportedly had an autism diagnosis, compared to 1.7% in 2008. Autism diagnosis 
rates had increased dramatically in the ten- year gap. As we had anticipated, in the 
two groups of eight- year- olds with severe CATs, there was no parallel jump in 
numbers; the proportion of children who had severe traits remained stable des-
pite increased diagnosis.
Our findings were not entirely what we expected. Intruigingly, the proportion 
of children with milder traits (the 5% threshold) had increased in MCS compared 
to the proportion in ALSPAC ten years earlier, in tandem with the proportion 
with a diagnosis (Figure 7.2).
The study was an attempt to answer a big question. However, it suffered from 
several limitations, which reviewers were quick to point out when the study was 
submitted for publication. Some reviewers were very strong in their criticism 
of the paper, although others liked it. One problem was that the two cohorts 
were quite different in their make- up, geographical distribution and compar-
ability. CATS was not a validated autism score, so some reviewers questioned the 
measure we used. It was hard to find a home for the work; it travelled to several 
high- impact journals, including the British Medical Journal (BMJ) before it even-
tually settled into a relatively low- impact journal, BJPsych Open.19
As the paper travelled through various journals and accrued rejections, I began 
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medical establishment might not like the tentative conclusion that milder autism 
traits might have increased in the general population, being worried it might 
fan the flames of the anti- vaccine ‘believers’. For example, on the manuscript’s 
journey to its final destination, one anonymous reviewer for Journal of the 
American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry commented:
Child and adolescent psychiatrists have been telling the public for decades that 
vaccines, for example, do not substantially increase the rates of autism. We have 
a professional obligation to anticipate how our literature may be perceived by 
the public and what our publication will be communicating. This article could 
be interpreted by those who are strong proponents of ‘environmental’ autism 
theories (vaccines, chelation therapy, etc.) as evidence that their claim is true.
One reading of this review, from a sociological standpoint, is that the reviewer 
indicates is there is only one approved way to have ‘professional obligations’ 
and those obligations appear to be mostly self- serving, by which I  mean 
stabilising the authority of the discipline. This is the power relation: the voices 
within (such as that of the peer reviewer) have the authority. The profession/ 
discipline’s agency is undermined by any marginal inside voices that might be 
taken as support for voices on the outside who might challenge the disciplinary 
position.
As an epidemiologist, I  could point out that the work was perhaps funda-
mentally methodologically flawed and no speculation could be based on the 
results. But were the methods too flawed to support a discussion that even raised 
the possibility of a real rise? Had a stronger methodological approach or data 
been employed, stronger conclusions would have been warranted. Was it, in fact, 
a question of good scientific practice? Although both positions are valid, this 
Figure 7.2  Change in mild traits and diagnosis in eight- year- olds in 1998 (Avon 
Longitudinal Study of Parents And Children (ALSPAC)) compared to 2008 




illuminates the tension between being both a quantiatively minded epidemiolo-
gist and a qualitatively minded social scientist. This is an issue of interdisciplinarity, 
that language and practices of each discipline are constrained and limit the pos-
sibilities of thought and expression, a topic I return to with reference to risk dis-
course in the next section.
At the same time as we submitted our work, unbeknownst to us, a similar 
article was submitted to the BMJ. This article, based on Swedish data, took a 
very similar tack, comparing time trends in autism diagnosis with parents’ reports 
of autism symptoms over ten years (1993– 2002). The sensitivity and specificity 
of the reported measure were similar to CATS. The Swedish article concluded 
that, although rates of diagnosis of autism were increasing, there was no parallel 
increase in symptoms. It was eventually published in the BMJ and had an enor-
mous international reach.21 But even this high- impact article had its limits: the 
parent- reported measure of autism was based on a very small sub- set of the data. 
Only 12 children were rated as having more severe symptoms of autism when 
the symptoms were first measured and 13 at the close. Nevertheless, this Swedish 
study had a larger overall sample size, like- for- like measures and many more time 
points than our study.
No study is without its limitations. There are inherent methodological 
challenges to all longitudinal, cross- cohort studies:  sample sizes, comparable 
cohorts, comparable forms of measurement and so on. ‘Exercise caution in inter-
pretation’ is the message. After multiple apprehensive reviews of our study, and 
some positive ones, I rewrote the concluding section of our article, abandoning 
any suggestion that autism might really be on the rise, as we were unable to pro-
vide any truly conclusive answers to the real- versus- artefactual debate. Instead, 
we reported our findings as a probable artefact of increased reporting of traits 
by parents and teachers, whose ratings primarily made up the CATS. The article 
concluded that the jump in the number of children with milder traits was likely 
to be as artefactual as the increase in diagnosis. This observed rise, I wrote, was 
probably due to teachers’ and parents’ increasing identification of autistic- type 
childhood behaviours.19 Unfortunately, this unintentionally threw the object-
ivity of the parent- reported symptoms in the yet- to- be- published BMJ paper into 
question.
Despite this experience, I still think it is important to at least hold open the 
possibility that neurodevelomental issues are on the increase in the population at 
large, however slightly. The observed shift might not be entirely ‘artefactual’. If 
this is the case, a proportion of the increase, however small, is likely to be under-
pinned by relatively new social or medical practices like those highlighted by our 
lay epidemiologists.
Covid- 19 and the discourse of risk
The empirical studies discussed in this part all operationalise the concept of risk 
as unproblematic, and this is how I have used the construct. As discussed above, 
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as a ‘disrupted’ neurodevelopment. Risk studies discursively position autism as a 
threatening entity; for this reason they may be objectionable to some radicals in 
the neurodiversity movement. The justification for the study of risk factors for 
autism is often that, by quantifying risks, autism and other neurodevelopmental 
outcomes can be avoided by mitigating the risk, that is, by intervention through 
policy or practice. Before considering the plausibility of risk factors for autism, it 
is worth considering Beck’s, and other social theorists, contributions to thinking 
about the ‘discourse of risk’.
The outbreak of Covid- 19 provides a demonstration of how risk has come 
to dominate political action and governance, both through risk calculation (of 
something that may or may not happen in the future) and the mitigation of risk, 
an endeavour Beck sees as characteristic of our late modern age. Beck’s work 
discusses how previously invisible risks are rendered visible by technical experts 
(in the case of Covid- 19, the risks posed were rendered visible by epidemiologists 
and modellers) and how these definitions of risk overtly direct the political gov-
ernance of society. Science not only defines the risk or the problem but scientific 
or technical experts also provide the solution (for example, a vaccine).
The result is that power becomes concentrated in the hands of a small cabal of 
experts who are qualified to assess the risk and recommend forms of mitigation. 
Decision making is removed from the population, which is ill qualified either 
to define risk or provide the best aversion strategy. Hence, the majority is left 
both enforcing the strategy and mitigating for the damage of the strategy itself. 
The lockdown in response to Covid- 19 was a population- level medical interven-
tion in response to a medically defined risk calculation. This is the ‘discourse of 
risk’, in which risk to life is discussed and dissected and action or intervention is 
demanded. Beck’s work has further been used to dissect the threat of ‘weapons 
of mass destruction’ defined by a small number of experts in intelligence agencies 
before the Iraq War, antibiotic resistance and the terrorist threat.22 For Covid- 19, 
risk is the dominant discourse and Beck’s work seems highly salient. Albeit, unlike 
the weapons, Covid- 19 is very real.
Michel Foucault had quite a different notion of risk. In his book Discipline and 
Punish, he describes the difference between normal and pathological states but his 
attention is on the normalising gaze that regulates the way we behave and present 
ourselves in public and in our community and how this is linked to a moralising 
discourse.23 Foucault’s early work defines biopower as the form of power that 
controls human bodies, interaction and populations, which not only flows hier-
archically from above to below (judges to accused, monarchs to subjects) as in the 
pre- modern era but is also wielded through surveillance – community surveillance 
and, in particular, self- surveillance.24 Power circulates and is employed through a 
net- like organisation. People police each other and police their own behaviour; the 
action and stances they take are shaped by discipline and self- control. Foucault’s 
ideas about surveillance seem highly relevant to the community policing during 
the Covid- 19 lockdowns, although his impersonal concept of power does not 
mean it is held equally. Power still acts to keep some in subservient roles and 





knowledge of which we speak: beliefs, ideas, concepts, language together make up 
a system of representation that organises our relation to reality.
Discourses such as those surrounding Covid- 19, and autism, do not simply 
describe reality but, according to Foucault, shape, and teach us, how we see 
reality, so there are only certain ways in which we are able to talk about a topic. 
The autistic activist, Nick Walker, calls discourse of the risk underlying autism 
science the ‘pathology paradigm’.25 In this, the risk discourse contains the under-
lying assumption that population- wide screening, defining risk and intervening 
are desirable, even if currently impractical, underpinned by the discourse that an 
undesireable outcome should be eliminated, when possible.
The limited palette of language for talking about an outcome is exacerbated by 
the media’s propagation of a risk discourse that highlights threats. In early 2020, 
in both the UK and the USA, commentators and politicians drew on metaphors 
of ‘battle’ and ‘war’ to motivate the common moral endeavour to protect the vul-
nerable  from Covid. In the UK, daily counts of the deaths from Covid- 19 were 
widely reported during the worst of the outbreak (reminiscent of the death toll 
of The Hunger Games26). Yet there was an excess of deaths above and beyond the 
number expected for the time of year that were not due to Covid- 19 although 
there were not as many of them, these lives were equally important, yet they were 
not subject to the same daily roll call. These excess deaths could be attributed 
to the effects of lockdown, such as a reluctance to seek care, delays in receiving 
medical treatment, isolation or unidentified Covid- 19. But it was the risk of 
death from confirmed Covid- 19 that was highlighted, breeding anxiety and pro-
moting surveillance by accentuating the danger of death both for those at high 
risk (mainly vulnerable elderly people with existing health problems) and those at 
very low risk (young, healthy people) to ensure compliance to new behavioural 
norms and foster self-and community surveillance to uphold them. At the time of 
writing, Covid- 19 has become more normalised and the discourse has shifted as 
the surveillance role that the population occupies is less heightened.
The ‘war’ against Covid- 19 is an example of how language has contributed to 
risk discourse. It is reminiscent of the proliferation of other discourses of risk, for 
example, the ‘obesity epidemic’ discourse, in which the media act as amplifiers 
and moralisers.27 In contrast, the ‘autism epidemic’ is an unorthodox and highly 
contested phrase, because of the unwanted mobilisation around its rise, yet 
autism is still associated with risk and being at risk. The positioning of autism as 
something to be dreaded and eliminated has motivated activism in the autistic 
rights and neurodiversity movement, as discussed in Chapter 4.
The Covid- 19 lockdowns in Europe, the USA and elsewhere, then, relied on 
community control, self- policing and surveillance to create a ‘new normal’. For 
Foucault, writing decades ago, the social institutions of school, prisons, hospital 
and so on are sites of surveillance that act as ‘a means of control and method of 
domination’.23 Institutional mechanisms, such as exams, medical training and 
qualification, link ‘a certain type of the formation of knowledge’ to ‘a certain 
form of the exercise of power’.23 Thus, in Foucauldian terms, epidemiological 
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its predicted transmission. To legitimise interventions, politicians defer to epi-
demiological experts. The population surrenders its power to determine the best 
course of action and patients surrender themselves to treatment by clinicians 
who become war heroes.
The potential risks of long- term lockdown formed another, alternative dis-
course of risk, based on a different outcome to risk of loss of life. What was at 
risk was not merely damage to the economy but the exacerbation of inequal-
ities across the divides that define the lines of power:  across gender, race and 
class. Lockdowns hit the disadvantaged hardest, exacerbating inequality and 
risking public health, as poverty is the biggest killer of all. For many people in 
the ‘gig economy’, who live a hand- to- mouth existence, it was not possible to 
earn money during the lockdown. People outside the system were not eligible 
for state support. Social distancing was hard for more disadvantaged people who 
lived in crowded urban areas and who needed public transport to get to work. 
Globally, domestic violence against women (and children), who perhaps relied 
on frustrated husbands who suddenly had little or no income, increased during 
lockdowns. Women and members of ethnic minorities predominated in low- paid 
caring roles or in caring for elderly relatives, making them susceptible to infec-
tion. Members of ethnic minorities, as well as suffering higher death rates, were 
disproportionately represented in the key workers’ groups, often in low- paid 
and insecure jobs. Education happened in a much more haphazard way for the 
poorest than the richest. Women carried the brunt of childcare and children’s 
education in the newly pertinent domestic sphere.
The mechanisms of democracy and free speech were also ‘at risk’. In some 
countries, the need for mass intervention of social distancing was used to suppress 
#BlackLivesMatter rallies after the death of George Floyd. Hungary fell victim to 
a new regime that took sweeping new powers to rule by decree; the Covid- 19 
pandemic and the measures needed to control it were used to justify the extension 
of state control, such as a new law proposing the end of legal gender recogni-
tion for transgender people. Journalists who opposed the government were unable 
to report the pandemic accurately and faced gaol for unauthorised reporting.28 
Márton Békés, a pro- government magazine editor, commented on Hungarian 
television that, as Hungary was now in a ‘war situation’, government control was 
necessary and opposition media outlets who drew attention to widening inequal-
ities were ‘openly rooting for the virus’.28 Covid- 19 interventions and risk discourse 
were used to justify the concentration of power and suppression of free speech.
A competing and parallel risk discourse provoked by the Covid- 19 pandemic 
was, and is, the discourse of planetary risk. Environmentalists pleaded that the 
focus should remain on planetary health; that climate change and the health of 
the planet were the big picture. The lockdowns saw widespread changes in human 
behaviour and encouraged companies to alter their everyday operations. Millions 
of employees worked at home, reducing congestion, improving air quality and 
lowering levels of particulate air pollution. A Tweet proclaiming ‘Coronavirus is 
Earth’s vaccine. We’re the virus’ had, at the time of writing, received more than 




movement and industry.29 Similar rejoicings accompanied the huge decline in 
aviation and the collapse of oil prices. The environmental lobby want us to learn 
the lessons of lockdown, advocating for some changes, such as home working and 
the demise of extensive tourism, to become more permanent.
Risk calculation is a thoroughly uncertain endeavour and the competing 
discourses swirling around Covid- 19 illustrate there are different points of view on 
what should be deemed an important outcome, what is at risk, what should be 
mitigated for and what considered a bad outcome. The upshot of action to mitigate 
or control risk is that more and different risks spring up. Beck writes that risk society:
draws attention to the limited controllability of the dangers we have created 
for ourselves. The main question is how to take decisions under conditions of 
manufactured uncertainty, where not only is the knowledge base incomplete but 
more and better knowledge often means more uncertainty.30
This is worth considering in autism discourse: the risk of what? Many measures 
are considered and tested and their outcomes are modelled. Increasingly, scholars 
have argued that reducing autism itself is less important than improving quality 
of life and well- being.31
Autism has its own discourse of risk. That is, autism is positioned as an outcome 
to be avoided. As with other risks, uncertainty in the calculation of risk is inherent 
in the studies of risk factors for autism. In the next chapter I will describe work 
that considers the risk of having autism, as measured by research scales (meas-
uring autistic behavioural traits) and/ or diagnosis.
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8  Risks during conception, pregnancy 
and birth
Risk factors
When considering risk factors for autism, it is not sensible to consider autism 
as one discrete diagnosable entity because the same types of risks are likely to 
underpin multiple neurodevelopmental traits that cut across different categories 
of disorder.1– 10 The co- occurrence of autism with attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD) is around 30%, the overlap of autism and intellectual disabil-
ities is in the range of 50% and the co- occurrence with epilepsy roughly 20%.11 
Internalising disorders, such as anxiety and depression, also frequently co- occur 
with autism, although this may be a result of exclusion, rejection and bullying.12 
A family history of autism is, of course, a risk factor but so are other parental psy-
chiatric disorders, clouding the boundaries between co- inherited traits of various 
disorders.13 Despite this, journals and disciplines are often organised around diag-
nostic categories and epidemiologists examining risk factors often write about 
risk predicting different diagnostic categories (autism, ADHD, etc.). Diagnostic 
categories may not always cut nature at the joints but are how epidemiologists, 
publishing houses and their readers and clinicians have historically structured, 
communicated and understood their work on risk.
In this chapter, I will review studies of factors that predict having both autism 
and broader neurodevelopmental disorders and summarise the evidence on three 
potential early risk factors for autism. I have conducted three brief reviews, one 
for each candidate risk, each a contender put forward by the lay epidemiologists 
of the previous chapter:  older parenthood, pre- term birth and air pollution.14 
Of course, this is not a comprehensive review of all the possible risk factors for 
autism; rather, these examples allow for some consideration of how social shifts, 
new aspects of the built environment and changing medical practice may, or may 
not, be plausible as triggers accounting for a portion of the observed rise.
Older parenthood
The time trend
Since 1990, in high- income countries, the average age at which women give birth 
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from 2000 to 2018. In Germany, the UK and France, mothers’ average age at the 
birth of their first child is now more than 30; in Sweden, where gender equality is 
high, more than a quarter of women have children after the age of 35.
The picture is moderated by the strong correlation between the mother’s age 
at childbirth and her education level.15 Well- educated women more often delay 
childbirth than do less- educated women. On average, having a university degree 
defers the age of starting a family by seven years.15 Consequently, there has been 
a sharp increase in women over 35 (and over 40) having babies. This is probably 
because well- educated women are more often financially independent and have 
access to fertility treatment (and contraceptives) and thus are able to defer preg-
nancy in favour of their career, maximising their earning potential and gaining 
time to undertake other pursuits. The demographic trend in fathers’ age follows 
a similar trajectory. Since 1970, the average age of first- time fathers has increased 
annually in all the 23 Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development 
(OECD) countries for which data are available.16 The rise in second marriages for 
men, sometimes to women much younger than themselves, can also mean they 
become a father at a more advanced age.
Evidence of association
Numerous studies, including one of ours, have identified a link between older 
motherhood, and/ or older fatherhood, and offspring with autism, although the 
evidence of the link with older motherhood is less conclusive than that with older 
fathers.17 One problem is that some studies, including our own, do not control 









for the interaction with the other parent’s age. One study of more than a million 
children in Denmark avoided this problem.18 This study found an association, 
independent of the other parent’s age, between both maternal and paternal age 
and their child’s later autism diagnosis. Intriguingly, the effect for fathers was 
greatest when mothers were less than 35 years old, and vice versa for mothers. 
Interestingly, there is evidence that both autism and ADHD are more likely 
outcomes for children of very young mothers as well as older mothers.19
A second problem in assessing the impact of parental age comes from pooling 
data across consecutive cohorts, sometimes from cohorts where children were 
born more than 20 years apart, which tends to over- estimate risk because the inci-
dence of autism diagnosis is rising.20 Another large study, which examined data 
from more than four million children in California born between 1992 and 2000, 
took this into account.20 This study found an increased risk of having a child with 
autism in mothers of more than 40 years old and a parallel, but limited, effect 
of the father’s age. A  Swedish study, including more than 400,000 children, 
found the effect of age on the risk of having a child with autism was stronger for 
mothers than fathers.21
A further Scandinavian study, again using Swedish data, this time of more than 
a million people, concluded fathers’ age independently determined the increased 
risk, over and above other risks, for autism, including inherited traits (which 
they assessed via controlling for risk of autism in the fathers’ other children).22 
The same group conducted a systematic review that meta- analysed data from 12 
studies on the same topic.23 This found evidence for both maternal and paternal 
age effects, estimating that the risk of having an autistic child increases by 18% 
for every ten years’ increase in the mother’s age, with a 21% rise in risk for every 
ten years’ worth of deferred fatherhood. Findings were similar in an updated 
review.24 Parental age at birth was more strongly associated with autism plus intel-
lectual disability (ID) than for autism without ID. The paternal age effect extends 
to conditions beyond autism, with studies showing late fatherhood is linked to 
schizophrenia, as well as to dyslexia, reduced intelligence25 and ADHD19 in their 
offspring. Older maternal age has been associated with Down’s syndrome26 and 
childhood cancer.27
However, research documenting an increased risk of autism, or indeed the 
increased risk of any other condition, usually neglects the potential benefits of 
being born to late- producing, well- educated parents. Being born to older parents 
is advantageous in some ways, probably because of the association with high 
education and high socio- economic status.16 Improved language, social and emo-
tional health, and academic attainment have been associated with later mother-
hood, for example.28
Explanations of association – see Figure 8.2
The most prominent hypothesis in the literature, shown in Figure 8.2 as pathway 
(i), is that spontaneous genetic mutations (known as de novo mutations), which 
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risk of disrupted neurodevelopment. Studies have found higher rates of de novo 
mutations in autistic children, with some variants common between autism and 
ID, especially copy number variants, in which chunks of chromosome are acci-
dentally replicated, deleted, inverted or translocated during cell division.29, 30 
Copy number variants at specific chromosomal locations are thought to have a 
role in autism susceptibility. The de novo mechanism is consistent with the obser-
vation that a child with autism who has an older father is likely to be the father’s 
only child with autism.31 However, in the Danish study,18 having both an older 
mother and an older father conferred no cumulative risk, which we would expect 
if the increased risk were due to new mutations.
Another suggested mechanism linking older motherhood to autism 
(Figure 8.2, pathway ii) is that older mothers are more likely to experience birth 
complications, including higher rates of birth by Caesarean section, prema-
ture birth and low birth weight,32 which have been associated with childhood 
autism, ID and neuro- disability.33 The impact of advanced maternal age on birth 
weight has apparently decreased over time as peri- natal services have improved, 








suggesting some effects of maternal age on child outcomes are not absolute but 
depend on the circumstances of the pregnancy and the services available.33, 34
Another possible pathway is the contribution of epigenetic changes (Figure 8.2, 
pathway iii). Distinct epigenetic profiles have been associated with autism, and 
may mediate the link.35 Whether or not genes are expressed depends on their 
regulation by other genes, which in turn depends on methylation (whether 
there is a methyl group attached to the DNA), imprinting (suppression of gene 
expression inherited from mother or father) and histones (the structures that 
chromosomes wind around), all of which may be influenced by the cellular envir-
onment, which in turn may be affected by cumulative exposure to toxins over the 
life course.36 One review refers to evidence that three environmental exposures 
(polychlorinated biphenyls (found in paint), lead (found in petrol) and bisphenol 
A (found in plastic packaging)) can alter DNA methylation in utero.37 Older par-
enthood means a person may have had more exposure to these substances, passing 
more epigenetic changes down the germline.22 Whether longer exposure really 
results in permanent methylation changes or indeed whether methylation can be 
inherited across multiple generations in humans remains highly controversial.38
Pathway (iv) offers a credible socio- cultural explanation. As better parental 
education predicts later parenthood and is also probably correlated to autism 
awareness and the reporting of autism traits (pathway v), better parental edu-
cation explains the link.15 Education is a confounding factor; higher education 
predicts older parenthood and autism will be identified more often by those with 
higher education. Assuming parents with a better education are more likely to be 
aware of autism, analysis will reveal an artefactual correlation between the two.
A final possibility, perhaps the simplest, is that the observed association is due to 
inherited autistic traits. There is some evidence to suggest that, on average, people 
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with autism are later in starting romantic relationships than allistic (non- aut-
istic) people.39 Studies suggest autistic adults are not only later in starting sexual 
relationships,40 are less sexually experienced as adolescents and young adults,41 have 
lower libido on average,42 engage in inappropriate courtship behaviours and more 
often focus on inappropriate targets as potential mates.43 Together, these studies 
suggest autistic people may face barriers in getting long- term sexual relationships 
off the ground and, if they eventually become parents, may be more likely to be 
older, passing on autistic traits in the second generation. The parent- with- traits 
pathway produces a putative looping or feedback mechanism (Figure 8.3). The 
social issues autistic people face in forming relationships feed back on to biological 
risk and, potentially, will increase the proportion of the population diagnosed 
with autism as the generations go by. The loop shown in Figure 8.3 cannot have 
contributed to the post- 1990 rise in autism, however, as the timeframe is too short.
Could older parenthood per se plausibly explain any of the rise in autism? This 
is conceivable (Table 8.1) and may be due to any or all of the mechanisms shown 
in Figure 8.2, plus others. But the likelihood is that increasing parental age has 
had only a small impact on the rise in autism diagnosis. A study analysing nearly 
a million children born in New York between 1994 and 2001 found the propor-
tion of mothers over 35 increased by around 15% and fathers over 35 increased 
by 12% in those seven years.44 Autism prevalence in the cohort reportedly also 
increased, from 1 in 3,300 children born in 1994 to 1 in 233 children born in 
2001. The risk of having a child with autism was nearly double for mothers aged 
35 or older compared to those under 25 and nearly one and a half times greater 
for older fathers. Because they controlled for risk factors other than parental age, 
the researchers made the dubious calculation that parental age accounted for 
2.7% of the rise in autism prevalence. Dubious, because the study was far from 
comprehensive in the ‘risks’ it was able to control for and made no attempt to 
account for changed understandings of autism, methods of identification, diag-
nostic infrastructures and cultural shifts. What the study did indicate is that it is 
plausible that a proportion of the rise in autism can be accounted for by older 
parenthood, but is likely to be dwarfed by the influence of other factors.
Air pollution
The time trend
Air pollution refers to concentrations of both dust and invisible gases. Most of 
what can be classified as ‘pollutants’ travels into the atmosphere from natural 
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sources such as volcanic ashes, smoke from forest fires, pollen and hair; humans 
and animals are adapted to cope with these sources for example through mucous 
and cilia clearance.45
Human activities also release airborne particles, through the burning of forest 
and farmland, industrial pollution, domestic fires, energy production, agricul-
tural emissions and especially through transport: planes, trains and automobiles.45 
Man- made pollutants in Africa are more likely to originate from domestic fires46; 
traffic, power generation and agricultural emissions contribute more in Europe, 
America and Asia.47 Vehicles are estimated to be responsible for 30% of emissions 
of airborne particles and gases in European cities and up to 50% of emissions in 
the cities of lower- income countries, with older diesel vehicles the main culprits.48 
Gases, dust and ash emission particles may contain heavy metals, minerals, 
moulds, sulphur, carbon compounds and organic and chemicals, including ben-
zene derivatives.
Particulate air pollution, airborne dust, is divided for analysis into smaller 
particles of fine particulate matter with an aerodynamic dry diameter of less 
than 2.5 micrometers (known as PM2.5) and larger particles of particulate matter 
(PM10). The bulk of research linking air pollution to neurodevelopmental 
outcomes has been carried out on PM2.5.
An array of gases and particles, all with different toxicities, is lumped together 
as PM2.5. Different emissions have different chemical compositions, so it is hard 
to detect a specific chemical signal for a possible neurodevelopment disruption 
mechanism. The diameter of the particle is not always the best determinant of 
how long it will remain airborne, nor of how the particle will interact with the 
respiratory system. In other words, a specific particle that may be damaging to 
human health may or may not be present in a generic measure of PM2.5. Fibrous 
dusts, such as asbestos, can trigger distinct health problems but these are pri-
marily related to the shape of the asbestos particles, not their size.49 Furthermore, 
PM2.5 levels are difficult to assess; they vary by time of day, indoors or outdoors, 
location, altitude, season, weather and local conditions.50 The picture is fur-
ther complicated in that people who may have experienced high exposure may 
not have frequent high exposure; prolonged low- level exposure may be more 
damaging than occasional high levels. Moreover, people of different ages have 
different sensitivities to pollution and human migration and travel render stable 
measurement of exposure even more challenging. The various methodological 
challenges of measuring air pollution have been summarised in several environ-
mental papers.51, 52
Despite the difficulties in measurement, the time trend is well established. 
Levels of PM2.5 in outdoor air have been increasing in low- and middle- income 
countries since the 1980s.53 Emissions over Asia have increased notably, partly 
due to the existence of industrial plants and the use of diesel vehicles, especially 
in China and India. It is estimated that 87% of the global population lives in 
areas where the air quality exceeds the World Health Organization’s (WHO) 
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However, in North America and Europe, levels of PM2.5 have declined 
between 1990 and the present day.55– 57 US national data suggest levels have 
dropped consistently since 2000, although there is some evidence of a slight 
increase since 2016.58 The trend towards better air quality in high- income coun-
tries is attributed to widespread implementation of air quality regulation and 
emission controls.53
Evidence of association
This cursory review gives a brief indication of the breadth of research on the 
putative association. Most epidemiological studies have focused on a child’s pre- 
natal exposure or exposure during infancy – periods thought to be critical for the 
developing brain.59 Much of the research on air pollution and child outcomes 
combines information from individual birth records or cohort data with measures 
of ambient air quality, usually from fixed outdoor monitors.51 But because fixed 
monitors do not follow mothers around, this introduces a degree of measurement 
error. Studies that cover the mother’s exposure to air pollution during pregnancy 
sometimes sub- divide the pregnancy by trimester to detect when the foetus might 
be more sensitive to air pollution but, to date, no systematic reviews have iden-
tified a clear pattern.60 Pre- natal exposure is almost always assessed via maternal 
exposure to PM2.5. This is problematic, as mothers vary in how efficient they are 
at removing inhaled particulate matter from their bodies before it is transferred to 
the foetus. Being a long- term smoker, for example, reduces the ability to remove 
particulate matter from the human system.49 Studies cannot usually control for 
such varied ability.
Studies have produced mixed findings. A large Danish study of children born 
between 1989 and 2013 that included more than 15,000 children with an autism 
diagnosis and more than 68,000 controls matched by birth year found there 
was no association between maternal exposure to PM2.5 during pregnancy and 
autism diagnosis in their offspring.59 It did find that exposure to PM2.5 in infancy 
increased the risk of autism diagnosis over and above the effect of parental age, 
smoking and pre- natal exposure to PM2.5. Pollution was more strongly associated 
with autism among residents of urban neighbourhoods.59
Two smaller American studies (with approximately 250 cases of autism 
compared to roughly equal numbers of controls) from California61 and 
Pennsylvania62 assessed exposures to PM2.5 pre- as well as post- natally. These 
studies both reported associations with autism risk during both developmental 
stages. The Californian study found exposure to heavy traffic pollution was sig-
nificantly associated with a child’s later research diagnosis.63, 64 A  study from 
China, on a similar scale, tested exposure in children’s first three years of life and 
found positive correlations between severity of air pollution and autism.65
A big US study using satellite- based estimates of air quality, with a sample of 
more than two million eight- year- old children living in 15 US sites, found a posi-

















study (more than 400 cases), based in Ohio, found a positive link between the risk 
of autism and post- natal exposure at high levels.67 By contrast, another American 
study found absolutely no link between PM2.5 exposure and autism severity,68 
and neither did a large Canadian study with a population- based sample of more 
than 100,000.69 A pan- European study examining associations between exposure 
during gestation and autistic traits in four cohorts in the Netherlands, Spain, Italy 
and Sweden found no association.70 A 2016 systematic review and meta- analysis 
found a significant increase in risk of autism when infants were exposed to higher 
levels of PM2.5 but no overall effect for mothers’ exposure during pregnancy.71 
However, only two studies met the inclusion criteria for the meta- analysis of 
infant exposure. A more recent systematic review,60 using data from nine studies, 
estimated a small increased risk of autism was associated with pre- natal maternal 
exposure to PM2.5 but it did not assess the post- natal effect of exposure. Overall, 
the evidence, although mixed, suggests there is a link.
My scoping search of the association between air pollution and 
neurodevelopmental outcomes revealed fewer studies about general 
neurodevelopment, perhaps because of the intense research focus on autism. The 
one systematic review I identified summarised links between neurodevelopmental 
outcomes, including cognitive functions, from 31 studies published between 
2006 and 2015, covering associations with air pollution through the entire life 
course.72 The vast majority of studies in the review came from high- income coun-
tries. Several studies included in this review found that pollution exposure in 
utero is associated with increased risk of neurodevelopmental delay; particulate 
exposure in childhood was associated with neurodevelopmental delays in younger 
children and with lower academic achievement and neurocognitive performance 
in older children.72 In older adults, air pollution was associated with accelerated 
cognitive decline. The authors concluded there is not enough evidence to show 
definitive links, because the quality of the studies was patchy.
Possible mechanisms
The effects of poor air quality on health are far reaching but chiefly affect the 
lungs, breathing, the respiratory system and the heart and cardiovascular system.45 
Nevertheless, fine particulate air pollution can cross the blood– brain barrier and, 
in rodents, has been shown to induce structural and physiological damage.73 The 
theorised biological pathways through which particulate air pollution induces 
neurodevelopmental disruption were helpfully summarised by Beate Ritz and 
colleagues.59 Their non- exhaustive list includes gene– environment interaction, 
with elevated PM2.5 exposure leading to de novo mutations,74 epigenetic effects 
such as hypermethylation, leading to changes in oxidation and protein forma-
tion induced in vitro by exposure to PM2.5.75 Perhaps the chief theory is that 
particulate matter may have direct and indirect effects on brain tissue, through 
inflammation and oxidative stress.76 One paper summarises a series of mechan-
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(a category of particles even smaller than PM2.5).73 These exposures induced a 
variety of inflammatory responses, including changes to mouse brain physiology 
and structure.
Several strong concerns have been raised concerning this type of work, 
particularly by the autistic community. First, can rodents really act as models for 
autism? In rodents, ‘autistic’ behaviours are modelled by observing the number 
and frequency of repetitive behaviours, aggression and social interaction. Autism 
is characterised by impairment in social communication, yet rodents have different 
social structures to humans and do not use language and gesture. Second, rodent 
experiments lack ecological validity, because the animals are kept in labora-
tory conditions rather than roaming free. Limited environmental stimulation 
in captive animals, such as in zoos, is known to induce repetitive behaviours.77 
Third, experimental conditions do not accurately replicate human experience; 
for example, in Allen and colleagues’ study,73 weaned mice were reportedly 
exposed to an average 96.4 µg/ m3 of fine particles across the day, about four 
times the European Union legal limit for PM2.5 (25 μg/ m3 in 201978). To give 
this above- daily- average exposure, extreme levels of fumigation must have been 
administered during the four- hour- long daily ‘exposure’ periods. The extremely 
high doses given to the developing mice are very unlike the everyday experience 
of most, if any, human infants.
Finally, the suffering of the animals involved is obscured by the scientific 
language used, which seems to distance us from the unpleasant reality and the 
impact on the animals. Being ‘fumigated’ for four hours at a time means the 
enforced breathing of highly polluted air every day. And after the study period, 
the mice are killed by decapitation. Despite the high pollution being described as 
a ‘challenge’ to the mice, the mice had no say in whether or not they were able 
to accept it.79 Translating the behaviour of rodents and other animals across the 
species boundary to humans seems highly dubious. I personally find experiments 
that force mammals to repeatedly suffer high toxic exposures, then publish the 
unsurprising fact that they suffer brain damage, disturbing.
Could rising air pollution plausibly explain any of the rise in autism?
Unlikely (Table  8.2). PM2.5 levels are dropping in high- income countries. If 
increased proximity to traffic fumes at local levels were partially responsible for 
the rise in autism due to more pregnant women and infants living near main 
roads, then there would also be evidence of increased premature deaths, known 
to be linked to air pollution. Instead, evidence suggests the numbers of pre-
mature deaths due to exposure to PM2.5 have declined during 1990– 2015 in 
Europe,80 as PM2.5 levels and other airborne pollutants have steadily dropped.55– 57
In addition, the effect sizes reported by the systematic reviews are small. The 
latest review estimates a small increase in risk of having a baby diagnosed with 
autism for every 10 μg/ m3 increase in PM2.5 in the ambient pollution.60 Given 











this is a huge increase in pollution for a small increase in autism cases. Even in 
the biggest cities in high- income countries, an increase of 10 μg/ m3 is very sub-
stantial. In London in 2019, for example, average ambient PM2.5 levels were 
approximately 10 μg/ m3 and around 12 μg/ m3 at busier roadsides. If levels of 
pollution did more or less double, so that the average level of PM2.5 increased by 
10 μg/ m3, this would be a horrendous increase in pollution but would result in 
only one more child in every 2,000 receiving an autism diagnosis, according to 
the estimate above.60 In reality, London PM2.5 levels have been going down by 
around 5 μg/ m3 every ten years.78 This is not to say that particulate matter is not 
per se associated with autism; on balance, the evidence suggests it is, but it does 
not seem to be a plausible candidate to explain any of the observed rise in autism 
diagnoses in higher- income countries.
Pre- term birth
A baby is considered pre- term, or premature, if they are born before 37 weeks 
of gestation. Pre- term birth is further sub- divided according to gestational age. 
Extremely pre- term (before 28 weeks), very pre- term (28– 32 weeks) and mod-
erate pre- term or near- term birth (32– 37 completed weeks of gestation) are the 
usual categories. Week by week, a foetus matures and if it doesn’t fully develop 
in the womb, there is an amplified risk of multiple adverse and serious med-
ical problems at birth. The shorter the gestation, the higher the risk of respira-
tory, heart and neurological problems, although this correlation diminishes as 
quality of neonatal care improves.81 Even babies born near to term, at 37 or 
38 weeks, who are not classed as pre- term, have higher risks of poor outcomes 
than those born at 40 weeks.82 Premature birth can be spontaneous but often 
initiated because of medical issues during pregnancy, through a Caesarean or 
induced delivery. A ruptured membrane, and other pregnancy complications, is 
associated with increased risk of infection, which can prompt doctors to recom-
mend early delivery.
Approximately one in ten children is born pre- term in the USA, the vast 
majority late pre- term. Late pre- term new- borns, born before but near the 
37- week threshold, are the fastest- growing subset of neonates, accounting for 
approximately 74% of all pre- term births and about 8% of total births in 2010.83 
Late pre- term birth brings its own risks of neurological issues and heart and 
lung problems.82 Increasingly, in some higher- income countries, a small propor-
tion of babies are born pre- term for non- medical reasons, by elective pre- term 
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Caesarean section, almost always carried out very near to the 37- week threshold. 
US clinicians have reportedly become increasingly comfortable with births in late 
pre- term gestations and many apparently recommend elective delivery or induced 
labour well before 40 weeks of gestation, believing that neonates are as physio-
logically mature as full- term babies.83 Figure 8.4 shows the trend toward more 
medically initiated pre- term births.
Globally, around 10% of living babies are born pre- term.82 In most countries 
in Europe, in the USA and Australia, there was an overall drop in birth rates 
between 1990 and 2020.84– 86 However, the estimated proportion of pre- term 
births increased.82,87 Figure 8.5 shows the increasing trend over time in pre- term 
birth rates for these three regions.
In Europe, the perception that the proportion of pre- term births has uni-
formly increased has been questioned.88 Most European countries have seen 
increasing rates of pre- term birth since the mid- 2000s but in some countries, 
for example Finland and Sweden, pre- term birth rates have dropped.88, 89 Thus, 
continental trends mask considerable local and regional variation. In the USA, 
the increase in late pre- term births has accounted for the birth of approximately 
50,000 more infants since 1990.90 But different districts within the USA have 
distinct patterns, probably related to service delivery and other local cultural 
factors.90 Thresholds for acceptable length of gestation at delivery vary by region. 
In Denmark, for example, a lower threshold of 22 weeks for extremely prema-
ture and viable replaced the 28- week cut- off in the mid- 1990s. Furthermore, 
in some countries babies who die soon after birth may be coded as stillborn, to 
Figure 8.4  The time trend in medically induced / elective births in the USA. Percentage 
change in rates relative to baseline rate in 1987 (index number, data from 











minimise distress, hospital fees and burial costs, so never appear in the pre- term 
records.91
Despite the measurement, reporting, service provision and categorisation 
issues, it is still possible to see a clear overall trend by triangulating the data. 
Several sources, as well as the WHO data, establish an overall trend of more pre- 
term births since 1990.82 Near- term birth has increased most in high- income 
countries and is generally accompanied by much milder difficulties than very pre- 
term birth; in these countries, near- term births account for the vast bulk of the 
rise in pre- term births. The proportion of medically initiated pre- term births is 
growing quickly, at least in the USA, partially due to greater demand for elective 
Caesarean section.92, 93 Other drivers include fertility treatments such as in vitro 
fertilisation (IVF) and other assisted reproductive technologies, which produce 
more twins, triplets and other multiple births, which have a high (40– 60%) chance 
of pre- term birth, compared with 5– 10% for single deliveries.94 Higher maternal 
age at childbirth is also associated with pre- term birth and may have contributed 
to the time trend.88 Other predictors include higher maternal body mass index 
(particularly obesity) and diabetes, both of which are on the increase in many 
higher- income countries.95– 97 Interestingly, pre- term birth is more common for 
boys, with around 55% of all pre- term births occurring in boys.98
A picture emerges in which the majority of the ‘new’ pre- term births in 
higher- income countries use medical technologies such as induction or surgery, 
are medically initiated or elective and are near the boundary of pre- term, nearing 
full gestation. Very approximately, 1% more of all children born in high- income 
countries are now born pre- term than were in 1990 (Figure 8.5).
Evidence of association
Direct complications of pre- term birth are thought to account for one million 
deaths each year;82 pre- term birth is the leading cause of child death globally.82 
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Conditions precipitated by premature birth include respiratory and cardiovas-
cular disorders, and cognitive and neuro- disabilities.99
Most studies of neurodevelopmental, cognitive and behavioural outcomes 
have examined their association with very premature birth in extremely low- 
birth- weight babies. The survival of very pre- term infants has improved mark-
edly over recent decades because of medical advances in neonatal care.99 Human 
viability, currently approximately 23– 24 weeks’ gestation in most higher- income 
countries, is defined as gestational age at which the chance of survival is 50%100 
The length of gestation needed for a baby to be viable has dropped as medical 
technologies and services have improved over time.
Around half of infants born very pre- term in high- income countries survive 
but around half of the survivors have moderate to profound impairment at one 
to two years old.101 The earlier the baby, the greater the risk. Of all children 
with cerebral palsy, around 45% will be pre- term.81 Thus, although technology 
and medical interventions have pushed back the age at which babies are ‘viable’ 
survivors, so the very premature set of survivors is more likely to have cerebral 
palsy and other neurological conditions, although the extent is dependent on the 
quality of and access to local health care services.102
Most studies have concluded there is a strong association for pre- term children 
with a range of other neurodevelopmental, cognitive and behavioural outcomes 
as they grow up. An Australian study of approximately 500 cases and controls, 
comparing outcomes of full- term and very pre- term children, found the latter 
had worse outcomes on a range of behavioural and cognitive measures at school 
age.103 The very pre- term group seem particularly vulnerable to difficulties related 
to inattention and hyperactivity and may have emotional troubles at school age 
that affect academic performance,104 and the risk of ID is high.105 One US study 
of around 4,500 infants born between 22 and 25 weeks’ gestation found 73% had 
either died or had impairment before they were two years old.105 The ethics of 
keeping very pre- term children, of so- called ‘borderline viability’, alive through 
neonatal intervention is therefore debated in medical journals in terms of risk to 
the children, their quality of life, and their families and the cost to wider society.106
However, the vast majority of pre- term births occur near term, and this group 
accounts for most of the increasing pre- term birth rate in higher- income coun-
tries.83 Could this potentially be a driver for more autism cases? In some countries, 
including France, the proportion of late pre- term infants with serious problems 
has decreased as time has passed, probably due to better care.107 Nevertheless, in 
mainstream school settings, children in the late pre- term group still have lower 
scores, on average, than full- term children on a range of measures.108– 110 A sys-
tematic review concluded a range of neurodevelopmental outcomes was ‘better’ 
in children with full- term gestation compared to those born before full term, 
even if the difference in gestation was only a couple of weeks.111 Three of the 
studies in this review found a significant association between ADHD and late 
pre- term birth. Intriguingly, in two, the effect was only seen when delivery was 
medically induced.111
Autism has been repeatedly linked to very pre- term birth and to very low birth 

















Belgium and Saudi Arabia, examined the prevalence of autism in more than 3,000 
pre- term infants (mostly very pre- term) and concluded that there is a higher preva-
lence of autism in pre- term children than in full- term children.112 Autism has also 
been associated with low birth weight, a proxy measure for prematurity, in many 
studies.17, 113– 117 Overall, though there is strong evidence that autism is associated 
with very pre- term birth, for children born nearer to term, who account for the 
bulk of extra pre- term births, there is less evidence, although one review of reviews 
cited Ceasarian section as an established risk factor for autism.125
Possible mechanisms
A common hypothesis of how brain development may be disrupted in pre- term 
children appears to implicate hypoxia, a lack of oxygen reaching the brain, induced 
by immature lung development. The lack of oxygen after birth can lead to brain 
damage, which quickly causes injury to vulnerable neurons and the physiology of 
the new- born brain.118 The brain regions involved in cognitive functioning, the 
hippocampus and cortex, are often damaged by hypoxia at or after birth.119 Early 
umbilical cord clamping, an under- researched risk factor put forward by a mid-
wife in our original study, seems a plausible trigger.14 Unfortunately, data on early 
cord clamping seem hard to obtain.
Could the rise in pre- term births plausibly explain any of the rise  
in autism?
Possibly. The evidence that autism is associated with later pre- term births has 
been hard to find (Table  8.3). The increase in pre- term births since 1990 in 
high- income countries is largely driven by babies born at or near term. The one 
meta- analysis I found specifically on the association between autism and pre- term 
birth had a median gestation of 28 weeks, so the majority of babies included 
were not in the late pre- term or near- term categories.112 Digging deeper into 
the studies in the review reveals a Belgian study that found 40% of infants had 
autism at two years old.120 Closer inspection shows all the pre- term children in 
the Belgian study were born very pre- term, at fewer than 27 weeks’ gestation. 
Another cohort study from Finland found no increased risk of autism with birth 
beyond 32 weeks’ gestation.121 The conclusion of the review, that 900,000 chil-
dren have autism accounted for by recent rises in pre- term births, is probably a 
gross over- estimate, because it is based on the premise that pre- term birth is per 
se a risk factor for autism, without reference to the more serious risk conferred by 
being born very pre- term rather than nearer term.122
Late pre- term births are, however, associated with cognitive delay and worse 
academic outcomes than in full- term children. This suggests there may be milder 
neurodevelopmental complications for this group. As the rise in autism is primarily 
due to an increase in higher- functioning children, there may be an interaction 
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An aside: The headless mother
It is striking that pregnant women rarely appear in the pregnancy risk literature as 
actual people; they more often become the ‘maternal environment’. To maximise 
their chance of having a normal, thriving child, it is the maternal environment’s 
responsibility to take medical advice, regulate its diet and alcohol intake, avoid 
smoking and other potentially dangerous exposures, and endorse and uphold 
medical and community regulation of its body.
The risk literature contributes to the apparent community ownership of preg-
nant bodies. Writing of the uterus as public theatre, Rebecca Kukla discusses how 
the literature on the effect of environmental contaminants, such as PM2.5, during 
pregnancy qualifies pregnant bodies as public spaces.124 Bearing a healthy child 
is ‘for the public good’, whereas pregnant women’s own outcomes are rarely 
considered. The emphasis on women controlling their bodies to protect the 
unborn child means that threats to the woman herself, whether through poverty, 
domestic violence or health risks, are obscured, she argues. The emphasis on the 
unborn child underlines its importance; the importance of the woman is as the 
vessel to carry it. Thus, the dominant discourse of risk in the epidemiological lit-
erature is concerned with risk to the foetal health and it throws its weight behind 
public health interventions designed to change women’s behaviour and protect 
the unborn child.
This discourse of risk props up gendered power relations: the subordination of 
women, the public ownership of the pregnant body, heightened requirements for 
female self- surveillance during pregnancy, female culpability and dehumanising 
images of the pregnant torso cut off at the neck. Women’s adherence, or lack of 
adherence, to obligatory behaviour – what they eat, what they expose themselves 
to – becomes the source of risk, at the expense of more overtly political concerns 
around population- level determinants of foetal health, including economic, social 
and nutritional inequalities.
Other risks
My brief review of three of the lay epidemiologists’ candidate risk factors suggests 
that some may plausibly be implicated in the rise of autism diagnosis. But many 
other candidate social and environmental risk factors, stemming from medical 
technologies, built environments and environmental contaminants, have been 
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studied. A recent review of reviews by Amirhossein Modabbernia and colleagues 
which, by its own admission, uses a design that provided only ‘a wide view of 
the evidence landscape in epidemiology’, is a useful pointer.125 Hitherto under- 
researched risk factors such as early cord clamping and low- level radiation (both 
put forward by two of the lay epidemiologists), that may be salient, are absent in 
the review of reviews due to lack of attention.
Modabbernia’s review concluded there is compelling evidence that greater 
paternal age, birth complications (including hypoxia and Caesarean section) and 
vitamin D deficiency are associated with autism, although one paper linking autism 
and vitamin D was recently retracted.125 The review noted that links between 
environmental lead, mercury and autism were not proven but the evidence 
warranted further investigation (mercury amalgam dental fillings were implicated 
by one lay epidemiologist). Some drugs administered during pregnancy, for 
example the anti- epilepsy drug sodium valproate, are strongly associated with 
autism in offspring. The effects of valproate have been known since the 1970s but 
this information wasn’t made widely available until years later, prompting calls in 
the UK for government apology.
The review found studies of diet were generally low- quality, offering little evi-
dence of links to autism. However, a growing amount of research suggests that 
changes in the gastro- intestinal tract may affect the brain, through the two- way 
communication known as the gut– brain axis; for example, people suffering from 
inflammatory bowel disease are twice as likely to develop dementia.126 The review 
also points to exposure to endocrine- disrupting chemicals, giving the example 
of bromide flame retardants (which increase free testosterone) in tandem with 
increased risk of autism.125 Both gut– brain and hormone- disrupting exposures 
are areas in which further investigation is needed.
These conclusions are similar to those of Craig Newschaffer and colleagues, 
who wrote several major reviews about the environmental aetiology of autism 
during the 1990s and 2000s.127, 128. In particular, Newschaffer’s team identified 
maternal infections during pregnancy as a risk factor. Another recent review finds 
evidence for bacterial infection and flu during pregnancy as elevating the risk of 
autism.129 No doubt Covid- 19 infection during pregnancy will be a future site of 
research into the risk of autism and broader neuro- disability.
Real risks and artefacts
Reviews and meta- analyses have shown that pre- term birth, older parents, infec-
tion during pregnancy and birth complications are associated with higher inci-
dence of autism in offspring.125 Caesarean section, which has led to more pre- term 
births and is itself a facet of medicalisation, has been directly linked to autism.125
Caution must be exercised when interpreting results. In any association 
study, it is not really possible to sort out what causes what. One problem is 
confounding; take the example of air pollution (as the exposure) and its associ-
ation with autism (as the outcome). People who live in more polluted places tend 
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polluted settings but this difference is itself associated with many other lifestyle 
differences: diet, smoking, depression, younger parenthood and obesity, to name 
a few. None of these differences is caused by the pollution and it could be that 
one or more of them is explanatory of difference in rates of autism diagnosis. To 
take the example further, let’s say obesity is linked to a greater likelihood of birth 
complications that increase the chances of hypoxia, thus increasing the chance of 
autism in the offspring. Obesity is a confounder; it is linked both to the exposure 
(air pollution) and, via the risk factor (hypoxia), to autism (the outcome). This 
hypothetical example illustrates how associations that are spurious, or artefacts of 
other associations, are sometimes reported (Figure 8.6).
Epidemiologists try to control for many such factors but it is not always clear 
how effective their designs are. Most study designs don’t control for many unob-
served or unmeasured factors. Confounding means there may be a mediator 
which is a stronger determinant, causing spurious or artefactual associations. That 
is why the mantra of the epidemiologist is ‘correlation is not causality’.
Another problem is ‘collinearity’, which means the predictors of risk are 
correlated. This can inflate the estimation of risk. The three risk factors I have 
examined (older parents, pre- term birth and air pollution), are correlated. Babies 
with older parents are more likely to have low birth weight and be born prema-
turely. Exposure to air pollution in pregnancy is a predictor for low birth weight 
and pre- term birth. It also predicts that the child will be exposed to air pollution 
after birth. All three risk factors have been associated with hypoxia, which itself is 
a well- researched risk factor for autism that could mediate the effects.125
A third issue is that measurements of different categories of risk vary and 
thresholds for defining categories may change over time; as we saw earlier, what 
counts as ‘pre- term’ varies among countries and over time. Missing data is yet 
another issue, especially in longitudinal association studies, such as births of 
stillborn children or those who die soon after birth being poorly recorded or 
missing in some countries, for cultural or pragmatic reasons.91 In Europe, and in 






anglophone countries, the drop- out rate of participants in longitudinal studies 
that link earlier exposures to later outcomes is clearly linked to socio-economic 
disadvantage, which itself maybe linked to the outcome of interest.130
The Covid- 19 crisis has shone a light on the variations in recording and 
reporting health statistics among nations. Levels of missing data are often highest 
in low- income countries, as they have fewer resources to allow them to partici-
pate in research studies and undertake less testing or surveying of their popu-
lation. Covid- 19 has also raised the question of whether the death figures may 
be subject to ‘massaging’ or interference in more authoritative states anxious to 
protect their international reputation.
Layered over these inherent uncertainties are the politics of research and 
funding. Epidemiologists’ attention to a particular risk factor and/ or outcome 
seems to be directed by the zeitgeist.91 For example, research attention to air 
pollution has consistently increasingly been directed at PM2.5, an arbitrary diam-
eter; a bibliometric review of PM2.5 research found research on it grew expo-
nentially between 1997 and 2016.131 But it may be that particle shape, or the 
precise composition of the chemicals that make up the particulate mix, is more 
relevant to health outcomes. PM2.5 increasingly became a focus of research at 
the expense of different substrates within PM2.5, as well as other forms of air 
pollution. This bibliographic study131 is reminiscent of the work of Jennifer Singh 
and colleagues, which demonstrated a huge increase in research funding about 
autism over the same time period.132 Funding for autism research from the US 
National Institutes of Health increased five- fold between 1997 and 2006, from 
$22 million to $108 million, and continues to climb.132
Singh studies how entities such as autism become salient and maintain them-
selves as sites of knowledge production, seeding centres and funding, journals 
and research staff to become important areas of investigation. Knowledge about 
autism and activity around it can loop back into rising referrals and rising diag-
nosis. Conducting the literature review for this chapter, I  recognised clusters 
of research groups in different parts of the world repeatedly publishing on one 
topic: air pollution in California, rodent models in China, and so on. As influ-
ential research groups gain and lose momentum and funding, they determine 
what is studied and therefore in what directions and down which channels our 
knowledge flows. Knowledge seems fluid and flowing, like a stream breaking 
off in different directions from the main channel of a river, shifting course over 
geological time. Some areas will begin to have more research interest than others 
and, as they do, funding will enrich them, like rain does a river. The reality shifts 
depending from which stream of knowledge it originates, and why, perhaps, Ian 
Hacking described the word ‘real’ as one of the great ‘ideological’ words.133 This, 
and the more concrete evaluation of uncertainties inherent in epidemiology, 
suggests that measurement of risk is itself subject to artefactual shifts. This is not 
to say that risks do not exist or should not be quantified, rather that their quanti-
fication is influenced by the circumstances of their measurement.
In the Introduction, I  identified a debate between those who think there 
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Artefactual changes involve shifting boundaries, creating either a bigger category 
or one applied to more types of people. A  ‘real’ effect, I  argued, means that 
there have been increased risk factors that seed the more real neurodevelopmental 
differences diagnosed as autism. Association studies seeking to identify such risk 
factors, using autism as an outcome against which to quantify risk of exposures, 
can themselves be victims of artefactual measurement, category and interpret-
ative errors. Alternatively, new definitions of what counts as autism are equally 
‘real’ and the fact that that there are additional types of people who can qualify 
as having autism is ‘real’ too. In these ways, the boundaries between what is real 
and what is artefact break down on closer inspection.
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9  Factors during infancy, childhood 
and adulthood
Exacerbation
This chapter contemplates the psycho- social and environmental factors that 
exacerbate or provoke the ‘symptoms’ of autism (in other words, the behaviours 
that qualify as autistic). Although these are not plausible as reasons to explain 
the rise in autism diagnosis, the outcome (more autistic behaviours) is the same. 
I tentatively suggest that these factors are best described as exacerbations rather 
than risks, because their effects are more transient. They are also more accur-
ately described as exacerbators or as provoking autistic behaviour, while autism 
is understood as originating in neurological difference, which is fixed at birth. 
Within the constraints of this framework of understanding autism, environmental 
exposures after infancy can only intensify pre- existing autism, rather than insti-
gate it. However, this distinction takes work to police, as studies of psycho- social 
deprivation have shown.
Psycho- social deprivation
An estimated 100,000 Romanian children were living in orphanages at the end 
of 1989, after the fall of the Ceaus ̧escu regime. Many of the children were not 
orphans but their parents could not afford large families, and abortions and 
contraception were banned. Conditions in orphanages were dreadful; the elec-
tricity supply and heating were intermittent and food was in short supply.1 The 
worst circumstances were found in children’s psychiatric hospitals, which lacked 
washing facilities, and where the bodily and sexual abuse of children was report-
edly commonplace.2 Children were often restrained, tied to their beds by their 
own clothes. Sometimes children were left lying in their own urine. Many had 
delayed cognitive development and did not know how to feed themselves.2
Infants continued to enter the orphanages after the fall of Ceauşescu.2 
Throughout the 1990s, thousands of infants in Romanian care settings had 
almost no physical contact with caregivers. Psycho- social deprivation – basically 
little or no stimulation and negligible human contact – was rife. The babies had 
cots, were fed and had their soiled nappies changed. But in many cases, there was 









condition of Romania’s entry to the European Union in 2007 but the BBC jour-
nalist, Chris Rogers, reported in 2009 that conditions in some institutions were 
still very poor.
Michael Rutter and colleagues spent several decades studying the 
‘English Romanian adoptees’, a group of 165 Romanian children who were 
institutionalised as infants but adopted by families in the UK. Rutter wanted to 
determine the effects of early psycho- social deprivation on the Romanian infants, 
using measures such as social difficulties and repetitive behaviours.3 Compared to 
a control group of adopted children born in the UK, his team found a very high 
incidence of these autistic behaviours in the cohort of institutionalised Romanian 
children when they were four to six years old, even after their adoption by fam-
ilies in the UK.4
Another study, again led by Rutter, followed the same children into adoles-
cence but only sampled among those with an intelligence quotient (IQ) of at 
least 50. This study again found a high level of autistic- type behaviours in the 
Romanian- born children (just under 10% of the Romanian adoptees), as opposed 
to none in the UK- born adoptees.3 An additional 6% of the Romanian adoptees 
had milder autistic- like ‘features’. By the age of 11, the severity of the autistic- 
type behaviours had diminished but not completely disappeared; a quarter of 
the Romanian children adopted into the UK no longer had autistic behaviour. 
However, for the rest, many autistic- type behaviours persisted into adolescence.5
This study also compared the Romanian adoptees who had spent less than 
six months in an institution with those who spent more than six months there.5 
The differences between the Romanian group that had been institutionalised 
for less than six months and the UK- born adoptees were negligible on a range 
of neurodevelopmental and cognitive measures. By contrast, the group with 
longer exposure to the institutional setting displayed higher rates of autism- type 
behaviours, including disinhibition, poor social skills, inattention and hyper-
activity, even as young adults.5 This group also had higher rates of cognitive 
impairment, low educational achievement, unemployment and higher use of 
mental health services in adulthood.5 This finding suggests that children’s autistic- 
type and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)- type outcomes might be 
determined by the length and timing of their exposure to severe neglect in infancy.
The Bucharest Early Intervention Project followed a second cohort of 
Romanian institutionally raised children, who were randomly allocated either 
to good- quality family foster care or to continue in institutional care.6 Again, 
high levels of autistic behaviours were observed. Roughly 60% of the children 
demonstrated repetitive movements or sounds at around two years old (although 
such behaviours are common in all infants). These behaviours were eased but not 
erased as they matured; more so for those placed with foster families.7 The lucky 
group placed with family foster carers also had better social communication skills, 
compared to the comparison group who remained in institutions. About 5% of 
the children continued to meet the criteria for autism irrespective of whether they 
moved to foster care.8 Adoptees often continued to exhibit social disinhibition 
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Autism- type behaviours, the authors of both sets of studies surmised, were 
most probably rooted in the children’s early lack of social experience. They argued 
there is a critical window for development in infancy – a time when nurture is 
crucial for normal neurodevelopment.5 During the first two years, babies’ basic 
nurturing and contact needs must be met if behaviours reminiscent of autism and 
ADHD are not to be aggravated. But note the language: ‘reminiscent of’.
Quasi- autism
Rutter and his group argued that the Romanian orphans who were diagnosed with 
autism probably do not have the same condition as others with autism. They called 
it ‘quasi- autism’.3 The ‘quasi’ distinction hung on the account of the adoptees 
having slightly different features from true autism: disinhibited attachment, more 
flexible (albeit unusual) communication styles and improvements in some as they 
matured. A  disproportionate number of adoptees ‘lost’ the diagnosis as they 
got older.
The ‘quasi- ’ designation was given despite the adoptees meeting existing autism 
diagnostic criteria and the enormous heterogeneity of current understandings of 
autism, the diagnosis of which can encompass the disinhibited social behaviour 
and abnormal but flexible communication described as distinctive in the quasi- 
autism group. Moreover, all children with autistic traits have different trajectories 
and some, but not others, mature to sub- clinical levels.9– 12 For all these reasons, 
it takes work to distinguish the quasi- from the true.
The distinction was needed to maintain (and enhance) the integrity of ‘true’ 
autism as it was – and is – understood: a lifelong condition that is normally pre-
sent from birth. The authors made the argument that what they witnessed was 
not actually autism, meaning that deprivation can’t possibly trigger ‘true’ autism. 
The adoptees’ autistic- like traits were expressed due to neglect, not because 
of inborn neurodevelopmental difference. ‘Quasi- autism’ is prominent in this 
seminal article’s title.3 Rutter and his colleagues emphasised that the adoptees’ 
symptoms, especially the 11- year- old children’s difficulties in picking up social 
cues, only resembled autism- as- we- know- it. Moreover, the article’s first line, 
‘despite the evidence that autism constitutes a disorder that is strongly influenced 
by genetic factors’, emphasises the biological aetiology of true autism.3
However, most of the Romanian adoptees did not have autism- type behaviours. 
This suggests that the sub- section of adoptees who developed autistic behaviours 
had a genetic predisposition to do so; that their autistic- type behaviours stemmed 
from a combination of genetics and early institutional deprivation. To distinguish 
the quasi- from the true on the basis of aetiology seems harder work when both 
have a biological basis.
Work on children’s general neurological development has shown that maltreat-
ment alters the trajectories of brain development. Early deprivation and later abuse 
may have effects on amygdala volume.13 Structural and functional neurological 
abnormalities initially attributed to innate conditions may be a more direct con-









understood as adaptive responses to enable endurance in the face of adversity.13 
Childhood maltreatment is the most important preventable cause of psychopath-
ology, accounting for about 45% of the attributable risk for childhood- onset psychi-
atric disorders such as depression, anxiety, substance abuse, eating disorders, suicidal 
symptomatology, psychosis and personality disorder. But this list omits autism.13
The idea that autism always occurs from birth (except in rare cases of regressive 
autism) is extremely useful and does great work for the various tribes, thus ensuring 
it is worth policing. ‘Born this way’ has been proclaimed by autistic awareness 
activists,14 who have compellingly argued that autism is, was and ever will be an 
unchangeable part of themselves.15 Autism is a fundamental difference in ‘wiring’ 
that can’t be reversed, therefore society needs to shift and accommodate. This 
strong and persuasive argument for disability rights renders unpalatable the idea 
that autism might only become apparent due to an infant or child’s environment.16
A second form of reason for invoking the ‘quasi- ’ qualifier is the fear of a return 
to the abysmal refrigerator mother theory described by Bruno Bettelheim in his 
book The Empty Fortress, published in the 1960s.17 The history and emergence of 
this theory, loosely aligned with John Bowlby’s attachment theory, are described 
in great depth in various texts.18– 20 Briefly, mothers were blamed for their children’s 
autism, which was thought to be a consequence of cold and inadequate parenting. 
The idea did untold damage, resulting in blaming, stigmatising and attribution of 
guilt to mothers (a tradition which continues in parenting). To heal the effects of 
this alleged psycho- social derivation, holding therapy involved the carer forcefully 
holding the child until the child ‘surrendered’ and looked into the carer’s eyes, even 
against their will.21 The suggestion of reviving the ‘refrigerator’ is chilling. Rutter 
himself was instrumental in demonstrating the high heritability of autistic traits, 
estimating that heritability was as high as 90%, with little contribution from the 
environment.22, 23 In the 1990s, this led to autism’s healthy re- construction as one 
of the most heritable of all psychiatric conditions, as opposed to primarily being a 
disorder of attachment, whereas the Romanian orphans clearly suffered from lack 
of attachment to nurturing parents.24
Autism- as- innate is a far kinder understanding of autism and one less 
stigmatising of parents. The rise of biological psychiatry and cognitive psych-
ology, which became dominant over psychoanalytic models in the 1990s, saw a 
welcome shift in conceptualisation to a difference in cognitive processing, located 
in neural mechanisms, underpinned by a strong genetic component.25 This neuro-
logical, geneticised framework has become somewhat reified, in part because of 
the work it does in protecting parents who refuse to be blamed, biologically 
minded scientists who seek a pharmacological treatment and self- advocates who 
argue for rights and accommodations.26 Writing about medically unexplained 
symptoms, Monica Greco argues it suits all parties to minimise any possibility of 
a psychological aetiology.27
A similar device to ‘quasi- ’ has been used to position adult- onset ADHD, a 
phenomenon only recently discovered. Researchers have argued that, although 
adults with adult- onset ADHD show behaviours (symptoms) indistinguishable 
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fide disorder that has unfortunately been mistaken for the neurodevelopmental 
disorder of ADHD because of surface similarities and given the wrong name’.29 
Like autism, ADHD is thought of as neurodevelopmental, with a strong genetic 
component and onset in childhood. To defend the existing model of ADHD, 
the adult- onset version cannot be ‘true’. Recall, however, Rutter’s words of 
wisdom:  our definitions of disorder are ever- changing, pragmatic attempts to 
group behavioural traits that cause distress. In his eyes, there is no ‘true’ autism 
or ADHD, only useful models worth defending.
The Romanian cohort studies also raise the question of whether only very 
severe neglect in infancy gives rise to the kind of autistic and ADHD traits seen 
in the Romanian adoptees, or whether milder cases of neglect also prompt per-
haps less- pronounced differences in neurodevelopment. In other words, is it risk 
accumulation (such as neglect suffered in childhood in combination with envir-
onmental and genetic risk factors) or only very specific risk exposure (such as very 
severe neglect lasting more than six months) that shapes neurodevelopmental and 
cognitive outcomes?
In the USA, in common with other high- income countries, maltreatment 
is highest in children aged between new- born and three years old but rates of 
child maltreatment have dropped.30 In the UK, data suggest cases of infant neg-
lect and entry into care have increased since 1990.31 Thankfully, however, the 
mass and very severe institutional deprivation witnessed in Romania has not been 
replicated elsewhere, making infant neglect implausible as any kind of trigger for 
the observed rise in autism diagnoses.
A study of stimming
During childhood, environmental and social stimuli can further exacerbate 
behaviours charcteristic of autism. Autism affects how children interact and com-
municate in the social realm. But autism can also affect a child’s relationship with 
their environment and this can result in modified behaviour, such as repetitive 
movements or an intense desire for sameness. These latter features form part 
of the so- called ‘non- social features’ of the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM- 5) diagnostic criteria for autism. 
Repetitive movements such as hand flapping are known among autistics as 
‘stimming’ (a contraction of self- stimulating).
There is an important distinction in developmental psychology between traits 
and states. A trait is a more enduring characteristic than a state. A state is tran-
sient, often triggering the onset of specific behaviour. The psychologist Richard 
Bentall points out that psychological characteristics vary from being trait- like and 
immutable to being state- like and changeable.32 He further describes the concept 
of a spectrum that extends into the normal and sub- clinical range as the ‘principle 
of continuity’, asserting that:
Abnormal behaviours and experiences are related to normal behaviours by con-







in non- psychiatric populations), severity (less severe forms of behaviour and 
experiences can be identified in non- psychiatric populations) and phenomen-
ology (non- clinical analogues of behaviour can be identified as part of normal 
life).32
As discussed, the imposition of a cut- off between abnormality and normality, diag-
nosis or no diagnosis, is therefore an arbitrary but convenient way of converting 
a dimension into a category, as Robert Goodman and Stephen Scott point out in 
their textbook of child psychiatry.33 Charles Nelson, the co- lead of the Bucharest 
adoptees’ study, noted that the Romanian infants, who lacked external stimula-
tion, often resorted to self- stimulation. Instances of self- stimulation induced by 
the severely neglectful circumstances of the infants held ‘captive’ in the orphanages 
included hand flapping or rocking. Stimming, or in psycho- parlance ‘stereotypic 
behaviour’, is defined as being repetitive, unvarying and with no apparent goal or 
function, and is seen in laboratory, farm and zoo mammals.34 Behaviours observed 
in laboratory monkeys and primates that have been separated from their mothers 
at birth or in the first year of life and brought up in partial or total social isolation 
include rocking, huddling, self- abuse and sucking.35 Animal studies show con-
finement in infancy may have a permanent effect on the infant animal’s ability 
to interact in a flexible and creative way with its environment, analogous with 
the quasi- autistic behaviour observed in the Romanian children. The emphasis 
in animal studies is on the permanence of these behaviours, suggesting that the 
environment of infancy can enduringly affect the way in which the nervous system 
develops.36 In adoptee studies, although some autistic behaviour endured, the 
emphasis was generally put on improvements in foster care.
In psychology, behaviour that represents a restriction of behavioural possibil-
ities is described as ‘perseverative’.36 Perseverative behaviour includes restricted 
interests or insistence on sameness but can also include repeated behaviours, such 
as taking the same route each day or always organising food on a plate in the same 
manner. Both are seen in the non- psychiatric populations that Bentall’s principle 
describes, albeit at lower frequencies and severity it is good to recall, too, that the 
boundaries of what is considered psychiatric and what is non psychiatric changes 
with time and circumstances, and is subject to lobbying.
There is a disparity between how the scientific and broader autism communi-
ties view and describe the so- called stereotypic, repetitive behaviours. Rocking, 
hand flapping and finger flicking are all forms of stimming that appear in the diag-
nostic criteria for autism. Having conducted several interviews in which autistic 
adults spoke about stimming, I was aghast at how stimming seemed to be viewed 
so differently in scientific circles than by those who actually do it. The autistic 
community has reclaimed and actively supports ‘stimming’, originally a deroga-
tory word.37 To help adjust the balance, we conducted a study to examine autistic 
adults’ accounts of how and why they stim and what stimming means to them.38
The autistic experience is so varied that we did not attempt to try and 
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study was to change the conversation from looking at stimming, repetitive and 
restricted behaviours as a ‘behavioural symptom’ to consideration of the diverse 
experience of the stimmers and their reasons for stimming. I approached Liz 
Pellicano, who introduced me to Robyn Steward, an autistic advocate, edu-
cator, researcher and musician, who had already conducted a survey on the 
topic of stimming among the autism community.39 Steward’s online survey 
reported that 50% of autistic people said they enjoyed stimming, yet 72% had 
been told not to do it. Many (58%) stimmed when overstimulated; the most 
commonly cited reasons for stimming were to reduce anxiety (72%) or to calm 
down (69%).
We decided to run a series of workshops to ask adults about their experiences. 
There was a good deal of additional interview data with autistic adults, and fur-
ther interview snippets are quoted here. To include autistic adults with a diverse 
range of needs, we recruited adults with high support needs living in two resi-
dential homes as well as people living in other settings.
Overstimulating environments
Our participants told us that environmental triggers such as artificial lighting, 
crowded and confusing social environments full of activity, exposure to loud 
or unpleasant sounds, strong odours and uncomfortable temperatures or 
substrates made autistic people uncomfortable and anxious and provoked bouts 
of stimming. Distressing social environments included confinement- specific 
stressors such as restricted movement, reduced retreat space, forced proximity 
to others and unfamiliar social groups. For example, one participant described a 
stim- provoking visit to a ‘restaurant [with], lot of sensory information going on’. 
My previous job, pre PhD, having been as a television producer, this description 
reminded me of a film set, with much activity and many lights, cameras and new 
people to negotiate, all in an inescapable work environment.
Stimming could engender a sense of control and restore balance. According 
to one participant stimming was ‘performing an action or vocalisation, often 
rhythmic in some way, to help oneself cope with a stressful situation. So rocking, 
humming, flapping hands kind of thing’. Equally, stimming was used to express 
intense joy and respond to a heightened positive emotional state. Another partici-
pant stated that ‘stimming to me is a natural expression of joy, excitement, anxiety 
and worries but also a strategy that helps my body process my thoughts, feelings 
and energies’. Stimming seems to be a way for people to regulate over- powering 
emotions, be they negative or positive.
The types of exposures reported to trigger stereotypies in animal studies include 
environmental sources of stress such as artificial lighting and exposure to brash or 
aversive noises, extreme temperatures or sensory stimuli or an unvarying envir-
onment.40  We cannot equate autistic adults with captive animals but the animal 
studies underline the point that proximal environmental triggers can and do pre-




do it more because we exist in a world where there’s a poor person– environment 
fit. Society is designed for neurotypical people’, as one participant put it.
Stims can be what diagnostic criteria describe as ‘symptoms’ but they seem 
to have a useful calming function according to the testimony we heard: ‘has the 
calming effect’, ‘to help oneself cope with a stressful situation’, ‘stimming can 
prevent you getting into an anxious state’. But, just as importantly, stimming was 
also likely to be provoked by extreme joy and overwhelming happiness: ‘thinking 
about exciting racing … I was making like funny like movements’. Anyone who 
has seen a toddler waving their hands in glee and excitement can appreciate that 
stims can be expressive of either anxiety or joy. Our study built on Steward’s 
work, and participants’ testimony backed up the idea that stims can be a useful 
way to regulate emotion, an idea that has been put forward before, although 
approached in a new way.41 I devised an initial simple model (Figure 9.1) which 
Steven Kapp developed into a more comprehensive picture  for publication.
A second finding, not yet published, was that allistic people also frequently 
found themselves ‘stimming’: tapping a foot, pulling hair, joggling legs, drumming 
fingers. Although the difference was unclear, they often did not call it ‘stimming’ 
but rather ‘fidgeting’. Stimming seems to be a pursuit that all people take part in, 
to a greater or lesser extent, but perhaps name differently because of the severity 
and frequency, and perhaps phenomenology, as in Bentall’s descriptions of clin-
ical versus non- clinical behaviour. This is a line of enquiry Kapp hopes to follow 
in future analysis of the dataset.
Participants described how their stimming was deemed unacceptable in public, 
and some private, spaces. Some autism interventions have aimed to minimise 
stimming; recent articles have summarised interventions aimed at minimising 
restricted and repetitive behaviours.42 If stimming plays a useful function, and is 
harmless, this seems a ludicrous ambition. ‘How would I calm down [if stimming 
were suppressed]?’ asked one participant. ‘If you’re taking away someone’s ability 
Figure 9.1  An initial model of stimming as regulatory mechanism.
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to cope in a situation, when they’re in that situation I worry they are going to 
have a breakdown’. Another described how for her, stimming had become a way 
to self- regulate her emotions:  ‘I never used to wave my hands that much but 
I’ve started doing it more, it actually helps … which is quite incredible’. Some 
scholars argue that Applied Behaviour Analysis (ABA), a well- used behavioural 
intervention, has sometimes been used to force autistics to comply in ways that 
are actively damaging and do little to bring about acceptance. Indeed, they argue, 
this makes society worse, by reinforcing the stigmatisation of autistic behaviours. 
In response to the suggestion that a reduction in stimming may reduce the 
bullying of the stimmer, it is noted that bullying is aberrant behaviour and that the 
person in need of a behavioural intervention is the bully. It is paradoxical that our 
societal norms and interventions stigmatise by rewarding suppression of autistic 
stims. We argued the site of intervention, if any is required, should be the envir-
onment, not the individual child (Figure 9.1).
The broadening of the spectrum to include cognitively able children means 
many more children with diagnosed autism are now in mainstream schools. 
I  wonder if behaviours teachers called ‘fidgeting’ in former times are now 
classed as autistic ‘symptoms’ of diagnosed pupils. In an earlier study, I listened 
to parents talk of children’s meltdowns and bouts of stimming on arriving 
home, prompted by holding it together at secondary schools in which ‘autistic’ 
behaviours were stigmatising. One participant noted that, although stimming 
was tolerated in younger children, such tolerance decreased with age. Perhaps 
acceptance and understanding of the ameliorating function of stimming is one 
key to neurodiversity awareness in schools.41
To summarise, while behavioural science describes stereotypies in humans 
(and other mammals), autistic people describe stims. While some behavioural 
interventions try to dampen stereotypies, autistic people regard stims as helpful 
and encourage them. The autistic anthology Loud Hands is a response to the 
command, ‘quiet hands’. Keep still, don’t stim.43 If the built and captive envir-
onments trigger anxiety and distress in animals and humans we should work to 
change the environments, not the living creatures.
To return to the main question, could changes to the built and social envir-
onment have elicited more stimming and other autistic behaviours since 1990, 
leading to more identification of autism? Are schools, for example, more crowded 
and difficult to navigate? This seems highly debatable, as autistic behaviours must 
be pervasive across multiple settings, for example both at home and school, to 
qualify for diagnosis.
Traits versus states
My far- from- comprehensive review of risks and exacerbating factors in Part II 
was organised by life stages. One tentative conclusion is that the earlier in the life 
course a risk is encountered, the more trait- like and less state- like the resulting 






of development seem to produce more trait- like results, whereas later influences 
exacerbate or provoke more transient behavioural states (Figure 9.2).
In reality, the frequency, severity and pervasiveness of particular behaviours are 
considered when diagnosing autism, as well as their persistence. But the state/ 
trait divide may be a useful way to conceptualise risk across the life course. On 
the one hand, older parenthood, which can disturb the quality of the gametes 
and the meiotic replication of DNA at conception, seems to be associated with 
more permanent and core autistic traits. Hypoxia at birth can give rise to severe 
and permanent brain damage. On the other hand, the early severe psycho- social 
deprivation experienced by Romanian infants resulted in autistic- type behaviours 
that were often (but not always) ameliorated when they were placed with 
foster families, and encountering unwelcome social environments in adulthood 
triggered transient bouts of stimming states.
Figure 9.2 draws on Urie Bronfenbrenner’s ecological systems theory of child 
development, which centres a child among layers of influence that shape the 
child’s adaptation to their environment.44 In Bronfenbrenner’s model, the macro- 
level environment is the surrounding socio- cultural environment; the meso- level 
the culture of the child’s neighbourhood and community; and the micro- level 
the child’s family and direct caregivers, such as teachers and babysitters. As chil-
dren grow and develop, they reach out from their existing level of understanding 
and experience to increasingly wider spheres. Smaller layers can be added, in 
ever- decreasing circles, through foetal development (the in utero environment) 
to conception (the development of the genome in the cellular environment).
In later work, Bronfenbrenner emphasised bi- directional effects; the individual 
person is both shaped by and shapes their environment.45 Bi- directional effects 
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seem more and more pertinent as life progresses and the child grows more inde-
pendent from the parent. A blastocyst has no conscious control over its uterine 
environment, a child a little control over its, an adult most control of all. Maturing 
means following a path to independence, autonomy and the resilience to bring up 
one’s own offspring. The earlier in the lifespan a threat occurs, the more vulner-
able the person is to those threats.
Threats, considered as risk factors associated with neurodevelopment or neural 
processes, can also operate at each stage; human neural development adapts and 
responds to the environment at every stage of the lifespan. The effects of envir-
onmental risks on neurodevelopment seem to have more impact and last longer if 
they occur in the fragile early stages (moderated by the severity of the risk). This 
temporality of response to environmental risk factors, more trait- like for early 
risks and more state- like for later meso- and macro- level risks, seems to be aligned 
to the age at which the factor is experienced and level of biology in operation 
(Figure 9.2). The environments of earlier stages seem more influential than later 
stages in determining the permanence of autistic traits. Later environments, such 
as school, that are more associated with behavioural states, are better considered 
as exacerbating factors rather than risks.
State/ trait theory fits with the idea of the critical developmental window, 
the closure of which means the opportunity to ameliorate the difficulties of the 
child will be lost. Window thinking can be used as a prompt for early detection, 
diagnosis and intervention, which fits with conventional wisdom on early inter-
vention. But science, as discussed earlier, can be good at telling the stories the 
discipline wants to hear. My states/ traits diagram is best thought of as tentative 
and a potential area for further research, rather than a claim of knowledge.
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In medicine, the value of diagnoses are assessed in terms of their validity, clinical 
utility and reliability.1 A diagnosis is said to be valid if it measures the construct 
it is supposed to and reflects reality; that is, it is a class that ‘carves nature at the 
joints’. It is reliable if the same diagnosis is given repeatedly by different clinicians 
in different settings, a skill that can be trained.2 And it is clinically useful if it 
predicts needs and prospects, is a useful communication tool and can be used to 
prescribe effective treatment in the clinic.
The validity of all diagnoses in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM- 5) has been challenged in ways covered in 
this book, using autism as a case in point. First, the validity of autism has been 
questioned because autism never occurs in isolation but almost always with other 
neurodevelopmental issues. This has led researchers to call for a ‘lumping’ of 
the category into a larger overarching neurodevelopmental framework. Groups 
such as Chris Gillberg’s argue that, to better reflect reality in clinical practice, the 
gamut of neurodevelopmental disorders that present with impairing behaviours 
in childhood, including attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD), developmental co- ordination disorder, intellectual dis-
ability, speech and language impairment, dyslexia, dyspraxia, Tourette syndrome, 
early- onset bipolar disorder, behaviour phenotype syndromes and neurological 
and seizure disorders, should be lumped together as ESSENCE (early symptom-
atic syndromes eliciting neurodevelopmental clinical examinations).3 Gillberg’s 
team points out that, for developmental disorders, co- morbidity is the rule, not 
the exception.3
Second, the validity of autism diagnosis is challenged because autism is not a 
characteristic of an individual person but may become problematic only in rela-
tion to the social context (Chapter 9), because diagnosis converts a continuum 
of traits in the population to a binary (Chapter 4) and because autism is now so 
heterogeneous that there are multiple aetiological pathways that do not hang 
together if nosology is based on underlying pathology (Chapter  3). Because 
of these concerns over validity,4 people have suggested ‘splitting’ by sub- types. In 












cognitive profiles, neural differences, intellectual ability, gender or sensory pro-
cessing differences. There are calls too to split autism research into studies of 
different types of traits.5
A traditional, medical, view of diagnosis is equivalent to a mechanic diag-
nosing why a car engine won’t start. The symptom (the engine won’t start) is 
due to a mechanical fault (the spark plugs are degraded). The mechanic identifies 
the fault (diagnosis) and implements a treatment (replacing the plugs) that solves 
the problem (Figure  10.1). The validity of the diagnostic category is further 
eroded by the presumed neutrality of diagnosis in this model (which nobody 
really subscribes to); a diagnosis is supposed to be purely descriptive but actually, 
it profoundly affects the person who is diagnosed. Annemarie Jutel and Sarah 
Nettleton call for a ‘sociology of diagnosis’, arguing diagnosis is not only a social 
process but can be considered an intervention in itself.6
Clinicians, researchers and social scientists are already acutely aware of how 
our diagnostic categories are flawed; that any class is what we define it to be. 
We are never going to definitively know if some people do or do not have 
autism. When autism is a moving target, judgement is invoked. Regarding the 
rise of autism diagnosis, I would argue the question of validity is irrelevant. The 
more important question than the validity of autism as a diagnostic category is 
whether it is helpful as a diagnostic category. That is, its utility should be the 
focus, not just for clinicians but also for people with autism and their families. 
The consequence of diagnosis, not whether it is valid, is the fundamental point 
to consider.
This recommends a pragmatic approach to clinical diagnosis which Jennie 
Hayes witnessed in her studies, and which was neatly summed up by a clinician 
academic quoted by Roy Richard Grinker: that to secure services one ‘would call 
a child a zebra’ if required.7 Yet if we unpack this quote it is apparent that being 
called a zebra is not the only issue; rather, there is a hidden assumption that ser-
vices are helpful. The deeper complexities of the issue of ‘is it helpful/ useful?’ 
depend on service availability and whether those services are geared towards 
doing something that is desirable in the first place.
This begs another question: desirable for whom? For example, diagnosing a 
child may be incredibly useful to the parent but not so useful to the child. If they 
are assigned behavioural programmes that minimise their stimming (Chapter 9) 
or sent on an unwanted ‘social skills’ programme, as one of our interviewees 








reported, it may not be helpful as hoped:  testimony from the autism commu-
nity suggests stimming has a useful function in emotion regulation, so efforts to 
suppress or ‘treat’ stimming may be misplaced.8 Benefits of health services and 
treatments are contingent on the quality of care available and the pathway taken. 
Calling a child a zebra might yield ‘anti- lion protection services’ that might not 
be practically achievable or indeed helpful for the child or her family.
Utility depends, of course, on who diagnosis is useful for, which in turn depends 
on when the diagnosis is given and under what circumstances. In the next few 
pages I will consider the functions of diagnoses, who they benefit and the caveats 
and costs of diagnosis. Regarding whether the rising use of autism diagnosis is 
helpful, the question of its utility is particularly pertinent to the groups that have 
come under the autism umbrella since 1990: newly identified adults and children 
of typical intellectual ability, at or near the threshold, where the bulk of the rise in 
application of diagnosis has taken place as discussed in Part I.
Institutional functions of diagnosis
Diagnosis is central to the organisation of health as well as social infrastructure 
and is useful to many different groups of professionals, as well as the people 
who receive one, as helpfully summarised by Nik Rose.9 Most obviously, for 
people with health troubles, diagnosis acts as a gatekeeper to medical services and 
treatments but can also be key to accessing other services, educational support 
or skills- training funding. Professionalisation means careers are built around par-
ticular types of expertise of a diagnostic category. For epidemiologists and service 
commissioners, diagnostic categories provide the basis of the prevalence estimates 
that underlie planning for services. Conferring diagnosis is the core business of a 
doctor and is what lends clinicians their medical authority. For researchers, diag-
nosis can serve to highlight areas where research is needed, and research fields and 
academic journals are often clustered around diagnostic categories. For lawyers, 
diagnosis can be a condition for involuntary confinement, mitigate responsibility 
for a crime or confer protected characteristics. For insurance agencies, it is a way 
to decide who is allowed pay- outs. For commercial enterprises, diagnosis enables 
the production and development of disease- specific drugs, interventions and the 
diagnostic tools to identify who needs one.
Diagnosis can also be the banner around which groups mobilise, with charities, 
support groups and activists lobbying for services and research based on a specific 
diagnostic category. It can foster a resistance identity that helps feed back into our 
understanding of the diagnostic category (Chapter 4). For clinicians, diagnosis is 
a way to categorise and communicate and provide access to services, determining 
pathways of care and treatment. Diagnosis delineates a set of symptoms for other 
institutions (such as schools). For epidemiologists, diagnosis may define the out-
come against which risk is defined and assessed.
The list goes on. Society’s institutions are so thoroughly reliant on diagnostic 
categories that it is impossible to imagine how they could function without them.10 







diagnostic categories and processes in particular ways. Another driver of diagnosis 
is the infrastructure, industry and professionalism that can grow up around any 
category. Commercial interests in autism’s expansion cover dietary and behav-
ioural therapies but also include aspects of research, education and medicine. This 
includes the founding of diagnostic assessment services (Chapter 4) and research 
expansion with billions in funding to develop drugs to treat autism, design behav-
ioural interventions and found glossy, state- of- the- art autism research centres.
Many autism interventions are well respected and established but others are 
controversial, such as the Judge Rotenberg Centre which until recently used elec-
tric shocks to deter autistic children from indulging in unwanted behaviours.11 
Even apparently benign diagnostic tools, such as Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule (ADOS), are often commercial enterprises that have a vested 
interest in promoting autism diagnosis, even if not consciously or overtly. Our 
commentators on the ADOS training highlighted how training is expensive and 
how it professionalises its services, selling to an elite of well- heeled clinicians and 
researchers, as well as consistently upselling its products.2 Commercial concerns 
can drive the promotion of diagnostic and self- diagnostic tools,12 and may fuel 
screening programmes that act as catalysts stimulating rising use of diagnosis.13 In 
turn, commercial enterprises loop back to the reification of autism (as a discrete 
object), leaving it open to commercialisation.14
Consequences of diagnosis
I have touched on consequences throughout this book. In this context, per-
haps the most important group to consider is the people who are given a diag-
nosis. A review of qualitative work on the impact and experience of diagnosis for 
people with mental health diagnoses (published in Lancet Psychiatry) shows that, 
for some people, diagnosis of mental health conditions is experienced as invali-
dating, whilst for others it validates.15 Studies reporting on whether diagnosis is 
experienced as positive find it often depends on whether adults actively seek one.
Being well informed about diagnosis makes it meaningful and gives hope.16 
Diagnosis is more likely to be experienced as harmful when people receive scant 
information from clinicians, are not told face to face or are kept waiting.15 Most 
people find mental health diagnosis validating but it sometimes causes confu-
sion, shock and rejection of the diagnosis.15 Unsurprisingly, different diagnosis 
experiences are mediated by the type of diagnosis and how stigmatised any par-
ticular condition is in the local cultural frame; diagnosed people report troubling 
effects of diagnosis, including hostility, exclusion and isolation.15 Some people 
report that they are no longer perceived as an individual person but as a diagnosis 
to be dreaded or avoided. Fear of such stigmatisation led to anxiety about being 
diagnosed.15
These experiences resonate with Bruce Link and Jo Phelan’s dissection of 
stigma via the identification and labelling of differences.17 Their work highlights 
the social process that determines which differences are deemed relevant and 
















degree to which they are socially significant. Hypertension, bone fractures and 
migraine, for example, are relatively benign and socially acceptable, whereas lung 
cancer, obesity and schizophrenia are morally loaded and equated with undesir-
able features. There is huge cultural variation in social and local responses, as 
demonstrated by a study which reported diverse reactions to a schizophrenia 
label in eight countries.18 This socially significant label leads to the detachment of 
‘them’, the stigmatised set, from ‘us’ – a divisive process harnessed and reversed 
by resistance identities for the purpose of challenging dominant forms of power 
(Chapter 419). A diagnostic label is said to be stigmatising if, once a person is 
labelled, or diagnosis is disclosed, the person is adversely judged and devalued 
by the majority. The social response is to isolate, reject and exclude them, which 
again is a form of exercising (dominant) power.
Clearly, diagnosis can be a double- edged sword, both helpful and harmful. 
Which edges are sharpest depends on the context and the diagnosis.
Consequences of autism diagnosis
What then can we say about the consequences of diagnosis of autism?
The answers, again, are threaded through earlier chapters but, to summarise, 
many studies, including one of mine, have shown autism diagnosis functions as a 
key to unlock numerous resources, including interventions, insurance, self- help 
groups, services support and financial benefits.20– 22 These include:
• social resources, such as access to support groups, holiday breaks
• health services, interventions and treatments, such as child and adolescent 
mental health services
• respite care
• access to information (once a condition is identified you can find out much 
more about it)
• financial resources, such as child benefits
• educational resources, often one- to- one support in class by a teaching 
assistant or a place in a special school or individual teaching unit.
In the USA, one study showed rates of diagnosis are higher in areas where there 
is more educational spending and diagnosis was linked to access to a school health 
centre (rates were also correlated to the concentration of paediatricians).23 Before 
1990, children with intellectual impairment may have been classified as having 
mild intellectual disability or developmental delay; today, autism is diagnosed in 
substitution to enable access the additional resources associated with the autism 
label.24
The utility of diagnosis depends on what services, what ways they are useful 
and so on. Parents in our study and others’ reported having a diagnosis for their 
child was useful (to them), due to this gatekeeping function.22, 25 But there were 
also caveats, for example, concerning the deluge of professionals. Some parents 









while others embarked on up to 40 hours of intensive intervention per week 
(Chapter 2).
Clinical recommendations change with time; what is advised as effective 
now may be discredited later. The type of intervention considered suitable is 
contested (for example, Applied Behaviour Analysis), as is what outcome should 
be its aim: whether autistic behaviour needs to be normalised at all or should 
be accepted. Some interventions/ accommodations remain essential, and their 
outcomes germane, such as aids to communication, which are indispensable for 
those who struggle to make their needs known.
That a clinician would ‘call a child a zebra’ if required also calls into question 
what the impact of being called a zebra would have of itself. If a child’s autism 
diagnosis is revealed, other people tend to attribute that child’s behaviour to an 
aspect of their brain difference. This transfers a social frame of understanding 
(such as mother blame) to a biological frame (brain blame). This can be both lib-
erating and limiting. Neurologisation can improve family functioning and lead to 
acceptance and the setting of that less stringent ‘new normal’ in expectations of 
behaviour both at school and at home (Chapter 8).26
‘Courtesy’ stigma is a form of stigma that arises through a connection with 
a stigmatised person. One study comprising 12 parent interviews showed how 
diagnosis is crucial for parents to resist courtesy stigma, that is, the stigma of 
having an autistic child.27 Resistance to courtesy stigma was achieved by disclosing 
diagnosis in schools and other institutional settings and supporting a neurological 






model for children’s behaviour. Inevitably, in this process, the child’s identity may 
be ‘spoiled’, in Erving Goffman’s terms.28 One reading is that in a patriarchy we 
see the ‘sacrifice’ of the child to the label to protect the mother from blame.29
In my interviews with parents, I learned how autism cards (Figure 10.2) are 
often deployed by parents and flashed at other shoppers to explain to others why 
their child is having a meltdown. In the classroom, at home and in society, a card 
proclaiming the diagnosis can transform a child who ‘is’ a problem into a child 
who ‘has’ a problem and this can be tremendously beneficial to relationships.30 In 
other people’s eyes the transference of the account of behaviour from a personal 
(or parental) failing to neurological or biological causes has an exculpating effect, 
which is why autism diagnosis has been called the ‘not guilty verdict’ and a 
diagnosis of forgiveness.31 I have seen first- hand the benefits of attributing my 
mother’s erratic behaviour to a brain- based explanation, engendered by her 
dementia diagnosis. This minimises frustration, engenders sympathy and absolves 
her of responsibility for her conduct, smoothing family and carer relations. The 
same is true for autism,21 although there may be a journey to parental acceptance 
of diagnosis that goes via shock, relief or denial, and acceptance may itself lead on 
to activism and action.22
Of course, power is distributed unevenly. When a card is shown, parents (or 
those with disciplinary authority) have more power to determine the course of 
action than the autistic child. For young children, escaping the power is impos-
sible but as children become more autonomous as adolescents and adults, resist-
ance is possible, and even indispensable, to question both being and having ‘a 
problem’. Alternative discourses to autism- as- disorder, other possibilities, other 
ways of thinking, notably autism- as- identity, have sprung up in resistance.
Responsibility and autism diagnosis
A study we conducted in secondary schools illustrated the shift in attribution of 
personal responsibility that was engendered by disclosure of a diagnosis.30 We set 
up an interactive session with 250 pupils. We provided them with descriptions 
of three boys in a series of vignettes read out to them by our research team, led 
by Rhianna White and Jean Harrington. One of the vignettes described Alex, a 
fictional adolescent who had a strong interest in science fiction and biking. Alex, 
it was revealed, hated untidiness and felt anxious if his stuff was moved. He was 
also pedantic, very funny, picky over food and loved Star Trek and helping friends 
with homework. We designated Alex to have clinical- level autistic behaviours, 
as well as strengths, referring to the DSM criteria to achieve this. Crucially, half 
the pupils who heard the vignettes were told that Alex had a diagnosis of autism, 
while the other half were not informed of it. Using a series of questionnaires, 
we then compared whether disclosing the diagnosis altered the pupils’ attitudes 
towards Alex.
Results showed that disclosure of diagnosis did not alter how close pupils 
wanted to be to Alex, or how they felt about him, but it did lessen his personal 












likely to see Alex’s behaviour as being under his control if the diagnosis was 
disclosed. The disclosure of autism diagnosis meant they were more likely to 
think Alex behaved as he did because of differences in his brain. This effect – 
divested perceived personal responsibility for action – has both positive and nega-
tive consequences.
Because diagnosis promotes the understanding of behaviour in terms of neuro-
logical difference and can sometimes be invoked to excuse transgressive behav-
iour (‘it’s not me, it’s my brain’), this reading may be associated with loss of the 
feeling of being in control of one’s destiny, instigating loss of power that may be 
associated with feelings of helplessness. Diagnosis and disclosure may undermine 
others’ belief in a child’s ability to progress;32 teachers, and others, may operate 
an unconscious expectancy bias because expectations are lowered:  they believe 
that a child is less capable than their peers.33
Such biases have been shown to operate in a series of psychology studies over 
many decades.34 In one of the earliest and most influential of these ‘Pygmalion’ 
studies, researchers posed as educational psychologists and tested a class in school, 
sharing with the teachers that a fifth of their pupils were ‘intellectual bloomers’, 
despite these pupils being selected at random.35 When pupils were re- examined 
a year later the ‘bloomers’ really did perform better in intelligence tests. Once 
an expectation was set, the authors argued, people – in this case, teachers – tend 
to act in ways that are consistent with the expectation. The expectation shapes 
teachers’ behaviour, which influences children’s outcomes, inducing a new reality.
Expectancy bias is closely related to the idea of the ‘autism lens’, discussed 
in Chapter 6, in which behaviours are interpreted in the light of autism. Such 
a lens allows one to reframe others’ and possibly one’s own behaviour in an 
autistic light, perhaps ascribing a lay diagnosis where a medical diagnosis is not 
given or disclosed. Adults diagnosed with autism are documented to interpret 
their past experiences in the diagnostic frame, applying the lens successfully and 
sometimes retrospectively to their own lives.31, 36, 37 This provides an explanation 
for a lifetime’s experiences of difference. Rewriting biography in this way, often 
through identification via diagnosis, is known as biographical disruption;38 ‘put-
ting a name to it’ has been reported by autistic adults as a cathartic, healing and 
helpful way to make sense of one’s history.39 In contrast, some adult participants 
our group interviewed in residential care settings indicated they were totally 
unaware they had an autism diagnosis.
Stigma
Whether stigmatisation is due to the application of the diagnostic label or to 
the autistic behaviours themselves is hard to untangle. Our school- based study 
attempted to examine the effect of labelling while controlling for autistic 
behaviours, as have others,40– 42 using similar vignettes but such research designs 
are limited in the ways they mimic reality, as what participants confess their 
attitudes to be may not marry with their actions. One US study found that telling 












effort interacting with the peer who had the bogus label. But actually having a 
diagnosis, that is, not having been identified but displaying traits,43 reduced the 
level and quality of interaction more than having the bogus label applied. This 
type of work is difficult to generalise, as local settings have a massive influence on 
how the diagnosis is understood and interpreted.
Internationally, understandings of autism vary widely, particularly in 
developing countries. A London conference hosted by Bonnie Evans in 2017 
provided insights from guests who worked with autistic groups from around the 
world. In Ethiopia, delegates reported, autism is bracketed as a mental health 
problem and in some rural settings children are chained, enabling their mothers 
to work in the fields.44 In Tanzania, the category is not applied to adults or 
higher- functioning people.45 In Taiwan, learning to speak later than is typical for 
most infants (which in the West is considered a sign of autism and developmental 
delay) is seen as predicting a brilliant future.46 The Chinese translation of ‘autism’ 
emphasises loneliness. In South Korea an autism label is heavily stigmatising, 
whereas in Australia delegates reported the diagnosis can be a useful mechanism 
to deflect blame from the parents.
The ways both autistic behaviour and autism diagnosis are interpreted and 
operated vary hugely among different cultures. Similarly, the relationship between 
impairment and the social demands put on children varies in different cultural 
milieus. One the one hand, if research harking from higher- income countries is 
uncritically projected on to the rest of the world, there is a danger that cultur-
ally determined social reactions may be incorrectly interpreted as pathological 
(eye contact is a good example). On the other hand, a medical explanation of 
children’s behaviour may either be less harmful than competing models in the 
local setting, such as possession by evil spirits, or can deflect blame. My prediction 
is that the use of autism as a diagnosis will continue to increase globally, largely 
because of the efforts and vested interests of the institutions, tribes and individual 
people that find it overwhelmingly useful and beneficial.
It is safe to say that, since 1990, at least in high- income countries, stigma-
tisation of autism has been reduced (Chapters  4– 7). Autism diagnosis is now 
not only linked to impairment but also to productivity, focus, breakthrough and 
creativity. There are stories about famous artists, political leaders and scientists 
diagnosed with autism (Chapter 6). Advocates with other neurodevelopmental 
conditions are ploughing a similar furrow; for example, there is an emerging 
narrative around on the strengths of ADHD.47– 49 These stories promote diag-
nostic biographies and create a kind of social capital around diagnosis.50 In this 
sense, diagnosis is an asset that can be deployed or weaponised to achieve the 
required or desired ends, which has led to appropriation of diagnostic labels when 
no clinical diagnosis has been made (see Conclusion).51
We made a contribution to the effort to switch focus from deficits in a 
study mapping how adults with autism experienced their condition as advan-
tageous,52 arguing that first- person accounts can locate the benefits of autistic 
people’s abilities in real- life experiences. All but one autistic participant in 












circumstances. Hyper- focus, attention to detail, good memory and creativity 
were most frequently described as beneficial traits. Participants also described 
their skills in social interaction, such as honesty, loyalty and empathy for others 
with autism.
However, the study had a flawed question, in that some participants found 
it impossible to separate what was ‘them’ from what was ‘autism’, in line with 
Sinclair’s pioneering work (Chapter 4). Autistic people described themselves as 
having behavioural or personality traits but did not necessarily identify them as 
‘autistic’. Most traits (for example, hyper- sensitivity), were reported as both bene-
ficial (to experience the world in all its splendour) and impairing (the experi-
encing of sensory overload). Traits could act as both strengths and weaknesses, 
depending on the extent to which participants felt they were in control of their 
behaviour and on the situation. This raised the question of whether interventions 
targeted at removing autistic difficulties might throw the baby out with the bath-
water; some valuable aspects might be lost by trying to treat ‘autism’ per se. A new 
model to look at autism was suggested, along the lines of a neurological ‘shift’ in 
development, with possible positive and negative consequences, rather than the 
purely deficit- focused diagnostic model.
To avoid deficit- based criteria, and for other reasons, various alternatives to 
the DSM and standard classification systems have been developed. These include 
the World Health Organization’s International Classification of Functioning, 
Disability and Health (ICD), which includes a list of environmental factors, as 
functioning occurs in relation to context.53 In the UK, the Power Threat Meaning 
Framework was an attempt by clinical psychologists to provide an alternative clin-
ical description to diagnostic language54 and the US National Institute of Mental 
Health, which is the world’s largest funder of mental health research, developed 
the Research Domain Criteria, which attempt to map dimensions of functioning 
to underlying biological systems.55 Despite these efforts, the clinical diagnostic 
framework outlined in DSM- 5 and ICD- 11 remains the standard set of criteria 
for clinical diagnosis.
A focus on strengths, or a remapping of criteria, not only simply reflects reality 
but also builds the language for people to interpret and construct a reality, or 
an identity, in terms of their diagnosis. The autism story illustrates how a diag-
nosis evolves in part through the telling of it. Narrative reconstruction involves 
resistance to dominant ideologies, in this case the deficit-based medical language. 
to ‘suffer’ from ‘symptoms’ or be ‘at-risk’ in the psychiatric lexicon are value-
laden meaning ‘less than’; if autism is an identity it is analogous to saying one 
‘suffers from’ and ethnicity, ‘symptoms of’ a sexuality or ‘at-risk’ of being female 
(etc.). Nevertheless, the resistance identity of neurodiversity co-opts the language 
of diagnosis and prominent activists advocate for further diagnostic expansion. 
Over time, this contributes to a net shift to de- stigmatise autism and provide 
a less- pathologising language, seeding a gradual change in public perception, 
at least in higher- income countries. Advertising, television, books, music and 
school curricula increasingly cover autism and other mental health conditions, 






Rhetorically, these developments reduce the stigma surrounding mental health 
and neurodevelopmental diagnosis and edge them further into the mainstream.50
The sociologist Svend Brinkmann describes how, since 1990, autism and other 
psychiatric diagnoses have been integrated into the cultural artefacts and lan-
guage of everyday life.56 The modern diagnostic culture, our eagerness for diag-
nosis as the go- to explanatory framing of difference, shows we live in the age of 
diagnosis. This is why diagnosis not only occurs in the clinical context but has 
spun out in the multiple ways in which extra- clinical diagnoses are applied, be it 
to friends, celebrities, fictional characters or pets (Chapter 6). A rise in diagnosis 
itself means a loop of increased awareness, which tends to de- stigmatise the con-
dition and leads to more diagnosis. Our diagnostic era and culture help millions 
but also individualise people’s problems, obscuring the context in which their 
troubles become apparent, coming at the expense of more politically mobilising 
social explanations or more spiritual explanations.56
One last effect of the clinical diagnosis of more types of people as ‘X’ is the 
impact on people who do not have a diagnosis. A consequence is the ‘shrinking 
normal’, outlined in Chapter 7. Inevitably, diagnosis, when acting as an exemption 
for unorthodox behaviour and setting a new expectation of normal (Figure 10.3), 
has repercussions in terms of how non- diagnosed people’s unorthodox behaviour 
is viewed; what non- conformist behaviour is ‘allowed’ unless theres is a diagnosis 
to explain behaviours. Diagnosis counts as a form of exceptionalism for aberrant 
behaviour; an exception is made and judgement is suspended, and a biological 









attribution for behaviour becomes implicit. Unfortunately, in this suspension 
of judgement, more pronounced judgement creeps in for ‘aberrant’ behaviour 
unmitigated by an official diagnostic stamp, i.e. no valid (biological) impairment.
Dilemmas of diagnosis
Eyal and colleagues’ thesis is that the autism category was expanded in reaction 
to de- institutionalisation and the need to classify children according to who bene-
fited from an educational and structured approach to therapy (which they suggest 
benefits all children on the spectrum, both severe and not so severe); in their 
words, all ‘atypical children’.57 This, they argue, was what initially drew a het-
erogeneous population of children together under the autism banner. However, 
their point, that for autism the ‘abstraction of a category’ pulls ‘too thin as to 
become meaningless’, returns us to the question of validity. This seems to contra-
dict their point:  it is exactly because autism can be so meaningful to so many 
different tribes and parties that it is expanding.
A pragmatic approach to diagnosis raises the question of who decides what 
counts as beneficial, rendering the power dynamic between clinicians and patient 
more obvious; the clinicians decide which people will benefit from receiving a 
diagnosis and when. Diagnosis may be of more use to the mother than to the 
child or the father, for example in cultures in which the mothers do the bulk of 
childcare and may be held responsible for children’s perceived failings. Other 
questions arise: for example, if utility is key, should diagnosis be lifelong or kept 
under regular review?
Clearly, autism and other diagnoses perform many valuable roles: improving 
relations, rewriting biographies, unlocking resources and performing numerous 
institutional functions. Many people have attested that they benefit in many 
different ways; many people and many institutions have vested interests in gaining 
something from diagnosis. But the double edge of the sword of diagnosis is 
obvious to tribes of all stripes. Diagnosis is neither good nor bad, like global-
isation. Some aspects are helpful, others less so. The picture is complicated and 
layered. Autism is a good diagnostic example to study this.
Parents in our interviews experienced dilemmas when weighing up whether 
to pursue an autism diagnosis for their child.22 On the one hand, they thought 
extra resources and support would be helpful, yet feared the impact of a lifelong 
label. Clinicians wanted desperately to help but described an internal struggle 
or dilemma.15 Such dilemmas belie the fact that diagnosis is almost universally 
promoted in autism literature and for neurodevelopmental and mental health 
conditions. Researchers, clinicians, autistic adults and the parents of autistic 
children, and the organisations that represent them, have argued for more and 
faster autism diagnosis, as the positives outweigh the negatives (Chapter  2). 
Diagnosis is actively promoted by many of these groups, via policy and personal 
communications to ‘get the diagnosis!’, embellished with narratives around the 
problems of people missing out diagnosis and the rhetorical devices of ‘earlier is 







or not the positives outweigh the negatives depends on the context in which the 
diagnosis is given or disclosed. This is experienced as a tricky balancing act for 
parents, clinicians and autistic adults.
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Why is autism on the rise?
The growth in diagnoses of autism can be considered a classic case of medicalisa-
tion, which Peter Conrad defines as the process through which non- medical or 
social problems become viewed and treated under medical jurisdiction.1 In three 
ways, the boundaries of autism as a category have expanded dramatically since 
the 1990s:
 1. Who counts as having autism has been extended to include new populations.
 2. What counts as being autism has extended to include new types of behaviour.
 3. How much counts for the diagnosis to be autism has decreased; the severity 
and frequency of thresholds for diagnosis have dropped.
The first part of this book focused on the first, and least explored, of the above 
three facets (as applied to autism). Populations that were not routinely diagnosed 






in 1990 include adults, particularly women, children with above- average intellec-
tual ability, and very young children. The expansion of autism diagnosis to these 
populations (described throughout Part I) is illustrated in a rather schematic way, 
in Figure C.1.
As the range of signs or behaviours that count as autism has expanded, the 
severity and the frequency of core symptoms required for diagnosis may have also 
dropped. As noted earlier, a Swedish study found that, as time passed, noticeably 
fewer autism symptoms were required for a clinical diagnosis of autism, at least 
for those diagnosed after the pre- school years, meaning those without very severe 
impairment.2,3. Having said this, our own work on the two cohorts separated by 
ten years, and indicating milder symptoms might have increased in the UK popu-
lation (described in Chapter 7) raised for me a question mark as to whether this 
mechanism was the entire story.
It is not just autism. Across the board, neurodevelopmental conditions have 
seen rising rates of diagnosis, identification, treatment and accommodations. In 
high- income countries, including the USA and UK, rates of diagnosis of attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) have risen dramatically since 1990, 
reflected in rising rates of child and adolescent medication for ADHD.4 The UK 
and other high- income nations have seen a rise in students’ dyslexia diagnoses (at 
the same time as new policies granting students identified with dyslexia 25% extra 
time to complete their exams).5 Rising diagnoses of multiple neurodevelopmental 
conditions could be taken as evidence for growth in the risk factors that underpin 
increasing neurodevelopmental traits across the board. Then again, they may be 
illustrating rises in our diagnostic culture; multiple diagnoses could be on the rise 
via the three pathways above.
The review of risk factors in the second part of the book indicates it is plaus-
ible that a portion of the rise in all atypical neurodevelopment could be induced 
by changes to some social and medical practices, such as older parenthood and 
increased births by Caesarean section, perhaps in combination with increased 
exposure to environmental contaminants.6 This would result in a rise in autism 
diagnosis as well as in other co- occurring conditions. Today, some estimates 
suggest that around half the variance in the outcome of autism could be attributed 
to environmental factors.7
My guess is the rise of autism diagnosis observed after 1990 in high- income 
countries (the trend established in Chapter  1) is chiefly an artefact of new 
understandings of autism and the wider application of diagnosis, dwarfing the 
contribution of ‘real’ increases, but that there may be an interaction between 
these two processes. Post- 1990 drivers include de- stigmatisation, autism 
narratives and looping effects, underpinned by the agendas and work of the latest 
wave of activists, meaning diagnostic discourse has generally become more dom-
inant (Chapter 6). This has strengthened the demand for autism diagnosis. The 
biggest driver, in my view, is likely the shift in culture towards applying medical 
labels to oneself and others and interpreting less severe troubles and differences in 
a diagnostic framework rather than in any other framework, such as the political. 











In contrast with the Swedish study,2,3 our study comparing symptoms to 
diagnosis through time suggested there could be an increase in the propor-
tion of UK children with milder autistic- type traits, along with an observed 
increase in diagnosis (Chapter  7), although there was no parallel jump for 
those with very severe autistic behaviours.8 As the observed rise has occurred 
primarily among ‘higher- functioning’ people, there may be an interaction in 
which increased risk posed by changing social, medical and environmental 
practices has increased the number of people with milder neurodevelopmental 
differences at the same time as they become ‘diagnosable’; that is, as the 
boundaries have shifted.
For example, in high- income countries very approximately 1% more chil-
dren are now born pre- term than were in 1990 (Figure 8.5). A picture emerges 
in which the majority of the ‘new’ pre- term births in higher- income coun-
tries use medical technologies such as induction or surgery, are medically 
initiated or elective and are near term, nearing full gestation. These cases often 
have neurodevelopmental differences but they are not so pronounced as the 
differences (on average) for very pre- term children. If what counts as autism 
has enlarged, people born near term, with milder neurological impairment, may 
count as having autism. If the threshold of severity of traits required for diag-
nosis has indeed dropped, then any risk factor (such as near- pre- term birth) 
that may seed milder impairment may count as an autism risk today, where 
previously it did not.
Increasingly older parenthood is another pathway that may potentially con-
tribute to a greater prevalence of milder neurodevelopmental difference at the 
same time as the autism ‘bucket’ is getting bigger. Such an interaction could 
account for exponential increases in autism diagnosis (Chapter 1). It therefore 
becomes incredibly difficult to truly separate the influence of the ‘real’ from the 
‘artefactual’ in this story, or indeed the social from the biological.
Where is autism located?
Autism diagnosis, despite all our attempts to study it, remains hard to pin down. 
It seems less like an entity, a ‘thing’, and more like a complicated assemblage of 
processes. These occur simultaneously, through time, on many different levels 
and become something different depending on who is viewing. To take a rough 
metaphor, think of a pianist giving a concert in a cathedral (Figure C.2).
Autism is identified by diagnosis. Take a moment to imagine that the diagnosis 
of autism is analogous to whether or not the audience think the music they hear is 
beautiful. The music is an analogy for autistic- type behaviour; to give a diagnosis 
it must be recognised as ‘beautiful’.
The piano is the hardware of the brain and the keyboard the person’s DNA. 
The make of the piano, its wood, glue and strings, the materials they are made of, 
and how, is the stuff of neurones, neurotransmitters, the flesh of the body. The 










The music the player produces depends on what keys are available. Even if the 
keys are the same in two pianos, the music may be different. Its tone is affected 
by what type of piano it is played on, how the piano has been strung, where, what 
wood was available and local piano- building traditions. Even if the same tune is 
played twice, the agency and emotional state of the player, how they are affected 
by the audience (is their partner or parent present?), their hours of practice, will 
alter the performance; the stool may be too uncomfortable for the player to focus 
on the notes. The cathedral may be overwhelming or it may be inspiring.
Some in the audience are the clinicians in assessment services who must decide, 
together, ‘Is this music beautiful?’, others are relatives and yet others are autistic 
self- advocates, representing the various neuro- tribes. The same music may be 
perceived differently by different members of the audience; some may find it 
beautiful, others may not. The novelty of the music may be a factor. Is the tune 
ancient or new, traditional or unorthodox? Some may be swept away by the gran-
diose setting.
Each person in the audience draws on various sources of knowledge about 
what constitutes good music, perhaps influenced by tribal affiliations. And so 
Figure C.2  The cathedral metaphor.
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does the player. When the clinicians must reach a consensus after the concert 
some voices may dominate others. The verdict ‘this music is not beautiful’ may 
surely affect future performances. And for certain, bad reviews travel. Other 
members of the audience, who think the music is hauntingly beautiful, may be 
uncomfortable with the clinical decision. They tell their friends.
Another factor is whether the audience knows the player’s desire. Desire for a 
diagnosis, or desire not to get one, seems to influence clinical decision making.9 
There can be a performative element to autism. That is not to deny many people 
struggle with, and are challenged by, debilitating neurodevelopmental differences. 
Of course they do. My emphasis on medicalisation is not meant to suggest autism 
is not real. I believe that some children develop physical neurological differences 
and that these can be highly impairing. The reality is that even the most able aut-
istic people experience challenges and often struggle to function.
Autism- as- diagnosed, in the cathedral analogy, seems less a simple construct 
and more an assemblage of phenomena. Being autistic is seen as located in the 
piano, discourses of risk entirely locate ‘risk’ as external or genetic, and autism 
as the brain- based outcome to be avoided. But the way autism is delineated and 
officially confirmed through its observation and recognition is impossible to pin 
down in one place. Autism is revealed as a concept in the minds of clinicians and 
carers, as a facet of a person’s brain, predicted by genetics, neurological make- up 
and in their embodied behaviours, which occur in interaction with the environ-
ment and are mediated by their cultural register, as well as being a product of 
the evolving history of its classification. Autism diagnosis is a practice reminis-
cent of what Andrew Pickering calls the ‘mangle’, the entanglement between 
the social, material, semiotic and biological that produces and maintains phe-
nomena.10 Autism- as- diagnosed is an assemblage of biology, society, discourse 
and the environment.
Today, instead of understanding autism as ‘one thing’, expansion has meant 
that, conceptually and in research, people have started to consider multiple 
‘autisms’. The direction the field is taking is to look at sub- groups, by gender, by 
age, with and without co- occurring intellectual disability, in verbal and minimally 
verbal autistic people and in sub- groups by aetiology. There is also a burgeoning 
field of research on autism- as- identity, at least in high- income countries and, as 
the neurodiversity movement diversifies and provokes new waves of thinking, 
beyond autism, this seems set to continue.
Afterword: autism and me
I can’t count the number of people over the last five years who have asked me 
if I am autistic. I certainly think I might have attracted a label of ADHD, had it 
been as salient when I was growing up as it is now. But it wasn’t. I never thought 
I qualified as having autism. Friends, students, several professional colleagues and 
family members, even my sister, have asked me: ‘do you have Asperger’s?’ Is this 
because I work in the field or because of my quirky ways? My partner has often 





I both took the Autism Quotient test; he had a higher autism score than I did. 
Perhaps I should now attribute his need to categorise me as autistic to his own 
autistic traits?
People love diagnosis because they need a reason and seem to hate the uncer-
tainty of not naming a difference. I wonder why people seem to need, or want, to 
attach the label to me. I wonder if they need a reason why I am working on this 
topic, a personal connection. Perhaps in this diagnostic age, all odd or eccentric 
behaviour must be classified; we seem to be less tolerant of deviance without a 
diagnosis, or a name, than we previously were. Lack of a name breeds uncertainty 
and uncertainty breeds anxiety.
I can’t say I have/ have not got autism because I do not know what a multi- 
disciplinary team would make of me. Even if they reached a conclusion, I might 
(like some of our participants) not agree with it. I only know I don’t want a 
diagnosis. The likelihood of me rocking up at an assessment centre any time 
soon is zero. My difficulties, such as they are, are not going to be mitigated by 
receiving a diagnosis. Many adults find a new diagnosis to be helpful, almost 
necessary for them to have an authentic voice in the arena and enable a diag-
nostic frame of understanding. But is not for me. I would rather the potential 
explanations were widened to include the political, spiritual and especially the 
existential explanations covered in Chapter 6, for the loosening of possibilities 
for neurodiversity.
Before about seven years ago, nobody, anywhere, had ever asked me the 
question: ‘are you autistic?’ Twenty years ago, probably no one would have ever 
asked any academic this question. It is not the answer to the question but the 
newly minted frequency of its asking that succinctly illustrates the points raised in 
this book. I have not changed or somehow become more autistic over the years. 
Autism has come towards me. I have not changed but autism itself is changing and 
it may soon encompass people like me. People’s understandings of what comprises 
autism have shifted and people like me, older women, have come to be included 
in, been absorbed by – and many have embraced – the expanding definition.
I think if I  did pursue diagnosis, being near the threshold, if diagnosed 
I would contribute to the ‘shrinking normal’. The march of medicalisation means 
that, as the boundary around the type of person considered to be diagnosable is 
loosened, the boundary around who and what counts as being non- diagnosable 
is tightened. Applying a diagnosis more often and to a wider set of behaviours, 
to explain deviance, means collateral damage to what counts as non- deviant as it 
is reduced in its scope.
In writing this book, I have come to realise that the language of each discipline, 
psychiatric, advocacy, policy, even sociology, in fact all texts has an impact on the 
world in terms of constraining or expanding possibilities for thought and action. 
The research I have done in the past has fitted in to prevailing discourses where 
they are published. For example, we recently worked on an article published in 
the psychiatric literature on barriers to medication for children with ADHD.11 
Interestingly, the findings suggested girls are less likely to receive ADHD medi-




because of  conduct problems of boys (my italics). My point is that our chosen 
language, aligned to its discipline, shaped the possibilities of reading this text. 
 Barriers suggests that medication is appropriate or needed,  symptoms immedi-
ately frames ADHD as a medical disorder and  conduct problems suggests that 
boys have nothing to be angry about or at least that frequent expressions or 
outbursts of anger are pathological. It is hard to escape the disciplinary infrastruc-
ture, yet the example underlines how important it is to have an overview of the 
fl ux and fl ow of knowledge, practices of science and use of narrative and other 
devices in shaping our understandings without losing sight that many people do 
have neurodevelopmental impairment which may have a profound effect on their 
ability to function, and that support is required. 
 Even the act of writing about a category, like this text, reifi es it and pushes 
it as a framework of understanding. Just as diagnosis is performative, so is my 
writing about diagnosis. This book is itself performative. Like diagnosis, my 
words construct an alternative or counter- reality to that enacted by expanding 
diagnosis. I hope it is one which encourages richer possibilities of neuro- being 
and relationships. My hope is that this text, if anybody actually reads it, will work 
towards the expansion of the normal, the standing up for eccentricity, oddness, 
extreme thought and action as challenging, unexplained and sometimes great, 
and providing more options for ways of being without resorting to diagnosis. 
Whilst acknowledging that autism and other neurodevelopmental states entail a 
different way of functioning, and some people can’t communicate, dress, eat and 
so on without assistance, so people do need services and support, and diagnosis 
releases these. A line must be drawn somewhere; the questions are where, why, 
and in whose interests the direction of the line is shifting. 
 In a sense, our research has conducted a social diagnosis of neurological diag-
nosis and, as with all diagnostic processes, one of the outcomes is the shifting not 
only of the ‘entity’ being diagnosed but of the world in which ‘it’ is embedded. 12 
As diagnosis is used more often to explain behaviours that were previously 
thought to be part of normal social behaviour, the price is a restricted defi nition 
of what counts as acceptable behaviour without diagnosis. I would rather see the 
normal expanded and new- wave neurodiversity include all people who regard 
themselves as in some way neurologically ‘different’, whether diagnosed or not. 
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